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ABSTRACT 
Till Frederik Paasche 
The governance of security in the revanchist city- The case of Cape Town, South 
Africa  
Much has been written on the revanchist city (for example Smith, 1996; MacLeod, 
2002; Belina and Helms, 2003) and the reclaiming of space from so-called 
‗undesirables‘ through the means of the police. Here, the guiding ideas are policing 
strategies such as the ‗broken windows syndrome‘ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and 
‗zero tolerance policing‘ (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994; Beckett and Herbert, 2008; 
Herbert and Beckett, 2010). However, the role of private security companies in the 
reclaiming of public space remains under-researched. Using a case study in Cape 
Town this research gap will be addressed in this study. 
Conceptualising the thesis through governance and territoriality, it will examine how 
revanchist ideas of reclaiming space from urban poor and street people lead to 
exclusionary processes in the quest for sanitised spaces. By taking private security 
companies out of the environment of mass private property in which they are most 
commonly studied (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; 
Wakefield, 2003), this thesis examines their role and impact on public spaces within 
the revanchist environment of Cape Town, South Africa. Here, fast and extensive 
developments in governance as well as in urban life, interwoven with exceptionally 
high crime rates, have created a flourishing market for private security companies.  
In this context this thesis examines the case of private policing companies operating 
in the core public spaces of the city; the research reveals their social ordering 
function and powers are the same as those usually associated with the public police. 
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Drawing on these insights it is claimed that private policing companies manifest an 
evolution from private security companies towards the police, and that this continues 
the pluralisation of the policing landscape. By mapping the privately policed spaces 
within the case studies and analysing the functions the different governance actors 
carry out, this thesis also argues that social development actors become part of the 
policing landscape. Analysing the governance landscape and its close ties to private 
policing, it is argued that social development is becoming the softer side of policing. 
Combining effective private policing companies with social development in support 
of the state reveals that private governance actors are indeed powerful players in 
public spaces. Drawing on this governance of security and its associated power, the 
final argument will be that a different kind of public space is being developed. After 
consideration of the particular history of defunct public spaces in South Africa, it is 
claimed that no single public space exists anymore, but that we now face different 
public spaces, characterised through their different norms and rules, and the social 
groups that use them.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Few things determine urban life as strongly as security. If a space is not secure, or is 
perceived as insecure, we do not use it. If a city‘s public space is insecure, whole 
new secure spaces are created and social life is re-configured around them. If, as a 
consequence, this means that public urban space declines, it might be reclaimed by 
applying a policing strategy that re-composes the social structure of urban public 
space. Although security, or the implementation of security over space, has a 
considerable impact on urban life, research on these issues is surprisingly limited. 
This is especially the case with private policing companies that, as this thesis will 
show, play an increasing role in various fields of policing urban life and in ensuring 
notions of social order and control.  
Although forms of private security can be found in most places around the globe, this 
thesis will focus on what has been labelled the ‗Revanchist City‘, in which space is 
being reclaimed for the elites from those seen as ‗undesirables‘ (Smith, 1996). Of 
particular interest for this study is the pluralisation of governance, especially in 
relation to security. By examining governance structures, recent developments in the 
governance of security will be conceptualised, visualised and interpreted.   
The research bridges urban geography, policing and security. However, a large 
section of the literature and the concepts that are the key to this study have been 
created by criminologists. The originality of this thesis is its examination of new 
developments in urban security through a geographical lens. While criminologists 
carry out valuable studies on security and policing, they sometimes lack a spatial 
perspective. By applying a geographical perspective, valuable nuances can be added 
to these ideas. 
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The literature that informs this thesis, and to which it will contribute, includes 
Smith‘s (1996) consideration on the revanchist city, Herbert‘s (1996a, 1997) work on 
policing, and Mitchell‘s (1997, 2009) analysis of public space and the annihilation of 
people and space by law. Furthermore, this thesis draws on criminological work by 
Rigakos (2002) on the ‗new parapolice‘, Shearing and Woods‘s (2003) and Johnston 
and Shearing‘s (2003) ideas on nodal governance, and Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) 
‗visions of social control‘.  
 
1.1 Site of study – Cape Town 
The case study for this thesis is Cape Town, South Africa. To explain this choice of 
case study site, I must begin with a personal experience that not only captures my 
fascination for South Africa, but also explains its academic relevance, particularly in 
terms of urban security and policing. In late 2002, I visited southern Africa for the 
first time. Still suffering from a tropical disease I caught in Mozambique, myself and 
a friend arrived at Johannesburg‘s (not Cape Town) central bus terminal after several 
days of travelling. Being a bit naïve at that time, we had not arranged 
accommodation and it was already getting dark so we called a few backpacker 
hostels to check availability.  
As we described our situation, the woman on the other end of the line sounded 
slightly worried and told us not to leave the new secure terminal, as the surrounding 
area would be too dangerous for two white men with big backpacks in the dark. To 
make her point she explained that just a few days earlier a man had been killed in 
that neighbourhood for just 10 Rand (about £1). Scared and exhausted, we waited 
next to an international fast food restaurant that gave us a strange feeling of 
familiarity and security. About half an hour later our landlady for the night arrived 
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and guided us to her car where she told us to lock all the doors and windows and told 
us about the ‗suicide tower‘, the gangs, and the changes in the city‘s face in the last 
few years as we drove through the downtown area, past run-down buildings and 
burning oil drums we had previously only seen in hip-hop videos.  
When we made it to the backpackers‘ neighbourhood, we had to pass a black security 
guard and then drive alongside a high fence for a couple of hundred metres. At the 
time we were quite surprised, as this was obviously not an upper-class 
neighbourhood and, from the appearance buildings and the cost of accommodation 
for backpacker, not even a middle-class one; nonetheless, the security measures we 
encountered were like nothing I had ever witnessed anywhere else.  
This example shows the distinctiveness of the space in terms of its new forms urban 
segregation and the importance of private security within this segregated urban order. 
Therefore, when thinking about a possible case study for the project, South Africa 
came into my mind as it is still (and possibly will stay) one of the best places to go to 
study private urban policing. The two main factors that enable rich data sets are the 
extremely high crime rate and an underfinanced, understaffed public police service, 
incapable of controlling the crime. The combinations of these factors have created an 
ever-changing private security landscape that is far more developed than, for 
example, in Europe.  
Having decided on the country, the next question concerned the city. Here the choice 
was between Cape Town and Johannesburg, as both places are synonymous with 
high, out-of-control crime and were therefore appealing for such study. The reason 
for deciding on Cape Town was that the kind of crime is different to Johannesburg, 
being less violent and dangerous, which makes research more feasible when it comes 
to issues of personal safety. Furthermore, the geography of the inner city is laid out 
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in a way that facilitates research. The Table Mountain and the sea have naturally 
created an area known as the City Bowl, which hosts the central business district 
CBD; most tourist attractions, including the historical city centre; and middle-class 
residential areas, all of which are accessible by foot. Furthermore the City Bowl 
borders both poorer and richer areas, with the majority-coloured suburb of 
Woodstock in the east and the white affluent suburbs of Sea Point and Fresnaye in 
the West. In other words, one finds a variety of different spaces in a small 
geographical space enclosed by mountains and the sea. For a similar sample of urban 
space it would be necessary to travel much more extensively in Johannesburg. All of 
this, combined with a personal affinity for the city, made a convincing case for it to 
be the case study.          
However, the criteria for the case study did not only include the local conditions 
ensuring a rich dataset, but also criteria that made a case study relevant beyond its 
immediate boundaries. The idea was to take an extreme case in terms of security 
measures that is also embedded in much wider policies, and to learn from the 
researched example. As mentioned above, the policies relevant in this context are 
global, constantly-reproduced urban renewal programmes, critically summed up 
under the term ‗urban revanchism‘ (e.g. Smith, 1996). On this, the mobile urbanism 
literature (e.g. McCann and Ward, 2011) argues that while the general ideas of 
programmes such as Improvement Districts are global, it is its the local changes and 
modifications which make in-depth studies interesting as we can learn from them. In 
this respect Cape Town achieves all the criteria. Besides the lack of policing and high 
crime that facilitates the growth in private security in Cape Town, as in other South 
African cities, the city hosts affluent individuals and communities that push urban 
renewal and global inter-city competition, which resulted, for example, in the 
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successful bid to host the 2010 football world cup. This combination creates an 
environment where urban developments are of relevance for researchers interested in 
rejuvenated urban spaces in different cities who are curious to see what is possible, 
where a trend goes, and what might occur in the future.  
However, besides aspects of generalisabilty the research also appreciates the 
individuality of the case study and its specific history and geography. Departing from 
the case of Cape Town, a more wider discussion on the nature of (public) space can 
be pursued which is of relevance, not only for South African cities, but also for post-
colonial cities characterised by past segregation and contemporary inequalities more 
generally. To conclude, combining the domestic conditions, such as the high crime 
rate and an understaffed public police; practicalities linked specifically to Cape 
Town, such as the geography of the city and accessibility from Europe; and the 
participation of parts of the city in the development of international policies, make it 
a case study that is well suited to the anticipated project.        
 
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis adds to discussions about urban geography and security. It contributes to 
theoretical debates on the nature and evolution of policing networks, as well 
discussions on the growing power and importance that private policing actors have 
over space and people. This will be achieved by answering four research questions, 
which emerge from the literature review chapters in the first part of the thesis.  
The first research question considers spatial variations in the forms and practices of 
private policing and private security companies in public space. Chapter 3 argues that 
although private security companies have been studied in private space, there has 
been little research on their role in public space. This chapter also suggests that 
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private security companies in public space take on different forms and functions than 
those in private space. Chapter 4 starts to reconceptualise private security companies 
by adding the dimension of space to the discussion. It concludes that the private 
security industry evolved in form and practices once it started operating in public 
space. This chapter also acknowledges the limitations of this approach and 
emphasises its need for grounded empirical measurements to support the argument. 
The first research question therefore examines spatial variations in the forms and 
practices of private policing and private security companies in public space. 
The second research question examines the impact of private policing on urban 
territories. The literature review considers how the pluralisation of governance and 
policing strategies are linked. As private governance actors cannot directly utilise the 
public police, they need their own force on the ground to implement their aims and 
objectives. This is where the private police come into play.  
The third research question will examine the significance private policing networks 
have on social geographies and how the privatised revanchist city affects the lives of 
the ‗others‘. Here the question draws on the idea of the extended policing family, as 
outlined in Chapter 2. In doing so, it not only examines the visible private policing 
agents, but also the role of more subtle forms of policing.  
Taken together, the aim of these three research questions is to make a broader 
contribution to the conceptualisation of public urban space, its governance and social 
geographies. This forms a fourth, overarching research question.  
To summarise, the four research questions of this thesis are: 
1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing 
and private security companies in public space? 
2. What is the impact of private policing on urban territory? 
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3. What is the significance of private policing networks on social geographies?  
4. What are the consequences of private policing for Cape Town’s public space 
and society? 
 
1.3 Chapter overview  
This thesis comprises ten chapters. After the introduction, the following three 
chapters set out to frame the thesis and to address conceptual issues. In addition, they 
specify the research questions formulated in light of a review of the relevant 
literature. Furthermore, the space in which the research takes place will be 
introduced and the key historical and social issues addressed. After the 
methodological considerations, the specific case study and the research results will 
be presented in four chapters, which are subsequently put into the context of much 
wider discussions on the nature of public space in the conclusion.   
Drawing on the concept of the revanchist city (Smith, 1996), Chapter 2 introduces 
urban renewal practices and policing strategies, such as the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and ‗zero tolerance‘ (Giuliani and Bratton, 
1994), and their consequences for space and society (Beckett and Herbert, 2008; 
Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Young, 1999; Sibley, 2003). By referring to Rose 
(1996a) and Shearing and Wood (2003), it is further argued that different ‗quasi-
autonomous governance communities‘ or ‗governmental nodes‘ are implementing 
their power through having their own security or police forces on their territory. It is 
essential for a governance actor to take this step from a theoretical idea to actual 
power within the city‘s space. Therefore, the consequence of a growing governance 
landscape (or the pluralisation of governance) is the pluralisation of security in the 
contemporary city. In short, governance actors either create their own security or 
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purchase the services of a commercial security provider, such as a private security 
company.  
Chapter 3 narrows the scale by focusing on the particular spaces in which private 
security companies operate. In order to introduce the private security industry in the 
context of a geographical study, three main spaces, and with them the three main 
discourses of criminology, geography and urban planning, have been identified and 
are introduced. The criteria for the structure are the openness of spaces and their 
ownership. The categories in this section comprise of closed private spaces, 
addressing the issue of gated communities; open private spaces, dealing with the 
phenomenon of ‗mass private property‘; and private security companies in public 
spaces. 
Chapter 4 attempts to conceptualise the term ‗private policing companies‘ in order to 
create a basis for this research on security companies in public spaces. The point of 
departure is the claim that while a general pluralisation of policing has been 
acknowledged, pluralisation within the private security companies has largely 
escaped the radar of academics. By adding a geographical perspective and a more 
rigorous analysis of space in the, mainly criminological, literature, it is claimed that 
as well as private security companies, private policing companies have also entered 
the scene in policing and that this should be acknowledged to produce a more 
nuanced picture of the security landscape.  
Chapter 5 discusses and reflects on the fieldwork and methodology used during two 
fieldwork trips in 2009 and 2010. Besides a structured list of the research questions 
and considerations on positionality, the chapter has sections on each of the three 
methods used. Altogether, 49 semi-structured interviews were carried out. The 
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interviews were complemented by ethnographical observations as well as the 
aforementioned mapping of privately policed public spaces.  
Chapter 6 introduces the case study of Cape Town, South Africa. To understand the 
research, it is important to be aware of the changes in urban geography and policing 
that have occurred in South Africa over the last three decades. Furthermore, the 
chapter places the research question that emerged during the three review chapters in 
the case study site where they will be addressed.    
In Chapter 7, the presentation of the empirical findings begins. Over the course of the 
chapter, different security schemes identified as being used by private policing 
companies and their governing bodies are introduced. Using maps of the case study 
area, the security landscape (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 
2003) is visualised and key information on the policing actors is provided. Here, the 
combination of maps and the daily policing tasks these actors carry out, as well as 
considerations regarding legality, show the importance that the governance of 
security has for the case study sites. By integrating territoriality into the 
consideration of issues concerning the exclusion of undesirables and, to a certain 
extent, the replacing of the public police, Chapter 8 builds on the previous chapter 
and deepens the scrutiny of private policing companies.                    
Chapter 9 focuses on the theme of making space through governance of security. The 
central argument of the chapter is that governing agencies have various tools 
available to them to produce a public space in their own favour. Besides the use of 
private policing companies, which have limits in terms of their efforts, this chapter 
also presents evidence that the social development sector also forms part of a 
revanchist policing project. Although it is not claimed that social development 
should be considered a new category in the policing network, it certainly contributes 
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to the production of spaces. In addition to private policing companies and parts of the 
social development sector, this chapter argues that the state actively supports this 
kind of politics. By considering the arguments on the ‗annihilation of people by law‘ 
(Mitchell, 1997) and ‗lifestyle crimes‘ (Belina and Helms, 2003), it is argued that the 
community court in charge of the case study site enables governance agencies to 
police more effectively, sanctioned by the law.        
The conclusion (Chapter 10) will then address the question of how the governance of 
security spaces affects urban space and what the impact of security measures are for 
space and society. Engaging with past research on some of the case study sites, the 
idea of different public spaces is introduced, referring to the history of dysfunctional 
public space(s) in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER II: (PRIVATE) POLICING THE REVANCHIST CITY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the context of the thesis. Framed by considerations around the 
revanchist city, it will explore how new governance networks become involved in the 
politics of making and shaping space in order to create investment-friendly 
consumer-oriented territories. Having a variety of new governance actors changes 
ideas of community and citizenship towards a stronger responsibilisation of 
individual governance actors. Because the community is increasingly responsible for 
its own security, the number of different forms of non-state security agencies 
increases, simultaneously meeting demand and creating a pluralisation of policing. 
Here, policing strategies such as the ‗broken windows syndrome‘ and ‗zero tolerance 
policing‘ are being applied, which do indeed help maintain the mentioned spaces. 
However, by drawing on a substantial body of literature, it is argued that these 
strategies are, in fact, at the cost of the more socially disadvantaged minorities and 
subcultures that conflict with the governing communities‘ norms and values of space. 
This results in urban exclusion and repressive policing measures against those 
groups, which are denied access to particular inner city spaces.  
The chapter examines new forms of urban governance and how new governance 
actors are pursuing the ideas of urban revanchism. The chapter also introduces the 
policing strategies that characterise revanchism. However, the question of how 
private governance bodies in public space implement these ideals using private 
security agencies remains open. How do private policing companies contribute to the 
pluralisation of policing and the emergence of the ‗extended policing family‘? 
(Crawford and Lister, 2004) What in turn are the consequences of these new policing 
networks on urban public space? 
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2.2 The revanchist city 
Within the substantial literature on the neoliberal city, the idea of revanchism 
describes a particular movement of repressive and exclusionary politics and 
practices. While the neoliberal city describes the more general policy of capital 
accumulation and changes in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 
1996; Hubbard and Hall, 1998), the idea of the revanchist city attempts to explain 
how these ideas are being implemented on a street level through policing. In general 
terms, the neoliberal city describes a shift of urban governance to the ideas of the 
free market, meaning a ‗commodification of the city‘ (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 161) 
and its ‗business-like‘ governance (Hubbard and Hall, 1998: 2). In doing so, 
individual cities attempt to compete against each other, hoping to lure mobile capital 
to accumulate it within their boundaries and become a ‗world city‘ (Harvey, 1989). 
Within this rather general idea of the neoliberal city is the theme of re-generating 
(usually inner) urban spaces in order to promote business. This upgrading or re-
generating of space is usually done by means of policing agents, which establish or 
spatially implement order according to the needs of their governing body. This 
process is referred to as the revanchist city, as famously explained by Smith (1996). 
The literature on the revanchist city is closely linked to works on gentrification 
(Zukin, 1993; Smith, 1996; Slater, 2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008). Before starting, 
the two concepts will be delimited from each other. To Smith (1996: 75), 
gentrification is ‗the product of local housing markets‘ and therefore concerned with 
issues such as increasing rents and the often aggressive upliftment strategies of 
whole quarters, which can make the place too expensive for the original population. 
Although this can result in substantial exclusionary processes (Zukin, 1993; Slater, 
2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008), it is ultimately linked to property prices and rent 
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levels. The revanchist city however is concerned with wider policing practices, 
which may be connected with a gentrification process and may happen at the same 
time in the same place at a street level. However, while gentrification refers to a 
more indirect exclusion of the financially weaker, the revanchist city is concerned 
with implementing policing measures against groups and individuals that do not 
mirror the investment-friendly, upliftment ideas of space the various governing 
bodies have (Smith, 1998, 2001; MacLeod, 2002; Belina and Helms, 2003).  
The clearest distinction between gentrification and revanchism is provided by Smith 
(1996) himself. Rather than seeing both applied at the same time he argues that the 
revanchist city follows a process of desegregation. Financial crises that affect the 
housing and real-estate market quarters can lead to desegregation and deprivation as 
the capital the segregated quarter needs to maintain its standard is not available. As a 
result the area becomes increasingly deprived. According to Smith (1996) a phase of 
desegregation (the flight of people from deprived neighbourhoods) follows an 
attempt to counter the development or reclaim the space again (describing the 
revanchist city). Although some of the literature does not divide so rigorously 
between gentrification and revanchism (Slater, 2004; Visser and Kotze, 2008), 
possibly because the term did not exist in this context when it was published (Zukin, 
1993), this thesis will make this division; firstly to clearly place itself within the 
literature, and secondly to emphasise the focus on policing measures and not on the 
debates around changes in the housing market.  
The term revanchism itself derives from the French word revanche, meaning 
‗revenge‘ (Smith, 1996) and refers to ‗a policy of seeking to retaliate, especially to 
recover lost territory‘ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2011). Smith‘s (1996) central argument, 
which has been confirmed and developed further by others (see for example Johnsen 
14 
 
and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Slater, 2004; DeVerteuil, 2006) is based on his research in 
New York and the policy applied by the former mayor Giuliani. He claims that the 
city‘s public space has been ―stolen‖ from the white middle class by the urban poor, 
minorities, the unemployed, homeless, homosexuals, immigrants (Smith, 1996), 
squatters, panhandlers, prostitutes, squeegee cleaners, graffiti artists, unruly youth, 
‗reckless bicyclists‘, and anyone demonstrating in public spaces (Smith, 1998). It is 
up to the white middle class to ‗retake this urban frontier‘ and to ‗reclaim‘ this inner 
city space from these groups and so to contribute to its uplifting and capital 
accumulation. This reclaiming of public space is to be done by policing so-called 
‗quality of life offences‘ and a pre-emptive policing strategy, which will be 
introduced later in this chapter. Without foreclosing a more detailed discussion on 
policing, the following quote by Giuliani from 1994 hints at the philosophy upon 
which the revanchist city is based, namely a very authoritarian one: 
What we don't see is that freedom is not a concept in which people can do 
anything they want (...) Freedom is about authority (...) Freedom is about the 
willingness of every single human being to cede to lawful authority a great 
deal of discretion about what you do (Giuliani in the New York Times 1994 in 
Smith, 1998: 4).        
However, Johnsen and Fitzpatrick (2010) argue that the reality is often more 
complex than ‗just‘ revanchism and that we therefore need a ‗much more nuanced, 
empirically grounded, approach‘ (Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2010: 1718) to understand 
urban life and its policing. Furthermore, the concept is now well established and has 
been transferred successfully to other spaces and cities in order to make sense of 
urban changes and exclusion. MacLeod (2002) used the example of Glasgow to show 
that, although it is on a smaller scale than New York, so-called undesirables or others 
are being targeted for being a nuisance in the growth-orientated city. However, social 
exclusion and ‗institutional displacements‘ are advancing and sharpen the social 
divide in the city (MacLeod, 2002: 602). On the example of beggars and drinkers in 
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England, Johnsen and Fitzpatrick (2010) confirm a revanchist notion, but claim that 
when doing research on the ground the reality is more complex and coercive care can 
take place under certain circumstances. Focusing on Glasgow, UK and Essen, 
Germany, Belina and Helms (2003) also confirm the practices of the revanchist city, 
such as reclaiming space from undesirables, reproduced in both cities.   
Tomic et al. (2006) and Swanson (2007) transferred the concept to countries of the 
global south. Tomic et al. (2006) argue that in Chile, modernity is being associated 
with cleanliness, while dirt is being associated with backwardness. To be part of a 
global city network, therefore, urban space has to be clean, which is commonly 
linked to the absence or exclusion of the present population, which is perceived as 
being dirty and seen as part of the backwardness. This backwardness is being tackled 
through ideas of urban revanchism. In the case of Ecuador, Swanson (2007) sees the 
Western concept being reproduced and visions of clean, sanitised urban space being 
applied. ‗Inspired by zero tolerance policies from the North, the cities of Quito and 
Guayaquil have recently initiated urban regeneration projects to cleanse the streets of 
informal workers, beggars, and street children‘ (Swanson, 2007: 708). 
 
2.3 Governance networks of the revanchist city 
The reclaiming of public space, as described above, is often done by local authorities 
and a network of different actors besides the state, represented by the city and its 
mayor. This thesis will therefore be conceptualised through ideas on governance, as 
there are various institutions that authorise policing measures on the ground. It will 
start with a brief analysis of Foucault‘s thoughts on governmentality before showing 
how his ideas have been applied and developed in contemporary theories and studies.       
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Besides other characteristics, Foucault (1991 [1978]: 102) defines governmentality 
as  
[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatus of security.  
According to Jessop (2007), who interprets Foucault, the state is only one form of 
governance, which means that there is space for other actors to participate in the 
governance landscape, meaning to exercise power over populations. In other words, 
governance can be carried out by various different actors or bodies. 
The target of contemporary governmentality is the population. In fact, the population 
is the ‗ultimate end of government‘ (1991 [1978]: 100); historically this was different 
as the sovereign‘s territory was seen as more important. For Foucault (2007 [1978]), 
the control of territory itself (defined as empty space with clear boundaries, or 
‘surface areas‘) is pointless. Instead he proposes ‗spaces of security‘, which are 
spaces inhabited by the ‘mass of its [the territory‘s] population with its volume and 
density‘ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 104). Instead of seeing territory as irrelevant, 
Foucault redefines it. While the historical notion of territory referred to the space 
over which the sovereign possessed power, Foucault argues that territory is the space 
that holds the population, and so argued for a reconfiguration of the subject of 
territory from empty space to the ‗ultimate end of government‘, or the population in a 
certain space. So territory is space ‗over which it [the population] is distributed‘ 
(Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 104). One could say Foucault‘s ‗spaces of security‘ or notion 
of territory are the spatial implementation of governmentality or the geography in the 
concept (see also Elden, 2007a).  
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The next term that demands explanation in the definition of governmentality above is 
the dispositif [apparatus] of security. The ‗procedures, analysis and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power‘ can be, and are being, implemented through the ‗technical means 
apparatus of security‘ or the dispositif of security (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 102). The 
control of the population and society is being exercised through the means of a 
security apparatus that includes, but is not limited to, the police (Elden, 2007a, 
2007b).  
Whilst ‗the police‘ refers to a mere body pursuing or establishing security, Foucault 
(2007 [1978]) describes security itself as the planning of a milieu for events that are 
possible, that might occur or are uncertain. This planning, however, can be carried 
out by the police, as one of the most obvious bodies to do so, but also by various 
other entities. For Foucault (2007 [1978]), security is about preparing for the 
unexpected. In this context ‗milieu‘ describes the  
multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only 
exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live. What one 
tries to reach through this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of 
events produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi 
natural events which occur around them (Foucault, 2007 [1978]: 56),  
or the governed population within a territory, with consideration to the physical 
geography of the space.  
The last open part of the definition is the ‗principle form of knowledge political 
economy‘ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 102). By this he means that governance is not 
done for the sake of the governing body but for the ‗wealth of the population, the 
improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; (...) it 
is the population itself on which government will act (...)‘, which is linked to the 
theme of biopolitics introduced below (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 100). In capitalist 
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societies a population‘s wealth is commonly measured against economic conditions 
and inventions of governance bodies as they aim to increase economic wealth. 
Therefore, there are ‗[n]ew networks of continuous and multiple relations between 
population, territory and wealth‘ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 101), something he calls 
‗political economy‘. 
Therefore, in Foucault‘s own words, governmentality is about controlling the 
population, the sum of people in the territory in which they live through the 
disposition of security and the preparation for the unexpected using agencies such as 
the police. Furthermore, the act of governance is to work for the population and only 
for the population, which implies the need to increase economic wealth, through 
which other conditions will be improved, including health care, education etc.  
To complete Foucault‘s thoughts on the issue of governmentality, the idea of 
biopolitics should be mentioned. By ‗biopolitics‘ Foucault meant  
the endeavour (…) to rationalize the problems presented to governmental 
practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings 
constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race … We 
are aware of the expanding place these problems have occupied since the 
nineteenth century, and of the political and economic issues they have 
constituted up to the present day (Foucault, 1997 [1978]: 73). 
On this, Elden stated ‗Biopolitics is the means by which the group of living beings 
understood as a population is measured in order to be governed‘ (Elden, 2007b: 32). 
This means that in order to govern, the governing body must use all sorts of 
statistical data about the population, such as crime data or trends on the biological 
mass, in order to determine what is needed, where problems might occur etc. 
(Murdoch and Ward, 1997); this is also something that influences intelligence-led 
policing. As mentioned above, this definition is only given to complete Foucault‘s 
thought in this context and the concepts most used in this thesis will be 
governmentality or governance and territoriality, as described above.      
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Originating from these considerations, the idea of governance has been picked up 
and developed further. In more recent literature, governance is referred to as ‗modes 
of exercise of political power‘ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 173) or the ‗recalibration of 
powers and responsibilities across and between the state, market and civil society‘ 
(Crawford, 2002: 2). Rhodes (1996) stated that the idea of self-organising networks 
can lead to ‗governing without Government‘ (Rhodes, 1996).  
As Foucault suggested, this means that the state or the government, which in the past 
was the exclusive governance entity, has to share its governing powers with various 
new entities that possess different powers on different scales or multiple levels. In 
short, political power has shifted from central government to the idea of a networked 
governance landscape (Jessop, 1997; Kearns and Paddison, 2000; Woods and 
Goodwin, 2003). While there are numerous publications on the issue of governance, 
one theory on nodal governance appears to be particularly useful to conceptualise the 
thesis.  
The idea of a governance network is being formulated by Shearing and Wood‘s 
(2003) influential paper on nodal governance, as well as Johnston and Shearing‘s 
(2003) book on the same issue. Their key argument is that governance is carried out 
by three main nodes, all of which possess a similar degree of power. ‗Within nodal 
governance we may now speak of first (state), second (corporate or business), and 
third (non-governmental organizations) sectors‘ (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 405). In 
this nodal landscape the state is only one, although still important, actor in the de 
facto governance landscape (Johnston, 2006). Although private governments are by 
now ‗ubiquitous‘ and a ‗truly global phenomenon‘, this is not sufficiently recognised 
by state representatives and others (Shearing, 2006).  
20 
 
Responding to this discrepancy in reality and perception, researchers following 
Clifford Shearing applied the theory in a number of different studies, many of which 
were based in South Africa and make the case for its validity (Marks and Goldsmith, 
2006; Wood and Dupont, 2006; Marks et al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010; 
Shearing and Johnston, 2010; Wood et al., 2011). The central argument in this work 
is that in reality neither the state police nor the criminal justice system is able to cope 
with the high crime rates due to a lack of resources. However, this is a reality the 
state does not acknowledge in its policies. Furthermore, it is a fact that there is a 
variety of non-state policing actors active in the country, indicating the citizens‘ 
response to the mentioned discrepancy between high crime and insufficient public 
police. However, this does not mean that the police force becomes irrelevant, but 
instead it becomes an ‗anchor in collective security provision‘ (Marks and 
Goldsmith, 2006: 139), meaning it remains a key node in the country‘s security 
provision. However, this would mean that the state has to acknowledge its above 
mentioned limitations in the provision of security and needs to restructure its policy, 
as well as giving up the policing monopoly, which in reality does not exist anymore 
anyway, reforming the police according to this reality and actively establishing a 
nodal security governance landscape (Shearing, 2006). This does not, however, only 
require a restructuring of the public police, but also an integration of non-state 
policing actors, such as private security companies, neighbourhood watches and 
vigilante groups, into the nodal security governance network or ‗polycentric, nodal 
security governance‘ (Marks et al., 2009: 146), in which the police becomes the hub 
for all policing done (Marks and Wood, 2010).            
While in reality this nodal governance landscape already exists in an unstructured, 
unorganised way, it needs to be formally acknowledged and integrated into the 
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policing landscape. This would also include mechanisms that ensure different actors 
act within the human rights framework and are monitored to keep it that way (Marks 
and Wood, 2010); in other words, they need to be embedded within a functioning 
legal framework (Shearing, 2006). 
The reason for assessing whether the nodal governance theory is a useful framework 
within which to conceptualise this thesis is its ability to describe and capture the 
situation of the space in which this research will be set. While in the UK the 
relevance or legitimacy of non-state actors is still being discussed (see for example 
Woods and Goodwin, 2003, and Connelly, 2011), nodal governance captures the 
reality in cities of the global south. The weaker a government is (including its 
presence on the ground through its police force) and the stronger the pressure on the 
country through, for example, high crime rates, the more non-state forms of security 
governance will develop (Baker, 1999; Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; 
Dupont et al., 2003; Shearing, 2006; Marks et al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010).  
As there can be various types of governance nodes, the theory will be complemented 
by ideas on the nexus of governance and community. Within a nodal governance 
network the community founded by citizens to govern (parts of) their lives is just one 
kind of node on which this thesis will focus. Particularly in their considerations on 
semi-autonomous communities, Rose (1996a, 1996b) and Rose and Miller (1992) 
provide a helpful framework for how to analyse changes in governance on a micro-
level and within a particular node. These papers remain key references when it 
comes to the analysis of the community-governance nexus. 
Again, the key assumption is that governance is being delivered not through the 
single unit of a state-focused society anymore. The central argument is rather that 
‗the regulated choices of individual citizens, [are] now constructed as subjects of 
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choice and aspirations to self-actualisation and self-fulfilment‘ (Rose, 1996b: 41). 
This means that individuals who are united by a certain criteria, such as a feeling of 
insecurity or an aspiration to foster economic growth, identify themselves as a 
community in order to govern. This could refer to neighbourhoods that organise a 
watch scheme together, or businesses in a particular area that decide to uplift the 
geographical area they are in. In this sense the community ‗has become a new 
spatialization of government‘ (Rose 1996a: 327). The government, on the other hand, 
does not withdraw entirely but exercises its governing power at a distance and more 
indirectly, which is slightly different to the nodal governance theory above. This can 
be done either through a legislative framework or through other control mechanisms 
that regulate the different communities in the interest of the state or state bodies such 
as city councils.   
What the different communities discussed in this thesis have in common is that 
certain groups of citizens possess considerable governing power over their space. 
However, although they can regulate behaviour, norms and values, in many aspects, 
with some individual exceptions, they can still be regulated by the state and existing 
legislations; therefore, the state is still governing at a distance, although these 
communities themselves are important governance actors spread over the urban 
landscape (Rose and Miller, 1992).            
Another issue both nodal governance and autonomous communities bring to the 
discussions on governance is the idea of responsibilisation. As mentioned above, 
responsibilisation can be a planned and overseen governmental policy that reflects a 
wider neoliberal agenda, but it can also be a response to a perceived lack of state, 
especially when it comes to service delivery or crime control (Garland, 2009). The 
latter is strongly linked to general levels of state power and becomes more important 
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in countries of the global south (Baker, 1999; Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 
2000; Dupont et al. 2003; Paasche and Sidaway, 2010). Responsibilisation or active 
citizenship describes a process in which the individual, or the group of individuals 
that form a community, take on the responsibility for their space, such as their 
neighbourhood, when it comes to urban renewal processes or the provision of 
security. This process is therefore closely linked to the idea of privatisation, not only 
of former public space but also of functions that used to be public, here meaning 
state run, in the past (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Rhodes, 1996; Crawford, 2002).  
Taking all of this into account, it shows that community increasingly supplements 
society as it becomes the community that citizens identify with (Rose 1996a; 
Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003, Staeheli, 2008). While in 
the west this might be part of a planned neoliberal policy of outsourcing 
responsibilities (Garland, 2009), this is different in countries of the south, such as 
South Africa, where the citizens cannot rely on the state anymore (Baker, 1999; 
Buur, 2003; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al., 2003; Pillay, 2008; Marks et 
al., 2009; Marks and Wood, 2010). In South Africa, communities are formed through 
state failure and as a response to policing policies that facilitate micro-governance 
structures, as outlined by Rose (1996a)
1
.  
The most obvious forms of micro-communities are the gated communities that 
determine the sense of community and belonging through walls and barbed wire 
(Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Lemanski, 2006a, 2006b). Other forms of community 
form in response to a lack in state service that causes the deterioration of business 
districts are business communities of individuals within a particular geographical 
                                                 
1
 As will be outlined later in the thesis, the reason for state failure in South Africa is not one of 
neoliberal politics, but a combination of this and the complex, pre-neoliberalism history of the country 
during apartheid.   
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area. They group together in order to organise a filling of the gap between existing 
state services in security, cleaning etc. and their perceived needs (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2008b; Samara, 2010a, 2010b). 
However, state-failure-produced communities are not limited to the wealthy parts of 
the country. In the poor regions, especially the township areas, various forms of 
communities, in Rose‘s (1996a) sense, have formed for the very same reasons 
(Madlingozi, 2007). Here, people have grouped together to respond to the service 
delivery crisis and the lack of fulfilment of basic needs, as promised in the 
constitution; in 2004/5 alone 6,000 protests for such needs were recorded (Pillay, 
2008). Different ‗social movement‘ communities unite the ones affected by an issue 
in order to solve the problem. In rural areas, increasingly the poor turn to non-
democratic traditional authorities such as tribal chiefs to gain power (Koelble and Li 
Puma, 2011). Although the relations between traditional authorities and, in 
particular, the ANC are very complex and not without tension, as suggested here, the 
government has to support and ultimately respect the contact persons for the 
government since they are so powerful in the territories over which they rein 
(Koelble and Li Puma, 2011).  
One of the more spectacular community forms that can be found in township areas is 
vigilante groups. In some poorer areas the population has lost complete hope and 
trust in the public police, and so the criminal justice system communities form their 
own vigilante groups (such as Mapogo a Mathamaga, PAGAD), or turn to powerful 
organised structures (such as minibus-taxi companies) not only to police their area 
but also to deliver justice, sometimes in the form of physical punishment (Minnaar, 
2001; Sekhonyane and Louw, 2002; Oomen, 2004).   
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This thesis will draw on some of these nodal governance communities. While taking 
the communities themselves as a given, the research focuses on the ways they 
implement their governing power over their space or territory on the ground. In so 
doing, the governing power of these communities, in contrast to that of other nodes, 
will be revealed, confirming the nodal governance thesis.  
 
2.4 Territories in the revanchist city 
As the previous section has shown, the conceptual framework of nodal governance 
and ‗quasi-autonomous‘ communities is a useful concept by which to make sense of 
the private security set-ups, as it enables the financing from the governing bodies that 
pay the security company to police its space to be analysed. To facilitate research of 
policing on the ground, governance will be linked to the concept of territory. As 
mentioned above, to Foucault (2007 [1978]), territory, meaning the space that holds 
the population, is of significant importance in studies on governmentality. It shows 
the space in which the subjects of governmentality, namely the population, are set. It 
is therefore not surprising that territory is key for any police work, when the police is 
seen as an important part of the dispositif of security (Foucault, 1991 [1978]; 
Herbert, 1996a, 1997; Elden, 2007a, 2007b).    
Territory is most commonly defined as a combination of space and power, or power 
over space (Manzoni and Pagnini, 1996). For Sack, territoriality is defined as ‗the 
attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting 
and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area‘ (Sack, 1983: 55); 
although dated, this is still a key reference on territory as claimed recently by both 
Antonsich (2010) and Vollaard (2009). Similarly Herbert (1996a) and Storey (2001) 
define the term as ‗spatial embeddedness of power‘ (Herbert, 1996a: 567), or the ‗the 
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spatial expression of power‘ (Storey, 2001: 6). Sack gives a helpful example of what 
that can mean: if x (e.g. business communities) wants to control y (e.g. undesirables) 
it can do it by ‗delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area‘ (Sack, 1983: 
56). In other words, territory is an ‗instrument for securing a particular outcome‘ 
(Taylor, 1994) and to control people and groups within the territory (Storey, 2001). 
As Elden (2010) and Antonsich (2010) confirm, Sack defines territory as a social 
construct, not just an empty space. Elden (2010: 811) adds that ‗[t]erritory can be 
understood as a political technology: it comprises techniques for measuring land and 
controlling terrain‘. As mentioned above, the control of a populated terrain is 
foremost done by policing agents legitimised by their associated governing body.  
Acknowledging this interrelation and the centrality of space in this analysis, Herbert 
designs his research on the police in North America around the concept of 
territoriality. In his argument, the police control social actions and public order by 
controlling or enforcing control over space, something that involves the creation of 
boundaries as well as exclusion from particular spaces (Herbert, 1997). 
‗Territoriality, in other words, is a fundament of police power‘ (Herbert, 1996a: 578; 
see also Fyfe 1991; Yarwood, 2007a). Like Rose (1996a, 1996b), Herbert (1996a, 
1996b) bases his idea on Foucault‘s work on governmentality and the central idea 
that power is established through exercising discipline. In opposition to that, Weber 
sees the state as the controlling entity over a clearly defined territory and that the 
exertion of cohesive force is used to establish and maintain a particular territory 
(Herbert, 1996a, 1997). Herbert (1997) suggests that Weber‘s idea on the central 
power is too ‗formal‘, not reflecting the current situation and all its subcultural 
notions sufficiently. Secondly, Herbert (1997) argues the boundaries the police 
produces are not long lasting, but only short lived. As the research will show, in the 
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case of private security companies that is very different. Here, territory is more than 
just an organisational unit, but is key to the entire private policing project.  
A further new feature in the literature on territory, which corresponds positively with 
the mentioned ideas on governmentality, is the turn away from the Westphalian 
notion of a sovereign state territory towards a more ‗flexible‘ idea of territory that 
resembles the ideas of nodal governance on a much larger scale, referring 
particularly to the EU as the geographical scale (Elden, 2010; Vollaard, 2009).  
Boundaries do not necessarily seal off a political system, but rather function 
as filters to regulate access to and exit from a political system, often 
differentiating between members and non-members (Vollaard, 2009: 696). 
Besides membership of a state‘s territory as a citizen, people can have several, 
possibly overlapping memberships with different territorial units by belonging to 
different communities that exercise power over space, such as being a citizen of 
South Africa, a member of a vigilante group that polices a township section, and part 
of a social development community. The following section will outline the causal 
connection between the pluralisation of governance and the pluralisation of policing, 
as this is one of the most common ways used to implement the theoretical power of a 
governance agency over space. Territory and governance are mutually linked to 
policing, so it is essential to understand the pluralisation in the policing landscape 
when discussing these issues  
 
2.5 Pluralisation of policing 
The pluralisation of governance has strong implications on the policing landscape as 
well. Linked to its monopoly on governance, the modern nation state also had a 
monopoly on policing (and violence) in the form of the public police force. The 
described pluralisation of governance, however, has changed the understanding of 
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the police as the only policing body. As a result, policing landscapes are now 
pluralised, enabling different governance bodies to introduce policing agents to 
implement their politics and power.  
Today, policing bodies can be generally divided into three categories: the public 
police, voluntary organisations, and commercial private security organisations 
(Yarwood, 2007b). In this structure the public police are responsible for public space 
and usually have rather limited rights on private property (see Yarwood, 2007b, and 
Jones and Newburn, 1998, for examples in the UK)
2
.  
The second policing category is voluntary policing. Although historically the idea of 
regular citizens being involved in policing activities is not new, it was largely 
superseded by state authorities claiming a monopoly on violence in the modernity
3
 
(Zedner, 2006; Garland, 2009). Nowadays, voluntary policing has undergone a 
revival as part of the mentioned idea of ‗responsibilisation‘, where local communities 
take on the responsibility for their safety at a local level (Yarwood, 2007b). 
Examples of voluntary policing are the Neighbourhood Watches in North America 
and Europe (Yarwood and Edwards, 1995), or the voluntary patrols of Aborigines in 
their communities as part of a multi-agency network (Yarwood, 2007a, 2007b).  
Finally, there is the whole sector of commercial private security. Commercial 
security encompasses all companies that offer security services on the market (note 
that here the focus is on private security companies, not private military companies 
that offer military services on the market, although the distinction can be fluid; 
Schreier and Caparini, 2005). Characteristically, the current forms of security 
                                                 
2
 As the next section will be on the role of the police in the revanchist city and different policing 
philosophies, here the section on the public police will be kept to a minimum. The focus instead being 
on the network character that is linked to the changes in governance.  
3
 A classic example is the plot of many good Westerns where the Sherriff recruits the villagers to go 
after the bad guys. However, the introduction of the modern nation state introduced the idea that the 
state had a monopoly on violence, and this was something that was key to the idea of the state.  
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services offered by private security companies are linked to the protection of the 
private property of private citizens, something the police had only limited 
capabilities and/or authority to do. With a growing influence of private spaces in 
urban life, the number of private security personnel grew significantly. Today in 
most democratic countries private security is often larger than the public police force. 
For example, the ratio of private security to public police in South Africa is 2:1 
(Taljaard, 2008: 73), in Germany it is 1:1 (Eppler, 2002: 28) (although the size of 
private security has probably risen by now), in the United States it is 2.6:1 (Manning, 
2006: 110), and in the UK it is 1.4:1 (Button, 2002: 98). 
Although the categories of public, voluntary and commercial policing provide a good 
point of departure, it is argued that the actual policing network is more complex than 
this typology. In particular, the line between public police and private security can 
become blurred to a stage where the difference is almost impossible to discern. 
Before going into further detail, a description of an imaginative walk Rigakos (2002) 
undertook in Toronto‘s International Airport might help to develop a better 
understanding of what is meant by blurring lines: 
As one enters Terminal 3 at Toronto‘s Pearson International Airport, one 
notices the newness of the structures, the cleanliness of the walls and ceilings, 
and the brightness and bustle of the building. Passengers move along various 
queues for airline tickets, baggage checks, and car rentals. Perhaps less 
noticeable are two of Canada‘s federal police talking to a pair of constables 
form the Peel Regional Police Service. After the discussion ends, the RCMP 
officers begin to patrol, nodding hello to two security officers from Excalibur 
Security making similar rounds. Further along, they watch two armed Brink 
guards carry money satchels from a nearby currency exchange kiosk. They 
wind by Commissionaires issues parking tickets and Group 4 Securitas 
security guards checking the luggage of passengers. On the lower level, 
Canada‘s Customs agents spot a suspicious traveller and call for RCMP and 
an immigration officer. In a processing centre just down off the tarmac, 
security guards from Metropol Security meet with the Immigration officials 
while the detainee is handed over to the security firm for transport to the 
privately run Mississauga Immigration Detention Centre (MIDC) (Rigakos, 
2002: 37). 
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When counting the different policing bodies around the airport carefully, one should 
have found three federal police forces and one municipal, one quasi-public security 
provider and four private security firms. This unclear intermingling of different 
policing bodies is a good example of multi-agency (Yarwood, 2007b) or plural 
policing (Jones and Newburn, 2002), which blurs the line between the public and the 
private. However, today it is not only the case that the public police force outsources 
policing jobs to private security companies. When Rigakos (2002) continues his 
account, he points out that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
continuously contracts out policing services. Quoting the Solicitor General of Canada 
in 1996, he states the RCMP‘s annual budget was $1 billion, while their income from 
contracts was $700 million. This constitutes a ‗loss‘ of only $300 million for the 
country‘s most prestigious police force. ‗The long-term goal of RCMP contract 
policing is 100 per cent cost recovery‘ (Rigakos, 2002: 47). Thus, in addition to 
contracting private security providers, a public police force also offers its services as 
a commodity, further blurring the public/private distinction (see also Loader, 1999, 
on the commodification of the public police in the UK). 
In an attempt to structure this intermingling of public and private, Button (2002) 
introduces the term hybrid policing, which constitutes a fourth category in which to 
structure contemporary policing. ‗The central problem in classifying policing‘, 
Button (2002: 16) argues, ‗has been the ‗hybrid‘ policing issue: the agents and 
organizations that vary in their degree of ―publicness‖ and ―privateness‖ and that are 
not public police, private security or some form of voluntary initiative‘. An example 
of hybrid policing is the British Transport Police (BTP). Although the BTP is 
publicly funded, it works on behalf of private railway companies on their private 
ground (Button, 2002). Therefore, in terms of its duties, the BTP resembles a security 
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company. However, if the state or a state symbol is seem as being under attack, such 
as during the protests at the Bank of England during the G20 summit in London in 
2009, the BTP leaves no doubt that it is a public police force, with the author having 
observed its members serving in one line with the Metropolitan Police. On a 
continuum from public to private, hybrid policing bodies come somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum and are difficult to place.  
What this section intends to do is communicate an understanding of the different 
policing bodies and how they intermingle with each other, rather than to provide an 
all-encompassing account. Although much has been written on the ‗pluralisation of 
policing‘ (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and 
Shearing 2003; Yarwood, 2007b), the key assumptions are always similar. With a 
pluralisation of governance comes a pluralisation of policing, as it is necessary to 
establish theoretical power over actual space. Furthermore, policing becomes both 
public and private, a matter of profit maximisation, or at least to cover the expenses 
invested in a police force. Having introduced the actors of the revanchist city and the 
policing tools they use to implement their spatial fantasies on the ground, the 
following sections will introduce policing philosophies and strategies through which 
the revanchist city can be established.  
 
2.6 The ‘broken windows syndrome’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ 
The policing philosophy of the ‗broken windows syndrome‘ and the idea of the 
revanchist city are intrinsically tied together. What Smith (1996) and subsequently 
others called the revanchist city is the theorisation of the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ and the associated ideas that Giuliani and his Police Commissioner 
Bratton had in mind. Since it is surprisingly rarely done, the following will sum up 
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the key points of the original broken windows paper. The fairly short article (the 
online printed version is only ten pages long without any references) with the title 
‗Broken Windows-The police and neighborhood safety‘ published in The Atlantic 
Monthly by Kelling and Wilson, the two ‗conservative criminologists‘, as Belina and 
Helms (2003) call them, in 1982. The ideas outlined in the paper were picked up by 
the mayor of New York Rudolph Giuliani and his New York City Police 
Commissioner William Bratton, who together translated the ideas of the paper into 
an applicable policing strategy. 
The key point of the broken windows paper (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) is increased 
visibility of police officers in the form of foot patrols. Although they acknowledge 
that this increased visibility of officers might not have an effect on actual crime, it 
contributes to the subjective feelings of citizens in the area. This point is one of the 
fundamental aspects supporters as well as critics of the concept identify; it does not 
target crime, but the perception of it due to crime-associated ideas. The strength, its 
supporters argue, is the indirect positive effect on the crime rate, which has, 
according to the critics, devastating consequences for the social life in the city.  
What the ‗broken windows syndrome‘ intends to target instead of actual crime is the 
‗sources of fear‘ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) of the good citizens in a particular 
neighbourhood. According to the article, these sources of fear are ‗disreputable or 
obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, 
prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed‘ as these groups created a feeling of 
disorder and caused the worry of being ‗attacked by a stranger‘. Later in the article, 
Kelling and Wilson (1982) sum up these groups under the umbrella term of 
‗undesirable persons‘. 
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Another assumption Kelling and Wilson (1982) make by drawing on a psychological 
study is that if one window in a neighbourhood is broken and is not fixed right away, 
other windows will be broken soon after as a broken window invites vandals and 
looters to the neighbourhood. In other words, the ‗untendedness‘ of space signals a 
‗breakdown of community controls‘ and therefore makes it ‗vulnerable to crime 
invasion‘ (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). One consequence of this is the increase in 
serious crimes, including violent attacks by strangers. The result is a process of urban 
decay (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). What is interesting is that the article very strongly 
brands certain groups of society as the root causes of the loss of control over space 
and urban decay. In this context, Kelling and Wilson (1982) criticise the limited legal 
framework for the police to deal with these groups that have been identified as the 
cause for the deprivation and fear. In areas where ‗disorderly behaviour‘ is not being 
policed, ‗[t]he unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window‘ (Kelling 
and Wilson, 1982).    
The solution Kelling and Wilson (1982) suggests is visible foot patrols that check 
upon the identified nuisance groups and thus establish social order and indirect 
safety. However, another key aspect is that the community itself stays vigilant when 
it comes to suspicious strangers, meaning the above-mentioned groups. In this 
context, they argue for a certain amount of vigilantism, something that should be 
seen in the context of the abovementioned ideas of responsibilisation (note that the 
article was written before the neoliberal agenda had achieved the prominent status it 
holds today). 
To sum up, the general assumption is that disorder causes crime (Gau and Pratt, 
2010). In other words, space and territory communicate with potential criminals. 
Broken windows, as well as graffiti, street people and panhandlers in a 
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neighbourhood, signal that a particular community is weak and not able to defend 
itself. Cleanliness and order, however, signal strength (Herbert and Brown, 2006). A 
community that is strong and capable of shielding off crime sees strangers as 
potential treats. This also draws on the notion that a fear of crime is being used to 
pursue revanchist ideas of urban space. As Shirlow and Pain (2003) and Gold and 
Revill (2003) argue, the fear of crime can be used politically to shape urban 
landscapes. ‗―Fear‖ has been constructed in particular ways around certain groups, 
and widely used to serve certain political interests‘ (Shirlow and Pain, 2003: 17). 
On the basis of the broken windows article, New York‘s former mayor Giuliani and 
New York City‘s former Police Commissioner William Bratton formulated the 
infamous Policing Strategy No 5, which (refers to Kelling and Wilson‘s (1982) work 
as a ‗ground-breaking article‘. Here the arguments of the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ have been translated into actual policing measures to reclaim space and 
stop the deprivation of the city (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994). Like the broken 
windows article, the policing strategy identifies certain groups of society as the root 
causes of a city‘s problems. Although the Policing Strategy No 5 is regarded as the 
parent of ‗Zero Tolerance Policing‘ (ZTP) and the implementation of broken 
windows strategies, the document is very rarely cited in the now extensive literature 
on ZTP (MacLeod, 2002; Wacquant, 2009; Herbert, 2008; Samara, 2010b, to name a 
few). Therefore the key arguments will be outlined before reviewing the critical 
literature on the issue.  
The Policing Strategy No 5 starts off with an interesting depiction of the ‗decent 
society‘: 
A decent society is one where all people are free to pursue education, 
enterprise, and entertainment that create sufficient standard of living for 
themselves and their families and contribute to an atmosphere of mutual 
respect for their fellow citizens. A decent society is a society of civility. 
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New Yorkers have for years felt that the quality of life in their city has been 
in decline, that their city is moving away from, rather toward the reality of a 
decent society. The overall growth of violent crime during the past several 
decades has enlarged this perception. But so has an increase in the signs of 
disorder in the public spaces of the city. 
Public spaces are among New York City‘s greatest assets. The city‘s parks, 
playgrounds, streets, avenues, stoops, and plazas are the forums that make 
possible the sense of vitality, excitement, and community that are the pulse of 
urban life.        
Over the years, enjoyment and the use of these public spaces has been 
curtailed. Aggressive panhandling, squeegee cleaners, street prostitution, 
―boombox cars‖, public drunkenness, reckless bicyclists, and graffiti have 
added to the sense that he entire public environment is a threatening place. 
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani has called these types of behaviours ―visible 
signs of a city out of control, a city that cannot protect its space and children‖ 
(Giuliani and Bratton, 1994: 5). 
After this, the Policing Strategy No 5 outlines how the identified undesirables will be 
‗controlled‘ by giving more rights to the local police. The reason for quoting the 
whole introduction here is that it sums up most of the issues that have become points 
of critique.  
Firstly, undesirable groups are not part of the ‗decent society‘; they are a nuisance to 
it. Broken down to the scale of the broken windows article, they are not part of a 
neighbourhood, but a threat to it. This is the main critique of Herbert (2001), Beckett 
and Herbert (2008) and Herbert and Brown (2006). Both introduced the concepts of 
certain groups that were identified as ‗other‘ and alienated them from the rest of the 
decent neighbourhood. Combined with the idea of the vigilant middle class resident 
trying to reclaim the space, everyone outside the community‘s norms and values is 
therefore a potential threat to the community, not part of it. 
Secondly, many of the issues that are defined as disorderly are not criminal in nature, 
but are instead forms of behaviour that are seen as a nuisance or perceived as a 
threat. In the case of the mentally ill and various versions of the urban poor listed in 
the strategy, they are seen as social problems; however, these problems are 
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approached with the police and security, not with welfare. In fact, according to Smith 
(1998), the budget of the social welfare sector is being cut while the police force 
receives ever more freedom and resources.     
Thirdly, the idea of society and freedom is associated with control over people and 
space, as Giuliani‘s quote above has already suggested. Many have argued that this 
control leads to exclusion of the ‗other‘ that does not conform to society‘s rules and 
norms. Here the idea of increasing inequalities as well as exclusion is a prominent 
feature of the revanchist or wider neoliberal city in various spaces in which extensive 
research has been conducted. Trying to assess these two concepts, they do have a 
positive impact on crime and the economic development of the space in which they 
are applied. This will be discussed in greater detail in the empirical section of the 
thesis (Herbert, 2001; MacLeod, 2002; Samara, 2005; Herbert and Brown, 2006; 
Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Young 1999; Sibley, 2003; Garland 2009).  
However, it should be emphasised that there are many other policing strategies 
besides ‗zero tolerance policing‘, although this particular strategy is very influential 
in contemporary policing discussions (Fyfe, 2009). Other influential proactive 
policing strategies that, like the ZTP approach, aim to replace the reactive or ‗fire 
brigade-policing‘ that only responds to crime, are community policing, problem-
oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, or hot spot policing (Tilley, 2008; Braga 
and Bond, 2008). However, in the space under research, ZTP is the leading paradigm 
and so the focus will be on this particular strategy. 
Consequently, the revanchist city is characterised by neighbourhoods governed by a 
network of public and private actors that reclaim urban space by the means of 
security and policing while displacing and excluding the socially weaker and the 
urban poor from these spaces. Some of the most influential accounts on this, besides 
37 
 
the cited works by researchers around Herbert, are provided by Young (1999) and 
Sibley (2003).  
Young (1999), and the similarly influential Davies (2006) who has a stronger focus 
on class, describe an increasingly exclusive society in Western cities. It is important 
to note that the inclusive society is not glorified in any way. Instead Young (1999) 
describes it as a homogenous society, characterised by solid mass consumption. The 
exclusive society instead is much more individualistic, but at the same time 
hedonistic and preoccupied with risk. He goes on to explain that this period is 
characterised by downsizing jobs that lead to higher rates of unemployment, thereby 
creating marginalised groups and resulting in an increase of crime. On the basis of 
these inequalities and rising crime rates, the formerly inclusive society turns 
exclusive. Differences are being identified and segregated or managed through 
mental and physical barriers. He explains this leads to an increasing ‗othering‘ of 
groups and people of a lower class (Young, 1999). In this environment a so-called 
criminology of intolerance is created that is not only perpetuated by individuals or 
certain groups, but by the state as a whole. Young (1999) describes a model that 
explains the structure of the late modern city: there is a core group of which the 
members are citizens with secure jobs, also known as the insiders. These insiders are 
also characterised by their fear of everyone outside their group and class, which leads 
to an increasing segregation of space and the privatisation of formerly public land 
such that it cannot be used exclusively by these groups. To commute between ‗their‘ 
spaces, Young (1999) observes ‗cordons solitaires‘ in the form of road networks and 
physical blocks that guarantee the exclusiveness of the space. Outside these spaces is 
the out-group, the part of the population that has been judged to be responsible for all 
the problems.  
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In contrast to Young (1999), who is a sociologist/criminologist and therefore looks at 
the exclusive society, Sibley (2003) is as a geographer more interested in the 
exclusive space. However, like Young, Sibley identified a socio-spatial exclusion 
and an increasing ‗othering‘ of society using the example of hippies and new age 
travellers in the countryside being branded as dirty and identified as undesirables. He 
identifies certain spaces of exclusion, such as shopping centres that serve as 
recreational facilities for the usually white middle-class nuclear families. He claims 
that the dividing line between the insider and the outsider is consumption or the 
economic ability to consume. If an individual is not able to participate in this 
capitalist ideal, he or she becomes undesirable in the new private spaces and is 
therefore expelled from these spaces. However, in liberal democracies, policing 
strategies have to concur with the criminal justice system and be based on legal 
foundations; this is discussed in the following section.  
 
2.7 Translating policing philosophies into the criminal justice system 
When introducing new policing philosophies and strategies, they need to be 
translated into the criminal justice system to avoid unlawful and arbitrary arrests. As 
various academics have pointed out, these adjustments to the criminal justice system 
are not an attempt to slow this development down, but instead follow the logic of 
increasing police powers and the addressing of social issues by the police, 
representing the law.     
Recently, Herbert, in cooperation with Beckett, contributed much work on this issue, 
particularly through his research in Seattle, USA (Beckett and Herbert, 2008; 
Herbert, 2008, 2010; Herbert and Beckett, 2010). The line of argument in these 
publications is that new laws, such as the banishment laws (Herbert and Beckett, 
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2010), or off-limited orders and trespassing laws in Seattle (Beckett and Herbert, 
2008), are a legal consequence of a ZTP approach that aims to control street people 
and the urban poor by changing/adjusting the criminal justice system.  
The new social control techniques [meaning the laws cited above] described 
above share a number of important characteristics. First, they tend to be quite 
explicitly aimed at spatial exclusion. Second, many of the new practices are 
hybrid in nature, combining elements of criminal, civil and administrative law 
and thus providing little opportunity for contestation. Third, despite their 
legally hybrid nature, they have significantly broadened the police‘s 
discretionary authority to stop, question, and search urban residents. Finally, 
despite being promoted as alternatives to arrest and incarceration, these 
techniques have created a number of new criminal and administrative 
offenses, violations of which result in many court visits, administrative 
hearings, and short-term jail stays (Beckett and Herbert, 2008: 16). 
These laws are tools of social control that provide the police with the means to carry 
out ZTP. Consequently they criminalise the space for undesirables (Herbert, 2008).     
A very similar argument was made by Mitchell (1997) in his paper The Annihilation 
of Space by Law. On the example of anti-homeless laws that restrict sleeping, 
begging etc. in public space, Mitchell (2001) argues that in the United States space is 
increasingly being annihilated for these groups. Whereas public space used to be the 
space where the homeless lived, this is now changing in certain parts of the city 
under the new legislation that goes hand in hand with the revanchist reclaiming of 
space. Making life for homeless impossible is therefore part of the ‗annihilation of 
space by law‘. As there are only limited alternatives to the spaces where these laws 
are enforced, Mitchell (1997) continues, leads consequently to the ‗annihilation of 
people by law‘ as the space where the homeless can legally exist gets smaller and 
smaller. Backed by the law, cities become spaces governed not for people, but for 
‗pleasure, consumption and accumulation‘ (Mitchell, 2001: 14) according to the 
abovementioned ideas of revanchism. These laws, therefore  
reflect a changing conception of citizenship which, contrary to the hard won 
inclusions in the public sphere that marked the civil rights, woman‘s and 
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other movements in the past decades, now seek to re-establish exclusionary 
citizenship as just and good (Mitchell, 2001: 15).     
Whereas exclusionary practices on private ground do not come as a surprise, the idea 
of creating sanitised spaces to attract investment and consumption is being 
increasingly applied in public space. However, as Mitchell (2001) argues, it is not 
just about exclusion, because where can someone in a public space be excluded to? It 
is actually an annihilation of space, made feasible by the full force of state 
institutions, such as courts, health departments and the police, as well as by private 
security. The state needs all of its own forces, as well as some additional forces, to 
play its role in neoliberal politics in the public space. A similar example of this from 
the UK is the anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) (Crawford and Flint, 2009). 
However, these changes in the criminal justice system, which are linked to urban 
revanchism and neoliberal policies, refer to local laws that target particular groups, 
but also have wider effects and implications for society.  
Extending the logic of broken windows and ZTP to police cultures and control 
mechanisms, Herbert (2001) and Herbert and Brown (2006) argue that what they 
have termed ‗hyperpunitivness‘ helps the state to pursue neoliberal politics. 
According to Herbert and Brown (2006) this is part of the politics or controls that 
divide society along class lines and consolidates segregation in the interest of upper 
classes that drive the urban revanchism and ‗shore up neoliberalism‘ (Herbert, 2001).   
A similar picture of a revanchist, control-orientated criminal justice system and state 
is painted by Garland (1996, 2009). In his Culture of Control, Garland (2009) 
describes how the Western state outsources control mechanisms to private or public 
private governance bodies, following the logic of responsibilisation, active 
citizenship and public-private partnerships. This state-controlled policy fosters the 
growth of voluntary policing bodies, such as neighbourhood watches, as well as an 
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increase of private security companies (Garland, 2009, 1996; as well as Johnston, 
1991; Johnston, 2001). 
On the other hand, the state expands its strength and punishing powers not only in 
the form of police forces but through the criminal justice system as well (Garland, 
2009, 1996; as well as Herbert, 1999; Singelnstein and Stolle, 2008), creating what 
Herbert and Brown (2006) called ‗hyperpunitivness‘. The results are exploding 
incarceration rates in many countries, but especially the neoliberal heartlands of the 
USA and the UK. During the welfare state criminologists used to say that criminals 
were disadvantaged and in need of rehabilitation, so the solution was seen in the 
inclusive approach of the social welfare state; however, in recent years the causes of 
criminality are not seen as a consequence of deprivation but of inadequate control 
that ultimately ‗orientates towards punitive segregation‘ (Garland, 2009: 17). In other 
words the state focuses on the consequences not the causes.  
The open, porous, mobile society of strangers that is late modernity has given 
rise of crime control practices that seek to make society less open and less 
mobile: to fix identities, immobilize individuals, quarantine whole sections of 
the population, erect boundaries, close of access (Garland, 2009: 165). 
What the idea of hyperpunitiveness means for the different governing bodies 
representing upper classes is an increase in their power due to the policy of active 
citizenship and responsibilisation. However, as in the West this is planned policy that 
is furthermore accompanied by a strengthening of punitive power, the state increases 
its control despite an increasing privatisation and commodification of former state 
assets (Herbert, 1999; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Singelnstein and Stolle, 2008; 
Garland, 2009). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to show the connections between the revanchist city, new forms 
of space and the role of policing. Policing is the main tool used for reclaiming space 
for the middle classes from groups of ‗undesirables‘. While in the past the idea was 
to approach social issues with social welfare, Giuliani and Bratton (1994) suggested 
that the police were the most appropriate body to produce clean and safe public 
space. Given their impact, the ‗broken windows syndrome‘ and ‗zero tolerance 
policing‘ models soon became part of many urban regeneration programmes and 
policing strategies around the world.  
This chapter has also identified that the governance structure of the revanchist city is 
increasingly dominated by non-state actors. The theories that appeared most helpful 
in regards to the latter case study of Cape Town, South Africa, are the nodal 
governance theory by Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Shearing and Wood (2003) 
and Rose‘s (1996a, 1996b) considerations on communities. The nodal governance 
theory conceptualises a governance landscape where all involved entities have 
similar degrees of power, with the state being just one node in this setup. Rose 
(1996a, 1996b), though, focuses on the importance of community. He defines 
community as a spatially consistent unit of individuals who are united by the fear of 
crime or the wish to foster economic growth and therefore move away from the state 
to build a semi-autonomous structure to implement their power over space.      
Nevertheless, the question this review of the literature leaves open is how private 
governance nodes reclaim their territory in public space. Since the literature suggests 
that the police are successful in applying their zero tolerance approach, the question 
is how do private policing bodies have an impact on urban territory? How does a 
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territorialised private policing network affect the lives of ‗undesirables‘ and the 
social geographies in those spaces?   
The next chapter will focus on a more specific aspect of the revanchist city, namely 
private security companies and the kinds of space they operate in. In doing so, the 
chapter specifies particular and often referenced governance nodes, such as shopping 
malls or gated communities, thereby extending the discussion on consumer-oriented 
sanitised spaces and the notion of segregated urban space established through private 
security companies representing one particular actor in the new plural policing 
landscape. Through this, it narrows down the available literature and identifies more 
specialised research gaps on private security companies.        
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CHAPTER III: GEOGRAPHIES OF PRIVATE POLICING  
3.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter has shown, research on broken windows and ZTP policing is 
usually concerned about the role the public police has on the ground. However, it has 
been argued that changes in governance are inevitably linked to changes in policing 
and the pluralisation of the policing network. Research on the revanchist city, 
meaning the reclaiming of urban public space, is almost exclusively concerned with 
the public police (although private security companies are being mentioned in the 
context of public-private partnerships they are only limited studied).  
This chapter identifies the different spaces in which private security companies 
operate regardless if public or private. By mapping different spaces in which private 
security companies operate, this chapter will show that the influence of private 
security entities is not only substantial on private property but also increased 
significantly in public space.  
Furthermore, using the concept of nodal governance and community as the 
conceptual framework for the thesis, the spaces identified in this chapter are the most 
common examples for these concepts. In fact has the nodal governance theory been 
developed from research on ‗mass private property‘ which will find mentioning in 
the following (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987; Stenning and Shearing, 2003; 
Shearing and Wood, 2003). 
In addition, it is almost impossible to introduce any work on private security 
companies without reviewing the vast body of literature on the various private spaces 
that increasingly dominate our lives. It is therefore that in due course the role private 
security companies play in today‘s cities will be analysed. The chapter is divided into 
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three sections according to the geography of private policing that emerged during the 
review process. Here dividing factors are the legal ownership of the particular spaces 
and their openness to a wider public
4
. By identifying the different privately secured 
space the chapter reveals research gaps in the literature on private security companies 
which the thesis will then address in the empirical sections.  
 
3.2 Private policing of closed private space 
The first section focuses on closed private spaces in an urban environment mainly in 
the form of physically enclosed residential neighbourhoods. When academics such as 
Young (1999) and Sibley (2003) describe segregation processes as characteristic of 
the contemporary city, closed private spaces such as gated communities are the most 
vivid examples. These urban and suburban phenomena derive from the USA. Here 
the main issue was not necessary security, but lifestyle and a desire for exclusiveness 
(Blakely and Snyder, 1999). However, with a stronger focus on security they soon 
became a feature of cities in the global South that are characterised by strong 
inequalities and increasing crime rates, causing academics to talk about a 
fortification or militarisation of urban settings (e.g. Eick et al., 2007; Kempa and 
Singh, 2008). One of the best examples of these spaces is South Africa where the 
development of enclosed communities is much advanced
5
. Here Bénit-Gbaffou 
                                                 
4
 As a general note to the thesis, the issue of CCTV does play an important role in contemporary 
policing including the following three examples. However, research on surveillance is a different body 
of literature this thesis will not draw on. Here the focus will rather be on the actual (security) officer 
on the ground. Nevertheless in instances CCTV will be mentioned but not analysed in greater detail.       
5
 In the context of South Africa, different forms of closed private spaces have been summed up nicely 
by Landman (2000b), who distinguishes between enclosed neighbourhoods, security villages and 
gated communities.  
Here enclosed neighbourhoods are spaces  
that have controlled access through gates or booms across existing roads. Many are fenced or 
walled off as well, with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at 
these points in some cases. The roads within these neighbourhoods were previously, or still 
are, public property and in many cases the local council is still responsible for public services 
to the community within (Landman, 2000b: 3). 
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(2008b), Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) and Kempa and Singh (2008) show that closed 
private enclaves can be found on former public land, which means that streets, parks 
etc. are being privatised by a neighbourhood community. This can involve a legal 
privatisation sanctioned by the city council or an illegal de facto privatisation 
tolerated by the city (Lemanski and Oldfield, 2009). This increasing privatisation of 
public land should be assessed as a different form of urban revanchism. It is, in a 
way, a reclaiming of space by those who can firstly afford it, meaning upper classes, 
guided by the fear of the, as dangerous, perceived ‗other‘. In this sense, the barbed 
wire and walls of the gated community are the most obvious forms of urban 
segregation (Young, 1999; Sibley, 2003) one will encounter.   
Most commonly forms of closed private space are privately secured by commercial 
companies (neighbourhood watches and the public police can be used on top of that 
in form of a strong security network but the core security is usually provided by a 
private security company)
6
. If no one controls the gate and the perimeter, directly or 
via several possible electronic surveillance measures, they would be useless when the 
leading paradigm is safety.  
As said, gated communities are a prime example for urban segregation and the 
exclusion processes. The inhabitants of such places perceive their surroundings, 
                                                                                                                                          
Security villages are planned as such right from the beginning and refer to  
private developments where the entire area is developed by a (private) developer. These areas 
are physically walled or fenced off and usually have a security gate or controlled access point 
with/without a security guard. The roads in these developments are private, and in most of 
the cases, the management and maintenance is done by a private management body 
(Landman, 2000b: 3). 
However, both of these spaces are frequently combined under the term ‗gated communities‘. 
According to Landman, ‗gated community‘ is an umbrella term that is used for every neighbourhood 
that is privately secured and access is denied only to one that is not an inhabitant or a visitor of an 
inhabitant of the neighbourhood. A gated community therefore encompasses  
a physical area that is fenced or walled off from its surroundings, either prohibiting or 
controlling access to these areas by means of gates or booms. In many cases the concept can 
refer to a residential area with restricted access so that normally public spaces are privatised 
or use is restricted (Landman, 2000b: 2).  
6
 This refers to gated communities with the objective of protection and e.g. not, as Blakely and Snyder 
(1999) defined, ―lifestyle communities, where, as the name says the idea is a particular lifestyle rather 
than concerns on personal safety‖.   
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public space, as hostile and blockade themselves off. As Rose (1996a) argues, here 
identity is being defined through a community that is part of the same class and 
shares the same fears. Furthermore, gated communities enable their residents to 
segregate themselves from the public space around and to govern themselves, 
creating a new governance node (Shearing and Wood, 2003). 
Therefore forms of closed private space such as gated communities, secured 
apartment complexes etc. are closely associated with the recurring theme of 
fragmented urbanism (Bénit Gbaffou, 2008b), fortified enclaves of privilege and 
spatially implemented ‘pools of capital‘‖ (Kempa and Singh, 2008), or territorialised 
security ‘quilts‗ and ‘patchworks‗ (Wakefield, 2003; Ericson, 1994). However, the 
phenomena of clean and sanitised spaces have been increasingly transferred to other 
form of private spaces which will be described in the following section.   
 
3.3 Private policing of ‘open’ private space 
Whereas private space was usually regarded as a clearly defined area that often 
required permission to enter (‗my home is my castle‘), in recent years a new kind of 
private space has developed that is associated with the neoliberal city. The leading 
paradigm of these spaces is to foster consumption through the creation of 
consumption-friendly space (often on former public land). However, critics have 
argued that shopping friendly in this context refers to the absence of ‗undesirables‘ 
and the creation of a clean, controlled or sanitised space (Raco, 2003; Houssay-
Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009). These private spaces are relatively open as long as the 
visitor is not part of a group of ‗undesirables‘ in the eyes of its owner or according to 
the definition by Kelling and Wilson‘s (1982). Furthermore, these spaces are 
characterised by their large size so they can be mistaken for public space and their 
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expansion into former public space. This makes it difficult to distinguish them from 
the surrounding public space and blurs the line between public and private (Shearing 
and Stenning, 1983, 1987; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Shearing and 
Wood, 2003; Wakefield, 2003, 2008). They have been therefore labelled ‗mass 
private property‘ (the most common example for new governance nodes) that ―refers 
to private property that has developed features that make it appear very much like a 
‗public‘ space‖ (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 410). In fact, the nodal governance 
theory developed out of the original studies on mass private property (Shearing and 
Stenning, 1983, 1987). Similar to gated communities, it is widely agreed that there is 
a strong link between the growth of ‗mass private property‘ with private security 
companies. As Jones and Newburn argue, ―the more private spaces become, the more 
likely they are to be policed by private bodies‖ (1998: 245), which means that the 
private security industry is growing in proportion to the ‗mass private property‘ and 
other similar private spaces (see also Wakefield, 2003; Kempa et al., 2004).  
The most common examples of ‗mass private property‘ are malls and shopping 
centres, usually policed by private security companies using CCTV and visible 
guards on the ground. Although examples from different countries show that 
governments promote a stronger liaison between private security and public police 
(see, for example, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in the UK (Wakefield, 2003; 
Noaks, 2008)) the level of co-operation between private and public forces is rather 
limited.  
For urban life ‗mass private property‘, especially malls, are of such importance that 
they became the main focus of academic discussions on private security in urban 
spaces (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1985, 1987; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; von 
Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; 2008). The reason for this 
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interest lays in the fact that ‗mass private property‘ has become a socially important 
place, where a growing number of people spend their leisure time (Wakefield, 2003). 
Today‘s malls are often much more than just shops under a roof. They can host 
cinemas, food courts, cafes, bars and pubs, and even small theme parks, which can 
make them the centre of life for many people. As Wakefield argues, the shopping 
centre ―became the modern version of the public marketplace‖ (2003: 20). So besides 
spreading into the public sphere (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009) and privatising public 
land they have an increasingly social function.  
Shearing and Stenning (1983, 1985), Shearing and Kempa (2000), Shearing and 
Wood (2003) and Johnston and Shearing (2003) compare the system of ‗mass private 
property‘ with a medieval feudal order in which a landowner (the feudal land baron) 
reigns over their space. ―These are spaces to which different sets of denizens7 have 
access, denizenship being in part defined in relation to those spaces‖ (Shearing and 
Wood, 2003: 410).  
Von Hirsch and Shearing (2000) complement the discussion introducing the idea of 
―new emerging ‗common‘ spaces‖ (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 80) found in 
North America and Western Europe. Historically, common spaces are not new; they 
existed long before the private-public divide and represented spaces that were, for 
example, under the king‘s domain, and were ―common to some but not common to 
all‖ (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 80). Later, common space was swallowed up 
into the public space. However, nowadays the common space is re-emerging in the 
form of privatised malls, residential communities, industrial parks or recreational 
domains (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000). Similar to the neo-feudal argument this 
                                                 
7
 Shearing and Wood (2003) describe denizens as people who have more than just the state as a 
governance node in their life. The state governed citizen becomes the denizen with multiple 
governance nodes.  
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shows that ‗mass private property‘ is not exclusive to recent urban changes, but has 
been around for much longer. However, the outlined theme of the revanchist city that 
drives exclusion form, for urban renewal and consumption-identified spaces, 
facilitates and fosters the growth of mass private property. Here shopping malls on 
former public land are the epitome of consumption-oriented space since this is their 
only purpose. In mass private property, the owner has the right to deny access to 
anyone who might disturb the created environment. In these terms the mall might 
well be the blueprint for revanchist policies in public space.   
On the example of a shopping mall in Reading, UK, Raco argues that ―[u]rban 
regeneration programmes in the UK over the past 20 years have increasingly focused 
on attracting investors, middle-class shoppers and visitors by transforming places and 
creating new consumption spaces‖ (Raco, 2003: 1869). These spaces require a new 
governance of policing that ensures ―safe environments‖ where the consumer is not 
‗molested‘ by any disruptive group of individuals who could distract him or her from 
consumption (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; 
Shearing and Wood, 2003). The difference to public space is that the terms ‗safe‘, in 
‗mass private property‘, does not only refer to actual threats, but also perceived 
dangers and as a threat not for safety, but consumption. The aim of policing in such 
places is to create sanitised spaces that are perceived as safe, where every person 
who could possibly cause disturbances is not only thrown out, but excluded right 
from the beginning. The general idea is to prevent crime or disturbance by reducing 
the opportunities (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000; Raco, 2003; Zedner, 2009). 
Private policing bodies use a pre-emptive strategy, targeting, for example, beggars or 
the homeless, but possibly also groups of young people as well as ethnic minorities 
(Raco, 2003). Von Hirsch and Shearing (2000), who assess the practice of exclusion 
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and the erosion of public space rather critically, see the liberty-preserving functions 
that existed threatened. Whereas the public-private divide was essential for liberal 
democratic societies, it is now used to exclude some people from goods and services 
that make social life. However, as Cresswell (2006) showed, there are also 
exceptions to this idea such as Schiphol Airport near Amsterdam, where homeless 
are being tolerated in an attempt to mimic ‗real‘ urban space.    
As mentioned above, ‗mass private property‘ is mainly policed by security 
companies. Although the verb ‗policed‘ is used in this context, private security 
guards should not be mistaken for public police. Especially in malls, the differences 
between public police and private security are distinct, including in terms of 
responsibilities, competence, training or equipment (this difference between private 
security and the police will be discussed in Chapter 4 in much greater detail) 
(Wakefield, 2008). Nevertheless, in terms of governance, security companies police 
the particular space they are contracted for according to the expectations of their 
employer. This means that the increasing privatisation of space and changes in the 
governance structure leaves parts of societies being governed by private entities and 
policed by forces that act in the name of consumption and capital accumulation 
(Raco, 2003; Eick et al., 2007).    
To close the section on the private policing of ‗open‘ private space, Jones and 
Newburn‘s (1998) critique of the ‗mass private property‘ theory will be briefly 
outlined. Their argument is that the characteristics of ‗mass private property‘ do not 
necessarily have to represent private property. Examples of spaces that have the same 
characteristics but are not private in nature but owned by the state are hospitals, 
university or college campuses. Although these spaces are under the public domain, 
they often appear just like mass private property and are commonly guarded by 
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private bodies and should be therefore assessed as hybrid in nature. Jones and 
Newburn (1998, 2002) therefore call these spaces ‗hybrid space‘ and expand the 
mass private property idea.  
 
3.4 Private policing of public space 
According to Loader (1999), Eick et al. (2007), Eick (2007), Rigakos (2007) and 
Töpfer (2007) public space is part of a revanchist urban policy and the 
commoditisation of security in public space constitutes the logical next step in 
capitalist societies. In doing so not only is it possible to make money out of one of 
the most important public goods, the safety of the individual and society, but security 
companies also became an integral part of the urban security concept, contributing to 
an ‘unbound spatial control‗ (Töpfer, 2007), the ‘punishing state‖ (Brüchert, 2007), 
and ‘militarised urban space‗ (Warren, 2007). The reason is a changing 
understanding of governance, responsibilisation and active citizenship where private 
governance actors resort to private security companies. Also it is a more cost 
effective way for the state to enhance its power. While the state increasingly 
outsources public police function to re-cover their costs, it also uses private security 
to save money as their services are cheaper for the state than a highly trained police 
force (Theodore et al., 2007; Minnaar and Mistry, 2004).  
On this, one of the most detailed studies has been conducted by Rigakos (2002). He 
researched the Canadian company Intelligarde International, which operates on 
privately managed public (and private) housing estates. Between different sites, the 
company also has to transect through public spaces to supply backup for the various 
security officers on different sites in Toronto. However, when discussing private 
security companies in public space, Rigakos‘ (2002) work is not the ideal choice 
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since it describes not quite the space that is associated with being public. The reason 
for drawing on this example is that it is one of very few empirical studies on the 
issue, already hinting at a substantial research gab.   
Nevertheless, similar to Herbert‘s (1996a, 1996b, 1997) work on the police force, 
Rigakos shadowed security guards during their work and gained valuable insights 
into the way they operate on the ground. His central argument is that Intelligarde 
carries out police-like tasks and forms part of the punitive, revanchist policing 
landscape. Rigakos (2002) claims that his findings suggest a closing of the gap 
between public and private policing that can be perceived in terms of duties, used by 
the force during their work, training etc. He therefore calls it the ‘new paprapolice‗. 
At least Intelligarde International found his argument so convincing that, when they 
were accused by the state for the false usage of the term ‗police‘, Rigakos was asked 
to testify as Intelligarde‘s witness in court to make precisely this point (again, a 
detailed discussion on the difference between private security and the police will be 
held in the next chapter) (Rigakos, 2007).  
In the context of the UK, Noaks (2008) provides an example of how private security 
companies are not only involved in the commodification of security and 
supplementing the public police force, but are starting to replace it. In Noaks (2008) 
study of Merryville, UK, an area that suffers from one of the highest crime rates in 
the country, a private security company has been contracted to carry out foot and 
motorised patrols by uniformed security officers and to provide a 24-hour accessible 
on-call service. Noaks‘ (2008) findings show that the residents contracted a security 
firm not to replace the public police force but to get additional security in their 
community, which involves a partnership or co-ordination between the different 
policing bodies, to maximise security. This wish, however, is not reflected in the 
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daily policing activities. Neither of the policing bodies are pursuing active co-
operation, which only consists of minimal communication. What has happened is 
rather the opposite. Noaks (2008) describes a kind of ‘shadow co-operation‗, 
meaning that the public police reduced their presence in areas that are privately 
policed. Therefore, the result of this ‗invisible trade‘ is not a supplement of security, 
but the tendency to replace the public police force with private policing, which the 
residents have to pay for themselves. With a change in the main policing body, 
Noaks (2008) observes that the Merryvillians start to directly compare the service of 
the ‗private police‘ to the public one as a result of their disappointment with the 
public police force. In fact, some subscribers prefer the services of private security 
companies over the public police when they require an officer. Similar to the case of 
private space, a commercial security force that increasingly replaces the public police 
to bring law and order to the neighbourhood raises interesting questions on 
governance. As the citizens of this area pay the security company directly, they are 
the governing body that can decide (presumably within an existing legal framework) 
how the space should be policed. Regarding Noaks‘ (2008) work, it should however 
be noted that the issue of private security in public space is not being conceptualised. 
Neither is the novelty of the researched space acknowledged. In other words, the 
geography is not being considered.   
Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) give a similar account 
of their more quantitative studies on public control in residential areas in the UK:  
The very purchase of additional policing as a commodity seemed unwittingly 
to transform residents into consumers of a purchased good, thereby arousing 
heightened expectations over the provision of commercial forms of 
accountability and responsiveness to consumer demands in order to 
demonstrate ―value for money‖ (Crawford and Lister, 2006). 
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The difference between Noaks‘ and Crawford and Lister‘s (2004, 2006), or Crawford 
et al’s. (2005) studies is that Merryville actually faced one of the highest crime rates 
in the country, while Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) 
argue that it was the increased fear of crime that facilitated the growth in commercial 
security patrols. Their studies also showed that security companies themselves 
identified this kind of service as the future market into which the industry can 
expend. The inhabitants of the researched areas perceive a lack of visible policing  
and therefore turned to commercial security providers. According to the authors, this 
extension of the policing family (Crawford and Lister, 2004), or the mixed economy 
of visible patrols (Crawford et al., 2005), raises questions on the co-ordination and 
the distribution of policing in and around the privately policed areas. Effective plural 
policing is not only about increased ‗boots on the ground‘, but co-ordinated patrols, 
shared intelligence etc. Similar to Noaks‘ (2008) study, this is not the case. Although 
co-ordination might happen on an individual level, a framework that creates reliable 
procedures is still missing. Another point that Crawford and Lister (2004, 2006) 
make is about the spatial impact of private policing. Although they cannot prove it 
with their data, they suggest that uneven geographical policing can result in a 
―displacement of crime and fear of crime into neighbouring (non-patrolled) areas‖ 
(Crawford and Lister, 2006: 171) and that the benefits of some could possibly result 
in disadvantages for others. 
Without emphasising it, Noaks describes a security setup in which new governance 
node, a community in Rose‘s (1996a) sense, took on the responsibility for their 
wellbeing. A more typical example for this would be a form of private-public 
partnerships that Harvey (1989) identified as a key component of the neoliberal city. 
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A well-established example of these partnerships are the Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs), or in the South African case City Improvement Districts (CIDs).  
Although various authors mention the use of private security companies in the 
context of BIDs and CIDs (Samara 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 
2007; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Singh, 2008), a detailed 
study on the actual security on the ground has rarely been done. One of the 
exceptions here is Berg (2004), who studied Cape Town‘s CIDs, that touches upon 
security companies. The main focus however is on the pluralisation of policing. She 
explains the policing network in the area and introduces the different policing entities 
that lead to an over-policing of the space. Similar to the other authors, who are all 
criminologists, the focus of the study is on co-operation, networking or governmental 
nodes, and the changes that have occurred in policing. Singh (2008) suggests that 
private security companies increasingly operate in public spaces of CIDs and what 
she calls ―‗ordinary‘ residential streets‖ (Singh 2008: 46) where they are involved in 
order maintenance. However the claim lacks empirical evidence to support it.  
Nevertheless, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) see CIDs in Cape Town as the "most 
significant security scheme created in the postapartheid context" (2008: 695). 
Although they argue that these business communities claim a ―right to exclude‖ and 
refer to urban exclusion processes and fiscal fragmentation, their focus on actual 
private security companies is limited and they are merely referred to as ―quick fix 
solutions‖ without going into much more detail.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter continued the ideas of the Chapter 2 and introduced different private 
governance nodes, including their link to the growth of private security companies. 
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The chapter furthermore explained the forms and functions of private policing 
companies in private spaces. In doing so it also revealed the limits of the literature on 
the issue of commercial private policing of public space. While the chapter showed 
that private security companies do operate in public space, it is not evident what the 
companies‘ forms and functions are or how these vary over space. To address this 
gap, Chapter 4 reconceptualises security companies using spatial perspectives.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE POLICING 
COMPANIES 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will make three claims:  
 Firstly, new policing actors, private policing companies, have developed in 
recent years, supplementing the urban poling landscape.  
 Secondly, these new actors are not equal to the police.  
 Finally, although these companies are not the police, they are also different 
from the security guards found in a shop or a mall. Instead they are a hybrid 
of the two, reflecting significant changes in the form, function and 
geographies of the private security industry. This is done by applying a 
geographical angle to existing studies and common policing definitions. 
This chapter will develop Yarwood‘s (2007a) analysis of governance and policing. 
As Section 2.3 outlined, governance has seen a shift from the government as the 
exclusive governing actor to a landscape or network of multiple governing actors, 
that includes the government as well as neighbourhood communities, businesses, 
NGOs and others (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). This 
leaves a new landscape in which several new entities can govern the space 
themselves. Quoting Foucault, Yarwood suggests that governance can be ‗recognised 
as an assemblage of different knowledge, technologies and practices that seek to 
shape conduct in particular ways‘ (Foucault, 1991 in Yarwood, 2007a: 341). In other 
words, governance is not only about political power, but also implies a 
reconfiguration of physical power on a street level to actively govern space. Indeed 
the monopoly of policing becomes an oligopoly, or even a market for policing that 
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mirrors the development of governance (Button, 2002; Yarwood, 2007a; Zedner, 
2009, also Section 2.5).  
For this reason many academics have termed this development of growing new 
policing agencies ‗multi-agency policing‘ (Yarwood 2007b) or ‗the pluralisation of 
policing‘ (Button, 2002; Crawford and Lister, 2004; Berg, 2004). However, within 
this pluralised policing landscape, the security industry has evolved over recent 
years, widely under the radar of academic attention. Instead there remains a common 
generalisation of private security companies that do not reflect this evolution and 
therefore oversimplify their role in the policing landscape. It is instead suggested that 
the private security industry should no longer be seen as one homogenous entity that 
is solely connected to spaces such as ‗mass private property‘ or the security of other 
private spaces (see for example Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Rose, 2000, 
Wakefield, 2003, 2008; Button, 2003).  
Corresponding with a growing potency of governing actors in public space, private 
security companies have evolved and adjusted to the demand. Indeed, Crawford and 
Lister (2004, 2006) and Crawford et al. (2005) quote a representative from a security 
company saying that patrolling public spaces is the future market that will drive the 
expansion of the industry. This change in space has a profound impact on the nature 
of private security companies. Therefore, this chapter aims to reconceptualise the all 
too general use of the term ‗private security‘. In order to do so, the term ‗policing‘ 
will first be discussed, especially under consideration of space, starting with an 
example of why geographical understandings are important to make the case for a 
more differentiated, nuanced terminology.  
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4.2 The missing geography  
The following draws on two valuable ethnographical studies by criminologists that 
were mentioned in the previous chapter. The first study was done by Rigakos (2002) 
in Toronto, Canada, where he made extensive ethnographical observations on a 
private security company that polices council houses in the city. During their work, 
security officers were patrolling the houses themselves, the surrounding streets, 
empty houses used by squatters or drug-users, and even undergoing riot training. 
Drawing on his results, Rigakos (2002) claims that the division between the public 
police and what he calls the ‗new parapolice‘ becomes ‗less meaningful‘ (2002: 43). 
The second study by Wakefield (2003) is an intense ethnographical research of 
security companies in three shopping malls. Wakefield (2003, 2008) conversely 
describes the observed companies as low-scale security. Their main tasks are to 
create a safe, clean and shopping friendly environment, which involves housekeeping 
and customer care, leading to the conclusion that they are only a junior partner to the 
police.  
The reason for choosing these two studies is that they use the same terminology for 
two very different spaces and not only come to different conclusions, but also refer to 
each other, suggesting that the other‘s argument is not comprehensive. In a later 
article drawing on her original fieldwork, Wakefield states:  
I would disagree with Rigakos (2002), therefore, that the ‗public and private 
police‘ have similar roles, due to the vast differences in their organisation and 
objectives. Yet in terms of what they actually do, there are considerable 
similarities in their respective, heterogeneous functions, and valid places for 
both within the extended police family (Wakefield, 2008: 676). 
Adding a geographical perspective to it would immediately show the differences in 
each researched space, suggesting that comparisons between might only be of limited 
value, at least from the applied angle. Both ethnographic studies show a clear line of 
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argument when read on their own. However, as Wakefield (2008) herself realised, 
they seem to contradict or disagree when read in comparison. The reason for this, as 
will be argued in the following section, is the lack of a cohesive spatial analysis 
when discussing public and private policing. It will be argued that with different 
spaces come different powers and social ordering functions. Securing a private mall 
is different to supplementing the public police in parts of the public space, although 
both will need to carry out some of the same tasks as the public police. To make this 
argument, policing and security must be conceptualised and defined considering 
space, functions and powers.   
 
4.3 Conceptualising policing 
Definition: Policing does not refer entirely to the police, meaning the state-run 
agency (Bowling and Foster, 2002; Newburn and Reiner, 2007). The police do 
policing but policing should not be mixed up with ‗a specific body of personnel‘ 
(Johnston, 2000b: 8). As Rawlings defines it ‗[b]y policing is meant the maintenance 
of order, the control of disorder, the prevention of crime and the detection of 
offenders, and by the police is meant those officials concerned with policing matters‘ 
(Rawlings, 2008: 47). Policing is therefore a social function that is these days carried 
out by various actors that have become ubiquitous in the urban landscape and who 
operate alongside to the public police force (Johnston, 2000a; Crawford and Lister, 
2004, 2006; Yarwood, 2007a; Wakefield, 2008, 2003).  
In order to define the complex term of policing, established criminologists associate 
two ideas with the term: social control and purposive action to establish social 
control (Shearing, 1992, in Johnston, 2000b; Reiner, 1997, in Johnston, 2000b). Here 
policing is used in an attempt to produce social control through ‗the creation of 
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systems or surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions‘ (Reiner, 1997: 1005 in 
Johnston, 2000b: 9). These sanctions are meant to maintain an introduced social 
order. Or, to put it more simply, if a person breaks the law and is caught, he or she 
can be arrested or detained by a policing entity. Summing this up, Jones and 
Newburn (1998) came up with a useful comprehensive policing definition 
Those organised forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule of law 
enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of 
investigation and associated information-brokering - which may involve a 
conscious exercise of coercive power - undertaken by individuals or 
organisations, where such activities are viewed by them and/or others as a 
central or key defining part of their purpose (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 18-
19). 
 
Figure 4.1: Sum of all policing functions as carried out by the police  
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
 
However, although policing is not always carried out by the police, the police as an 
institution is still the most advanced policing body in terms of functions, 
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responsibilities, training and legal powers. The police do perform all policing 
functions, although some are by now also being shared with other actors such as 
neighbourhood watches (as in Yarwood, 2007a) and private security companies (as 
in Wakefield, 2003), or are being carried out in different spaces, such as mass private 
property. In other words, the police are the sum of all policing functions, as outlined 
in Figure 4.1
8
, although some of these functions are also carried out by various other, 
more specialised actors. 
However, in the context of mass private property, urban renewal programmes or the 
‗broken windows theory‘, issues around investigating powers, state and national 
security or crowd control are commonly neglected as they are seen as less important 
or are not relevant to this context (for example in Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Rose, 
2000, Herbert, 2001; Wakefield, 2003; Belina and Helms, 2003). Here policing is 
limited to policing strategies in spaces such as on the street or in the mall, such as the 
strategies discussed in terms of the revanchist city. Acknowledging the very wide 
field of policing the police carries out, including issues of national security and 
investigative work, this thesis will focus on the street-level policing.  
Space: Policing can be carried out in all spaces outlined in Chapter 3 and beyond, 
such as in the virtual worlds of finance or the Internet. However, different individual 
policing bodies have particular spaces designated to them. While the police and 
neighbourhood watches usually operate in public space and have restricted rights on 
private property, it is the opposite case with private security, as private security 
companies typically operate on private property commissioned by the owner of that 
space.         
                                                 
8
 The table is based on a list in Bowling and Foster (2002: 987). The list in Bowling and Foster (2002) 
is based on a variety of sources: Morgan and Newburn (1997); Neyroud and Beckley (2000); Johnston 
(2000); Home Office (1993), and HMIC (1999). An aspect of enforcing law under the point order 
maintenance has been added based on the discussion below, especially Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008). 
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Function: When conceptualising policing, the most common attribute is its function 
of social control, which in its widest sense all the different policing entities try to 
establish or maintain (functions listed in Figure 4.1 are more specific and break down 
aspects of social control into more concrete aspects). Therefore, in order to define 
policing, it is important to understand social control. Generally, sociologists divide 
social control into formal and informal mechanisms. While informal social control 
refers to the direct ‗social pressure from those around us‘ (Stark, 1998: 221), 
meaning social standards as well as notions of conformity, acceptable behaviour and 
norms (Stark, 1998; Wilson, 2006), formal social control is about the various actors 
that address illegal acts. In terms of the latter form of social control, the main actors 
in the formal social control landscape are the criminal justice system including the 
police (as outlined in Section 2.5 on plural policing or the extended policing family). 
These actors become active when the law is broken or an offence is committed. 
Focusing on these forms of social control, well established criminologists such as 
Jones and Newburn (1998) refer to Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) definition of social 
control, which defines it as ‗the organised ways in which society responds to 
behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, 
troublesome or undesirable in some way or another‘ (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 1). 
Herbert (2008, 2010), Beckett and Herbert (2008) and Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
are more concrete in their definition of social control and link the issue directly to 
specific laws and with the laws connected to policing strategies, as outlined in 
Section 2.7. To recapitulate their core argument: social control or disorder is 
recognised through a policing strategy or philosophy, of which the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ and ‗zero tolerance policing‘ are currently prominent in many cities. This 
idea of policing is then enabled through various adaptations and introductions of 
65 
 
civility laws. These laws are again implemented spatially by policing agents in an 
attempt to restore the social order. Here it is important to notice that violations to the 
social order, or better social disorder are personified and linked with particular 
individuals and groups that can be summed up under the umbrella term of 
‗undesirables‘ (to a neighbourhood, community, quarter, city of un-broken 
windows). In short, social order is regularly being translated into law. In return, laws 
such as the banishment laws or by-laws show the kind of social order ideas that 
prevail in the spaces in which they are policed. This means that in an urban 
environment the ‗organized ways‘ in Cohen‘s definition is the law, and the society 
that responds in Western democracies is the city council or some similar structure.  
Engels (2003 [1884]) places an emphasis what the above implies, but does not 
clearly formulate, that social control is inevitably linked to the requirements of the 
state. The state, legitimised through society, has to use a public force financed 
through taxation to control the different classes within its territory. The order this 
public force pursues is aimed at the wellbeing of the state in general, but over time it 
becomes biased in favour of the upper classes. Social order is what is good for, or in 
the interests of, the state. What makes this idea interesting and a helpful tool to 
define social control is that since 1884 a new context of urban governance has 
emerged, as outlined in Section 2.3. Today, Engels‘ nation state can be broken down 
to urban governance bodies and their individual territories, which use their own 
forces (private security companies), enabled through a taxation system (extra levies). 
Here social order is again what is best for the individual governance body. In other 
words, the agenda of the urban governance institution becomes social order for their 
territory. On the ground this means that private security implements this order 
against the, in the territorial hierarchy, lower classes or undesirables. Indeed, the idea 
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of having control over street people is seen as the equivalent of social control, which 
is nothing new. Rawlings (2008) argues from a historical perspective using the 
example of the UK that policing used to be about controlling the poor and street 
people, who were seen as the main threat to the social order, something that Herbert 
and Beckett (2010) and Beckett and Herbert (2008) have confirmed in a North 
American city very recently. As mentioned, the police have the full powers to 
enforce these laws, while other policing actors have fewer or no legal powers. 
Key points: Summing up the above, the key attributes of what constitutes policing on 
a street level is the function of order maintenance, as outlined in the legal framework 
of the criminal justice system, and the power to sanction contraventions of this social 
order (meaning the law) in the form of arrests and other means. While this can entail 
the securing, installation or guarding of a state, or even private property (as seen in 
the recent UK riots), it is not limited to this (as shown in Figure 4.1). Furthermore, 
order maintenance and social control are mainly linked to public space, making space 
another characteristic of the policing definition, drawing on the case of the missing 
geography as outlined above. Also, the police undertake all policing functions and 
are the key actors in this field in terms of mandate, functions and powers. However, 
others are increasingly taking over some of the policing functions and therefore form 
part of the policing landscape. Different actors besides the police specialise in certain 
aspects and functions of policing. One of the most specialised functions of policing, 
namely security, will be outlined in the following section.     
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4.4 Conceptualising security 
Definition: Conceptualising security, Zedner‘s (2009) book with the promising title, 
Security, appears to be an appropriate starting point. Although hoping for a definition 
of the term ‗security‘, the first sentence of the first chapter reads, ‗[s]ecurity is a 
promiscuous concept‘, and later on the same page it states, ‗not only promiscuous but 
also inconstant‘ (Zedner, 2009: 9). Trying to come to a definition of the term feels 
like holding sand; it constantly runs through the hand and is difficult to grab or pin 
down. Zedner (2009) consistently describes security as a rather abstract state of being 
safe that is trying to be achieved or pursued. 
 
Figure 4.2: Highlighting security with the policing functions 
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
 
However, Zedner (2009) also describes a second way to conceptualise security. On 
the street level in day-to-day operations, security has a much more concrete meaning. 
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Here it is not an abstract state of being, but the protection of property or, in the case 
of body-guarding, a person, and does not refer to a wider maintaining of order as 
policing does (Zedner, 2009; also Wakefield, 2003, 2008). This loss prevention is 
done through proactive measures, such as showing visibility at sites that need to be 
protected or guarded, i.e. private property such as construction sites and shops, and 
possibly also at state-owned sites. Proactive security can also involve the exclusion 
of groups and individuals that might cause trouble in some form. This is especially 
the case in mass private property where the owner has the legal right to exclude 
anyone he or she likes (Wakefield, 2003). Referring to South (1988), Fyfe (1995) 
and Shearing and Stenning (1983) confirm the public police versus private security 
dichotomy in terms of their objectives. While private security is concerned with loss 
prevention, the police maintain wider social order, which is different from the social 
order in mass private property. 
As Figure 4.2 highlights, proactive security and guarding covers only a small aspect 
of policing. In order to structure different policing actors and to make sense of the 
complex policing landscape, this is labelled as security. It is a specialised part of the 
wider policing landscape, and to establish a clearer terminology it should be called 
‗security‘ not ‗policing‘, as the latter term covers many other functions.   
Space: Security and private security companies are most strongly associated with 
securing private space, as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. As that chapter shows, 
the growth of private space in terms of quality and quantity correlates with the 
growth of companies focused especially on these security tasks, hence private 
security companies. Nevertheless, as Figure 4.1 shows, the police also do security; it 
is, however, only one part of much wider responsibilities.      
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Function: Security, meaning the task rather than the synonym for a security 
company, is carried out ‗to protect the company‘s [here the mall‘s] property‘ (quote 
from an interview with the manager of the City Mall in Wakefield, 2008: 662). On 
this, Zedner (2009) states that private security is about guarding and not order 
maintenance and the upholding of norms. (Singh (2008) argues that there are 
exceptions in South Africa; however, as mentioned earlier, she does not substantiate 
the claim with empirical evidence or much insight). The purpose of such security is 
to identify opportunities for crime or wrongdoing to occur and to try to prevent 
further losses; this could be called a security measure using exclusion as the main 
mode of operation (Button, 2003). In gated spaces, as outlined in Section 3.2, this 
can be done very simply just by securing the perimeter. In mass private property and 
hybrid spaces, as outlined in Section 3.3, this is more complex. Here security 
companies establish a shopping friendly ‗order‘ (Raco, 2003), through excluding 
potential shoplifters, vandals etc. as part of a proactive security regime
9
.  
As mentioned above, Shearing and Stenning (1985, 1987) and von Hirsch and 
Shearing (2000) use examples like Disney Land or Wakefield‘s case studies to argue 
that private security companies create a certain order within these spaces through 
proactive exclusion. However, as Zedner (2009) and Wakefield (2009) argue, this 
order should not be mistaken for a social ordering that occurs in actual public spaces, 
and the reactive enforcement of laws, which is exercised to a far lesser extent. 
Therefore, security as a concept and security companies as actors have different 
functions to the police. In Wakefield‘s (2003, 2008) context, the function of a private 
security company is literally to secure. Nevertheless, as Figure 4.2 shows, within the 
concept of policing, these kinds of security measures are part of a wider policing 
                                                 
9
 Wakefield does however claim that the private security companies under research would respond to 
emergencies within the mall. What that entails and how much force they have to actually respond to 
fights is not explained in any greater detail. 
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network/patchwork and they will, for example, share CCTV images with the police if 
requested. 
Key points: Security refers to proactive measures taken to prevent loss or damage. 
Although it can be found on state property such as courtrooms, it is most 
characteristic of private space. In some of the private spaces where it is applied, such 
as mass private property, security also involves creating an ‗order‘ to facilitate 
consumption. However, established criminologists claim this is not a social order, as 
in enforcing the law. In addition, companies who carry out security functions have 
lesser legal powers that prevent them from enforcing the law in the first place. 
Nevertheless, here security is part of a wider policing landscape in which it is a 
small, specialised section (see Figure 4.2). Having tried to structure the by-now 
established order of the policing landscape, the following section will introduce the 
argument that a new policing body established in recent years disrupts the above 
outlined dichotomy.  
 
4.5 The geographies of private policing companies 
Returning to Rigakos‘ (2002) and Noaks‘ (2008) studies, they claim some private 
security companies are actually policing as they have increasing social ordering 
functions. This comes with the space they operate in, which are high-crime public 
spaces like estates and other partially-public spaces. It is not claimed that they are 
equal to the police, but that they sit somewhere between conventional security 
companies and the state police. As said in the introduction, these companies are 
established through the growth of private governments in public spaces; the high 
crime rates in these spaces lead the community to perceive the public police service 
as insufficient, so they call on private security (literally). Therefore, alongside loss 
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prevention and proactive policing (which remain elements of their work), the 
company Rigakos shadowed is concerned with making reactive responses to 
complaints, which reflects a social control function, as argued above. To a lesser 
degree this is confirmed by Noaks (2008), who suggests there are now overlapping 
responsibilities and tasks between private actors and the police.   
This chapter therefore challenges Zedner‘s (2009) and Wakefield‘s (2009) general 
statement that private security is not responsible for order maintenance and 
upholding norms or social control. It is argued that private security companies can 
indeed hold up norms and be responsible for a social ordering by supplementing or 
even replacing the public police. The aims of these companies are not the prevention 
of financial loss due to shoplifting etc., but the maintenance of a wider social order 
through performing a task that used to be done exclusively by the police in a space 
that used to be exclusively occupied by the police. As the public police are perceived 
as not providing sufficient security, a security vacuum is being created that 
responsible citizens, and private agencies and governments have to fill themselves, 
often using private security companies (Garland, 2009).  
Comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the argument that these are new private policing 
companies
10
 is based on the fact that when patrolling in public and quasi-public 
spaces, targeting burglars, stopping-and-searching drug users and responding to calls, 
these companies are overtaking governing of security tasks that used to be in the 
realm of the police. In light of these functions, it is argued that private policing 
companies do not just perform proactive security and guarding, but are responsible 
for much wider functions. Therefore, the label ‗security‘ fails. Instead the wider, 
                                                 
10
 In the past South (1997) argued for private policing, but was referring mainly to security in mass 
private property. Also Berg (2007) refers to private policing without providing any empirical evidence 
for made claims.    
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more inclusive term ‗policing‘ should be applied. Figure 4.3 shows that while 
security is a specialised aspect of policing and the police, not the sum of their 
functions, private policing companies now cover some important, but not all, 
policing functions. Above and beyond mere proactive security and guarding they 
also reassure the public through patrols and visibility, they respond to disputes, are 
responsible for order maintenance and keep the peace as far as they are able within 
their powers.  
Nevertheless, although engaging in these functions makes them a policing actor, they 
have limits compared to the police in many aspects, including training and legal 
powers, as well as other functions. It should be emphasised that although private 
policing companies carry out many policing functions they do not engage in them to 
the same degree as the public police. Therefore, the term ‗parapolice‘,  with ‗para-‘ 
meaning ‗beside‘ (Oxford Dictionary & Thesaurus, 1995), as used by Rigakos (2002) 
is not being applied. 
While for the sake of the argument the division between private security companies, 
private policing companies and the police has been clearly drawn, the dividing lines 
might be much more blurred in reality, especially between companies in mass private 
property and companies involved in urban regeneration schemes. Private policing 
companies employed by private governance actors might indeed be expected to 
establish spaces of consumption similar to a mall, which can blur a clear division. 
However, the kind of space and the associated policing functions differentiate them 
from mall security, which is something that needs to be acknowledged in the 
terminology.   
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Figure 4.3: Functions of private policing companies 
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
It has been argued that private security companies, who secure private gated 
enclaves, should be differentiated from private policing companies, who work 
alongside the police in public spaces due to their functions. However, although 
sharing the same space and having similar objectives, private policing companies are 
not the police. At least in democratic countries, the police have more legal power, 
such as when it comes to arrests, the use of weapons, and investigative powers. 
Looking at the governance of security as a continuum (Jones and Newburn, 1998), 
the police would be its most formal end, followed by private policing companies. 
The next actors in this continuum towards its informal end would be security 
companies providing security measures for various enclaves in the urban landscape 
(see Figure 4.4). Nevertheless, no matter how specialised their functions might be, all 
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of these agencies are part of a wider policing security network/patchwork 
(Wakefield, 2009) or multi-agency policing arrangement (Yarwood, 2007a) among 
other less formal actors, such as neighbourhood watches, that seek to establish the 
abstract state of being secure for as many inhabitants of the urban space as possible.  
 
Figure 4.4: Structuring different policing actors under consideration of space 
 
Source: Own figure.  
 
It has therefore been argued that, at least for geographical work on private security 
agencies, there is a possible new actor in the multi-agency policing network (Button, 
2002; Yarwood, 2007a,) besides the police and private security companies: the 
private policing company. Policing companies that operate in public spaces range 
between the police and security companies, who operate strictly on private property 
and deal with loss prevention (see Figure 4.4).  
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What the literature also suggests is that in recent years these private policing 
agencies have gained more and more power, which invites geographers to conduct 
grounded studies on the issue. Private policing companies create social control in an 
organised way and hence are establishing an absence of danger that leads to a state of 
security. In opposition to that, secure private security companies create a consumer 
friendly environment and do not establish a social order. Nevertheless, these are 
theoretical observations and the differences that exist have been emphasised to make 
this argument. The realities on the ground or in individual spaces might often be not 
as clearly structured as the different lines in Figure 4.4 portrays them, but may in fact 
be much more blurry. There is therefore a need to examine this model and the 
spatialities of private policing in more detail. The following chapter describes the 
methods that were used to do this. 
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CHAPTER V: METHODOLOGY  
5.1 Introduction  
This study is based on a case-study in Cape Town, South Africa. Specifically, it is 
based on the City-Bowl district and the surrounding neighbourhoods of Woodstock 
and Sea Point (see Map 5.1). This site comprises the centre of the city, including the 
CBD, the main tourist areas and important transport hubs. The first large scale 
private policing schemes originated here and, as the next chapter will outline, it has 
experienced a growth in private policing linked to the growth of an urban 
development programme based on revanchist public space. The site is also close to 
various residential suburbs hosting different classes (from middle- to upper-class), 
each with their own security schemes, as well as smaller sub-centres that have 
organised policing themselves, following the ideas of the centre. 
Two extended field visits were made to Cape Town. The first trip, from July to 
October 2009, was for preliminary research, where the first data were collected and 
relevant actors identified. This trip was combined with a separate research project on 
urban security in Maputo, Mozambique (see Paasche and Sidaway, 2010 in 
Appendix F). The second fieldwork period, in which the main body of data was 
gathered, was from May to July 2010. By drawing on the contacts and preliminary 
findings from the first fieldwork trip, work could start immediately, enabling the 
collection of a rich and focused dataset that addressed the research questions. The 
findings of this thesis are based on 47 semi-structured interviews, 15 ethnographic 
structured non-participant observations and three cartography projects. 
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5.2 The case study approach  
Yin (1994) and Bryman (2004) argue that the case study is the best research design 
when the ‗focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context‘ 
(Yin, 1994: 1). The case study enables the research of wider, general theories and 
ideas or hypotheses in a particular space, to see if they are being confirmed but also 
how they might vary or evolve. On the downside, case studies have the disadvantage 
of low external validity (Bryman, 2004; Schofield, 1993; Bailey et al., 1999; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). In short, a small sample size makes more general comments 
beyond the immediate case study less academically valid as they lack the data, and 
therefore knowledge, to be supported.  
Yin (1994: 10, 36–37), however, claims that the findings of a case study are 
generalizable, not to populations and universes, but, rather, to ‗theoretical 
propositions or theories that build on the gained insights‘. Referring to Geerz (1973), 
and Lincoln and Guba (1985), Bryman (2004) presents the concept of transferability 
and states that by providing a ‗thick description‘, which means ‗rich accounts of the 
details of a culture‘ (Bryman, 2004: 275), it is possible to transfer findings to other, 
similar milieus. Behnke et al. (2006) put forward a similar argument when they claim 
that it is not possible to generalize a single case, but that a researcher is able to take a 
single case as an example for general connections. A single case, in combination 
with a general theory, can lead to a new general insight.  
Local peculiarities notwithstanding, the case-study of Cape Town allowed theoretical 
departures to be made and, as Chapter 10 will outline, broader contributions to the 
understanding of urban space. In terms of its geographic scale, Cape Town was large 
enough to have a variety of security schemes, which enables some generalizable 
comments to be made. Equally, the site was small enough to allow a clear overview  
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Map 5.1: Boundaries of the case study site in Cape Town, South Africa 
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of all relevant actors. Thus, the case study of Cape Town allowed the four research 
questions outlined in Table 5.1 to be examined using the methodology outlined in the 
following sections. 
 
Table 5.1: Research questions and main methods of instigation 
1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and 
practices of private policing and private security 
companies in public space?  
Semi-structured interviews and 
ethnographic observations 
2. What is the impact of private policing on urban 
territory?  
Observations, also interviews in which 
observations were discussed 
3. Assess the significance of private policing 
networks on social geographies.  
Observations, also interviews in which 
observations were discussed 
4. What are the consequences of private policing 
for Cape Town’s public space and society? 
Interpretation of the data in 
combination with the reviewed 
literature. 
 
 
5.3 Methods 
The methodology follows the logic of triangulation, or the multi-method research. 
Originally connected to the issue of validation, particularly of quantitative results 
(Punch, 1999; Flick, 2006; Cope, 2010), triangulation allows insights to be made on 
a research topic from different angles and strengthens the findings (Mason, 1998; 
Clifford et al., 2010). Applying semi-structured interviews enables an understanding 
of the different actors involved in the policing landscape. However, interviews are 
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likely to reflect a particular institutional perspective, so the observations were useful 
to supplement the interview findings. The mapping again shaped the understanding 
of the cases study site and strongly influenced the interview schedules and the 
conversations during the observations.       
  
5.3.1 Interviews 
It was decided to utilise in depth, semi-structured interviews with various 
organisations involved in the governance of security, as they allowed an exploration 
of the research questions in detail, including the possibility of following up on new 
or interesting themes. An interview schedule provided guidance to ensure that all the 
important issues were addressed and permitted the option to fall back on some pre-
formulated questions if the interview dynamics were difficult, such as if a participant 
was not very communicative and needed to be prompted to collect the relevant 
information (Crang and Cook, 1995; Punch, 1999; Bryman, 2004; Longhurst, 2004; 
Cloke et al., 2007).  
The key actors in the case study area were identified during the first explorative visit 
to the city. This group of participants is usually referred to as the elite or key 
informants (Scheyvens et al. 2007; Herod, 1999; Rice, 2010). This group comprised 
representatives of private governance bodies, member of the city council, members 
of different political parties, representatives of private security companies that 
operate in public space, members of the social development landscape and 
representatives of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, interviews with 
marginalised groups, such as squatters, homeless people and housing activists, were 
also conducted. Except for the last group, most of the people interviewed possessed a 
considerable degree of power or formal knowledge over the case study‘s space, often 
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by being in some formal position. Existing contacts were utilised as gatekeepers 
(Cloke et al., 2007), which enabled snowball sampling (Crang and Cook, 1995) and 
access to participants who would be otherwise difficult to access, such as public 
servants of the court or large security companies.      
In other instances, smaller security companies were identified through their signs on 
the street or from visible officers. Once identified, these companies were approached 
directly to schedule an interview, which was sometimes conducted on the spot. Other 
ways to set up interviews were to contact and meet journalists or organisations 
mentioned in the local paper (Crang and Cook, 1995). Furthermore, some interviews 
were carried out spontaneously, for example one interview took place with squatters 
after witnessing their eviction.    
Setting up interviews: Although the literature suggests using a very formal method 
for setting up the interviews (see for example Crang and Cook, 1995), it was decided 
very early in the study not to adopt this approach. Experience taught that if a 
prospective participant was left in a position of control to take the next step, by 
replying to an email or returning a call, it rarely happened. Instead it was decided to 
go up to a company or organisation‘s office and ask for the relevant person to meet 
them (known as ‗cold calling‘). If this was not possible, a business card was left and 
a phone call made later, after being given a phone number, or a return trip would be 
made the next day. In other words, this ensured the initiative remained with me 
whenever possible. Although this was a time consuming process, it helped, except 
for two or three cases, to set up interviews with all the initially-targeted individuals 
and organisations.     
Interview schedule: Before departing to the field, different general interview 
schedules were prepared for different groups who it was planned to target for 
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interviews. This included members of governance organisations, representatives of 
private security companies and politicians. Once an interview had been set up, the 
schedules were reworked to fit the individual interview using existing information on 
the particular participant or his or her organisation. All the interview schedules 
consisted of three main themes: how the issue of governance is linked to private 
policing and social services on the ground; what ideas of space exist and how they 
are pursued; and a third section on how the services (policing and social 
development) are offered (Longhurst, 2004; Cloke et al. 2007). Examples of the 
interview schedules can be found in Appendix A.  
While the interview schedule was very formal at the beginning of the research, this 
changed gradually with time and increasing knowledge of the space. Once a general 
knowledge had been gained, the questions became more detailed, following the 
specific ideas and interests that were built on a wider understanding of private 
policing in the space. By the end of the research the schedule had morphed into a 
mere checklist of a few handwritten notes (Crang and Cook, 1995; Cloke et al. 
2007). This was especially the case in follow-up interviews with the same 
participant, or when I was particularly interested in specific questions. Another 
reason for this change was an increasing confidence in conducting the interviews that 
came with knowledge and experience. However, the changing structure of the 
interview schedule also meant that the interview dynamics changed. While at the 
beginning it was attempted to cover all relevant themes to get a broad data set to 
work with, the atmosphere during the interviews became more relaxed towards the 
end of the research. The semi-structured interviews increasingly turned into 
narrative, unstructured interviews enabling a different kind of data that was less 
focused on facts but allowed the various themes that came up to be explored (Seale, 
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1998; Punch, 1999; Hoggart et al., 2002; Cloke et al. 2007). Letting participants talk 
more freely, having time to expand on what they considered as important or to 
integrate anecdotes into the conversation enabled a better understanding to be gained 
about the space and for issues to be explored that had not been considered before, as 
some information opened up new ways of thinking and seeing the researched space 
(such as the theme of social development that will be outlined in Section 9.4).  
Location and recording: The majority of the interviews were conducted in the 
offices of the participants or in public cafes. At the beginning of each interview the 
participants were asked if they were happy for the conversation to be recorded. If that 
was the case, the interview was recorded on a digital recorder. All recordings have 
since been transcribed. In the cases where a recording was not agreed, notes were 
taken. The reason for this was usually a general discomfort with the microphone and 
issues of confidentially or the sensitivity of the data. If this was the case and 
information was shared off the record, the recorder was switched off.  
In five instances a recording of the interview was not requested. These instances 
usually involved groups that can be called powerless. The reason for this was so as 
not to formalise the situation and to keep the atmosphere relaxed. In these instances 
the key issues were either written down directly afterwards or notes were taken 
during the interview. All notes taken have been transferred to a laptop and 
supplemented with other fresh memories directly after the interview. Ultimately, of 
the 47 informants 27 were not recorded.  
 
5.3.2 Ethnographic observations 
Following the logic of triangulation, ethnographic observations were unitised. While 
Cloke et al. (2007) and Crang and Cook (1995) argue that ethnographic observations 
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are suitable for building an understanding the lives of the people in a case study site 
in general, it has also been argued that they are particularly useful for researching the 
police. Punch (1993), Keith (1992), Holdaway (1982) and Herbert (1996b) are 
examples of where ethnographic observations provided in-depth insights into the life 
and reality of police forces that could not have been obtained without close 
observation of the daily work and the routines of police officers. As outlined in 
Section 4.2, Rigakos (2002) and Wakefield (2003) performed similar studies on the 
routine of private security companies. 
Although there seem to be different opinions on what exactly ethnographic 
observations are (compare Cook and Crank, 1995, with Behnke et al., 2006 and 
Diekmann, 2002), three pairs of characterising features for ethnographic observations 
have been identified. These pairs are covert vs open observations (Walsh, 1998); 
participant vs non-participant observation
11
 (Punch, 1999; Diekmann, 2002; Behnke 
et al., 2006); and structured vs unstructured observations (Punch, 1999). As all the 
observations were done openly (since I am not trained as a security officer in order to 
participate covertly and to avoid complications regarding the ethics of covert 
observation), this will not be discussed in greater detail as it does not apply
12
. The 
observations that were carried out were therefore either structured non-participant, or 
unstructured non-participant. All three kinds of observations will be outlined in the 
following section. 
For the structured non-participant observations, permission was sought to go on 
patrol with the guards after an interview with a key actor in the individual site, such 
                                                 
11
 Here the grade of participation can be differentiated as well (Walsh, 1998; Punch, 1999), something 
ignored in this case. 
12
 Here the question of open from what perspective arises. The observations were communicated 
openly from the perspective of the hosting security/governance body. However, from the perspective 
of, for example, a street person being approached by the patrols, I appeared like another white 
authority. On other occasions, such as friendly chats, I was introduced as a researcher. Consequently 
‗open‘ should be put in inverted commas, as real openness cannot be achieved in this kind of research.  
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as a CID. This was granted in about half of the cases. The patrols had a very different 
character depending on the company and nature of the space. In some cases I walked 
alongside routine patrols with either a security guard or a CID manager. In others I 
sat on the backseat of the patrol car observing and chatting with the officer in charge. 
As the patrol guards often work 12-hour shifts driving up and down the streets, they 
were usually happy to have someone to talk to. In all of these cases the patrol had the 
character of an extensive narrative interview as there was talking most of the time. 
Notes were not taken on any of the observations, except for an occasional quick note 
of a particular phrase or word that was used. While some argue for the 
‗ethnographer‘s bladder‘ (Crang and Cook, 1995: 21-35), meaning using toilet 
breaks to take notes, others (such as Walsh, 1998; Laurier, 2010) suggest taking 
notes directly after the observation. In these interviews it felt inappropriate to take 
notes as the hope was to see the security in action. Since it was a common theme that 
I had to convince the participants that I was not a journalist (something most security 
companies are very careful about), I did not want to do anything that anyone could 
associate with journalists. It was felt that if they thought everything they said would 
be written down it could all too easily change their behaviour and jeopardise the 
observation. In retrospect there is still doubt if some of the statements, such as on 
bending the law, would have been made if the participants had seen that notes were 
being taken. Instead notes and impressions of the observed were taken directly after 
the observation in a notebook or directly onto a laptop. In terms of events, the patrols 
were very usually quiet and involved lots of chats with shop owners and vendors. 
Occasionally it could get a bit loud when drunken street people were involved, but it 
was rarely violent. Possible risks had been addressed beforehand in the risk 
assessment that can be found in Appendix B. 
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Two valuable points were made through following the patrols. Firstly, through being 
in the same space every day the patrols helped to improve my understanding of the 
space and I started to see the landscape through the eyes of the security patrols. It is 
the little things that show a sort of subculture of the revanchist city one usually does 
not see. For example, there are the so-called rent boys (underage male sex workers) 
who hide their belongings under the sewage drain covers, and that it is part of the 
daily routine of the security guards to keep street people or urban poor outside ‗their‘ 
space leading to a constant struggle for every metre of a sidewalk that is being 
claimed and reclaimed over and over again, day after day. As Herbert (2000) argues, 
it is particularly through these small routine issues that a better understanding can be 
gained of other‘s lives. While more spectacular events might have been better suited 
to making a point and capturing the reader‘s attention (as in Herbert, 1996b), the 
smaller observations help to understand the researched cases better.    
A number of perspectives, despite their differences, concur with the 
proposition that the link between macro-level social phenomena and micro-
level dynamics represents one of the pivotal moments in social life. Here 
ethnography provides an important methodological way forward, because it 
enables an exploration of the processes and meanings through which 
everyday life is maintained. It therefore provides understandings of how daily 
life is connected to – or disconnected from – the broader structural 
imperatives that create the horizon of possibilities for human agents (Herbert 
2000: 564). 
Furthermore, the observations complement the interviews and put statements made in 
them in to perspective. In retrospect, it can be said that the results of the research 
would look very different if it had not been for the observations. Following Megoran 
(2006), the ethnographic observations become a counterpart to the interviews, which 
tend to be constructed in an artificial environment. As an example, the head of a 
larger security entity was interviewed and carefully outlined the legal limitations of 
the guards; a few days after the interview I sat in the backseat of a patrol car of the 
same company, and while the driver was repeating the legal limitations, his colleague 
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shouted to a ‗vagrant‘ at the other side of the street ‗if I see you one more time I will 
lock you up‘. Immediately, this one sentence put the whole idea around legalities into 
perspective, as the guard has no legal right whatsoever to lock anyone up for 
standing around.  
However, for reasons unknown, many of the requested observations were not 
permitted by the governance body of the security companies themselves. If 
speculating, one reason for this could be the fact that the companies sometimes 
operate in a legal grey-area and do not want to be researched; this will be outlined 
further in the following empirical chapters. Therefore, the number of direct 
participant observations was fewer than hoped for. Nevertheless, as the following 
chapters will indicate, they did supplement the interviews and allowed valuable 
insights that would not have been obtained otherwise. 
In addition, more natural unstructured participant ethnographic observations were 
performed simply by living in the space that is being studied. Here the researcher is 
part of the landscape (in this case the security landscape), by, for example, being a 
member of a gentrification process or the kind of individual that the local revanchist 
city or suburb targets (Walsh, 1998; May 2001; Cloke et al., 2007)
13
. While these 
unstructured, participant observations of ‗going native‘ were originally applied in the 
context of ethnographers researching tribes in the bush or somewhere deep in the 
tropical rainforest, it now refers to a researcher living in case study sites and 
experiencing life first hand, in this case the governance of security.  
[E]thnographic research has developed out of a concern to understand the 
world views and ways of life of actual people in the contexts of their 
everyday, lived experiences and the method of participant observation is the 
means by which ethnographers have often done this. In its basic form it can 
                                                 
13
 However, as Laurier (2010) argues, this can be a participant observation as well, depending on the 
research question. When researching the sociology of people, living in a space can itself be the 
participatory element. 
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be described as a three stage process in which the researcher somehow, first, 
gains access to a particular community, second, lives and/or works among the 
people under study in order to take on their world views and ways of life, 
and, third, travels back to the academy to makes sense of this through writing 
up an account of that community's 'culture' (Crang and Cook, 1995: 21). 
During the fieldwork the I lived in the case study site at all times, so during the banal 
activities of daily life such as running, going shopping or having a coffee in one of 
Cape Town‘s street cafes, valuable observations could be made. They informed the 
research, even if just by helping me to understand the space better. When in later 
chapters the issue of exclusion of ‗others‘ from the privately policed sites is being 
discussed, this is based on the interview data and participant observations. However, 
while living in a street just off one of the researched sites, meaning the space from 
which street people and urban poor are being excluded, urinating and defecating 
were constant issues. Furthermore, it was noticed daily how street people washed and 
dried their clothes just outside the CID boundary using the fences of my 
neighbourhood as their ‗washing line‘. On other occasions it was clear when the CID 
security and the police had ‗cracked down‘ on the street people, as they call it. On 
these occasions familiar street people would come to the case study site when friends 
and I were sitting outside, behind the wall to the street, and showed bruises while 
asking for cigarettes or some of the food that was cooking on the braai (Afrikaans 
for barbecue). These are all small observations that created an in-depth 
understanding of the space.  
This section will discuss two issues linked to ethnographic observations and ethics; a 
discussion on the more practical side of ethics follows below. The first issue is the 
betrayal of participants, while the other communicates a potential source that can 
bias observations. Keith (1992) argues that for an ‗angry writer‘, an academic who is 
driven by political motivation, ethnographic observations are ‗in part, an act of 
betrayal‘ (Keith, 1992: 554). In his case he was coming from an anti-racist 
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background to research the institutionalised racism in the police force. In the 
progress of his research he felt that he was abusing every friendly relation he built 
with the police officers he was spending his days with in the name of his anti-racist 
research. Arguably this kind of research is undemocratic, exploitative and partially 
unethical, but the individual researcher has to decide if this is justified by a wider 
goal, in his case anti-racism. However, as Keith (1992) notes, this is not only a 
theoretical problem. Not agreeing with the fundamental viewpoints of the 
participants can put the researcher in a difficult position if, for example, one of the 
officers makes a racist comment. Should this be answered by the researcher 
jeopardising the good relationship with the policemen he is depending on? Keith 
gives an example where an ‗outing‘ as a left-wing researcher bounced back 
negatively on him:  
However, getting onto politics was a big mistake. Some interests might have 
been shared, but politics clearly were not and in the early hours of the 
morning silence followed a disagreement that was capped with the comment: 
'So what are you going to do once you have finished with us then? Write up 
your horror stories about the brutality of the police in London in a book then 
or just put them in stories in one of those left wing newspapers?' (Keith, 
1992: 554-555). 
Nevertheless, Keith (1992) concludes that to most methodological problems there is 
no clear answer. The final decision has to be made individually by the researcher 
using the discussed examples only as reference points for their own considerations. 
Being rather critical on the issue being researched I encountered similar experiences 
during the fieldwork that were not easy to deal with. As a PhD student with funding 
that will run out after three years, there is a pressure to collect enough data to be able 
to finish the thesis within this time. Furthermore, it is a duty of social science to 
research issues that deserve critical attention. On the other hand the research has to 
be justified on an ethical and personal level. The solution for this conundrum has 
been two legged. First, I did not push the already difficult process of negotiating 
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access to a patrol once a dataset was perceived to be sufficient for an analysis. 
Secondly, the data used has to be judged in the particular context of Cape Town, 
South Africa. Here opinions on crime and policing are more extreme as they are 
linked to the security situation in the country and may possibly cause alarm to 
‗western ears‘. In various instances I myself reminded participants that the recorder 
was still running in cases where drastic opinions were being described, or I double 
checked if certain statements were still on-the-record to avoid possible 
misunderstandings later on. Although all were happy with this, I still did not use 
these extreme or direct statements in the thesis to avoid a possible ‗betrayal‘ of the 
participants in Keith‘s (1992) sense meaning to use them for my personal gain. The 
data provided in this thesis reflect or are exemplary of statements made by other 
participants as well and which are covered by the consent forms (see discussion 
below). No extreme quotes were used in order to ‗shock‘ the reader or get more 
attention. In fact, by South African standards the data used is rather moderate in its 
language. As an example, statements made on exclusionary practices were not 
hidden but were openly communicated, and they are visible in public spaces anyway. 
Even heavy-handed security practices are often openly discussed as they can be seen 
as an indication that a security company is doing its job, and can be a sign of quality 
rather than something that has to be downplayed. In other words, security measures 
and the language about them come with the territory they are placed in. As the 
following chapter will outline, the territory in this case is rather extreme in its nature.                 
This leads to the issue of positionality. Referring to a quote from Punch (1979: 13) 
on police research, Fyfe (1991) cautions that observations on policing bodies can be 
biased by the politics of the institution, running the danger that the researcher is 
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being ‗used‘ to communicate a certain picture of the organisation and their work. As 
one officer told Punch:  
How much do you think you found out when you were with us? ... Well, we 
only let you see what we wanted you to see. You only saw about 50%. We 
showed you only half the story (Punch, 1979 in Fyfe, 1991: 261). 
There is very little the researcher can do to avoid this, except for discussing this 
possible bias in the methodology section of his or her work. However, there was one 
instance during a patrol with two white senior officers of a security company where I 
got the feeling that they offered a very honest and unbiased picture of the South 
African revanchist city.  
During the whole patrol the officers talked about weapons; fictive 
machinegun nests to take out the street people and skollies and so on. At 
some point the patrol went up a street that it is a popular place for street 
people to camp out. Soon the patrol found a group of teenagers sleeping in 
the sun. However, there was a gap between the street on which we were and 
the camp of the teenagers on the other side. Feeling safe from retaliation one 
of the teens made the mistake to show an officer the finger. Immediately the 
situation tensed and I had to run to the car which than started to speed over to 
the other side of the street. Once the teenager who showed the finger realised 
that he was in trouble he started running. By the time we made it to the other 
side he was gone so the patrol started searching for him calling backup via the 
radio. Soon one of the officers found the boy hiding under dirty blankets. 
Threatened with a 2.5 million volt electro shocker the boy took off again. 
However, before taking up the chase the white officers told their black 
backup that had arrived in the meantime to collect all of the boy‘s belongings 
and to take them away. So while the teenager was watching from a distance, 
his belongings were loaded up into a van to be dumped somewhere out of his 
reach. To my relief we never caught up with boy later that day. This 
observation showed the full force that is being applied against the ‗others‘. 
What I witnessed today were two highly trained security operatives (one of 
them ex-special forces) hunting down a street child who had dared to show 
them the finger (Observation 03). 
After this occasion we met up with the manager of the same company for a coffee. 
While his colleagues were telling him about the day, the manager got paler and paler, 
realising that his staff might have been too honest during their patrol, considering a 
researcher had been sat in the back of the car the whole time. Hidden in a joke he 
told me that he would deny everything when he read about it in the next day‘s paper. 
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After assuring him that the researcher was not a journalist the conversation was 
ended. However, during later observations with that very same company it was felt 
that the officers had been ‗briefed‘ before as they were less exciting, to say the least. 
As mentioned above, these are problems that come with ethnographic police research 
and may possibly bias the data set. Nevertheless, this occasional control of what was 
supposed to be seen, which can still only be assumed, does not influence the data to 
the extent that it is not representing the policing practices anymore for three reasons. 
First, there is a notion of pride about policing measures as a counterbalance to the 
many and brutal crimes, which participants wanted to share and saw as a sign of 
quality. Secondly, I lived in the case study site and so was constantly observing the 
security. Over a period of nine months I was able to watch the security closely and 
saw their own idea of the policing landscape, which was confirmed by the 
observations. Thirdly, interviews were conducted with critics of private policing and 
the ones most affected by these measures in order to balance out possible bias in the 
ethnographic dataset.    
 
5.3.3 Mapping 
Criminologists have talked about the need to map differently policed spaces or zones 
of governance. ―[T]here is much work to be done in mapping this changing 
morphology of governance and it is interesting to speculate on how the task of nodal 
cartography might develop‖ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 147). Furthermore, 
criminologists commonly use spatial ideas to visualise their arguments. As Zedner 
states:  
Other observers see security itself as forming tangible new formations 
variously described by a series of graphic metaphors that include security 
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‗patchworks‘,  ‗quilts‘, ‗bubbles‘, ‗corridors‘, ‗mosaics‘, ‗webs‘, ‗networks‘, 
and ‗nodes‘ (Zedner, 2009: 61).  
Although these concepts are indeed tangible, they principally stay as metaphors. In 
none of the criminological literature is the changing security and governing 
landscape actually mapped, as in producing a map of a space showing the different 
nodes. However, there are fairly clear guidelines that suggest how to identify a 
governance node through four characteristic points (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; 
Burris, 2006; Wood, 2006; Shearing and Johnston, 2010). 
[M]entalities (relating to how nodes think about security); technologies 
(relating to the methods they might use to facilitate it); resources (relating to 
the social, cultural, economic or other means they might deploy in its further-
ance); and institutions (relating to the structures that enable the mobilization 
of resources, mentalities and technologies in pursuit of security) (Shearing 
and Johnston, 2010: 503, own emphasis).  
This is further explained by Burris: 
To be a governing node as this theory defines it, a node must have some 
institutional form. It need not be a formality constituted or legally recognized 
entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the 
mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time. A street 
gang can be a node, as can a police station or even a particular shift at a 
firehouse. A node like this may be primarily part of an integrated network, 
like a department in a firm; it may be linked to other nodes in multiple 
networks without having a primary network affiliation, like a small lobbying 
form; or may be what we call a ‗superstructural node,‘ which brings together 
representatives of different nodal organizations (...) to concentrate the 
members‘ resources and technologies for a common purpose but without 
integrating the various networks -  a trade association for example (Burris, 
2004, 341-342, in Wood, 2006: 219). 
As Wood claims, ‗governance is never fully actualized by a single node‘ (2006: 219), 
but shows different development in each of the defining characteristics. 
Having identified the nodes, the aim of this thesis is to perform the step of taking the 
abstract description of governance nodes and security patchworks and putting them a 
map. When only talking about them theoretically it is hard to develop an 
understanding of their scale. One of the few existing examples is Bénit-Gbaffou 
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(2008b), an urban planner who integrated a map of road closures in Johannesburg 
into her paper. Looking at the closely woven net of closed formerly-public roads in a 
particular suburb, a statement such as the increasing problems for emergency 
services finding their way suddenly becomes stronger as the reader can see the maze 
of open streets between the net of closed ones. Another example is Nemeth‘s (2010) 
and Nemeth and Hollander‘s (2010) maps of security zones and the shrinking of 
public space. Using sophisticated GIS-based mapping, these studies show how public 
space is decreasing as post 9/11 anti-terror measures are on the rise. Here the map 
first allows the extent of security measures to be quantified through their exact geo-
references, but secondly it visualises the spaces that enables the reader to grasp the 
highly spatial written facts better.     
Nevertheless, problems that can arise from the use of a map have been taken in to 
account and acknowledged (Dorling and Fairbairn 1997; Crampton, 2001; Perkins, 
2010). The most problematic issue is the one of generalisation. Introducing different 
governing bodies and policing philosophies in one category and map, it suggests that 
they are all the same, especially in terms of their power. To minimise this possible 
misconception, the different governance structures are introduced individually in the 
next chapter, while the maps are used to support the arguments and show the extent 
of space that is partially governed by private actors. Visualising an urban 
fragmentation supplements its detailed interpretation. Nevertheless, literature on the 
problems linked to mapping commonly refers to much more sophisticated projects in 
which an entire area is being mapped starting with a blank page.  
The actual maps were drawn by James Quinn and Brian Rogers of the Cartographic 
Resources Unit, SoGEES, Plymouth University, using the data provided. The basic 
layer of Cape Town was extracted from the online resource OpenStreetMap. The 
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layer was then partially re-digitised and re-labelled. New labels for main roads and 
some suburbs names were chosen for orientation purposes and to enable the reader to 
identify the areas that will be mentioned. In addition to that, various landmarks of 
either large private or non-residential spaces and mountains and hills have been 
labelled in order to point out the areas of relevant public space on the map.  
To the basic layer, different governance and policing structures were added in 
additional layers, the sources of which are mentioned below. When acknowledging 
the non-relevant spaces of the harbour, the private V&A Waterfront shopping mall 
and the slopes of the Table Mountain National Park, Lions Head and Signal Hill, the 
vast amount of urban space affected and policed by private governance structures 
becomes clear. 
To map private policing schemes in public spaces, the term ‗public space‘ had to be 
defined first. The definition used is taken from the ‗By-law regulating to streets, 
public places and the prevention of nuisance‘ (City of Cape Town, 2007) since most 
of the measures relevant to the thesis are based on this by-law and its definition of 
public space. Here public space is defined as   
(a) a public road; 
(b) any parking area, square, park, recreation ground, sports ground, sanitary 
lane, open space, beach, shopping centre on municipal land, unused or vacant 
municipal land or cemetery which has- 
(i) in connection with any subdivision or layout of land into erven [erf is a 
South African term and refers to a mostly urban plot of land designated for 
building proposes], lots or plots, being provided, reserved or set apart for use 
by the public (...)‖ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1350) 
Unless the term ‗public space‘ is being discussed in a theoretical way, this is also the 
definition for public space in the empirical section of the thesis. The boundaries of 
the CIDs were taken directly from their homepages and transferred to the map. Some 
of the boundaries of the larger residential security schemes were shared during 
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interviews. In other instances they were mapped through observation of the 
patrolling guards and warning signs on the streets.  
In the case of the smaller residential sites, they were mentioned during the 
interviews. I then asked for their exact location and if it was okay to visit the sites. 
Information on locations and the permission to visit them was granted in all cases. 
Additional sites were identified through making several walks through the case 
study. Since these sites are relatively small it is difficult to guarantee an entirely 
comprehensive map. Furthermore, the industry is highly mobile and one site can be 
gone in a street while a different site has been introduced around the corner. It is 
therefore not claimed that all the smaller sites have been mapped. It is, however, 
certain that examples of all the different kinds of security setup in public space have 
been mapped. Therefore the map categorises and visualises private commercial 
security setups in public spaces, stressing the importance of these policing entities, 
although ultimately there might be more sites than those mapped.  
 
5.4 Analysis 
Except for maps and images, all data were analysed using the NVivo 8 software. To 
do this, all interview transcripts and field diaries were coded for recurring themes. 
Using the software it is possible to structure different themes and to combine them in 
related nodes. Using thematic analysis the focus is exclusively on the identification, 
analysis and patterns (themes) within the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). In other 
words, the facts in the data are being filtered out, structured and prepared for 
interpretation. The data were analysed three times. The first time, wider themes were 
identified. Using this general structure a first draft of the empirical chapters has been 
laid out. During a second analysis, different specific themes (or nodes, as they are 
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called in the software) were identified within the main theme and internally 
structured. Once the thesis was written and the arguments made, the data set was 
examined again in order to rule out any missing or contradicting statements, or 
misinterpretations that might have occurred during the re-working of ideas.  
However, when describing strategies for the analysis of data, Cope (2010) or Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) make it sound like the researcher is seeing the data (meaning the 
actual transcripts) for the first time. While that might be the case for some projects, 
in this case I lived within the case study for about nine months, so every time I left 
the house I was in a privately policed governance setup. I talked about the interviews 
and observations with friends, housemates and fellow researchers in the city. 
Furthermore, I transcribed the interviews and transferred the observation data from a 
notebook to my laptop. In addition to the interview schedule changing constantly 
while thinking about the findings so far and adjusting to new or reoccurring themes, 
follow-up interviews were conducted when I had the feeling that my understanding 
had changed or gaps in the knowledge had occurred. In other words, I was familiar 
with the data well before entering it into NVivo. I knew the general themes as well as 
what individual interviewees had said and where to find a strong quote to make a 
point. Using the analysis software certainly helped to structure the data, but the wider 
themes existed long before starting the analysis as a separate work process.     
 
5.5 Positionality 
Reflecting on one‘s own positionality does not only pay respect to the hosting 
country, but is of importance as it almost influences the way people communicate 
with a researcher due to complex power reactions that can influence or bias the 
research findings (England, 1994, 2006; Blunt and Wills, 2000; Smith, 2004). 
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However, the difficulty with the positionality debate is that a lot of it is based on 
assumptions. In the field one does not know how far, for example, race is a factor or 
how far gender plays a role, at least in a research project where race or gender issues 
are not explicitly being examined. Therefore, this section will start with the known 
facts: I am a white male from Europe who was in his late 20s at the time of 
conducting the research, speaks English with a German accent, is doing his PhD, and 
is rather critical of neoliberal politics.     
As mentioned above, in the actual semi-structured interviews a lot of participants 
were too professional to be distracted by issues such as gender or race. They had 
been working in the landscape of urban governance for years. During the 
observations this was slightly different. Here the issue of masculinity in particular 
played a role. Being male certainly helped to get a few ‗honest‘, such as macho or 
sexist, comments out of the interviewees (e.g. ‗I would not mind to body search 
her…‘). Nevertheless, how far this would have actually influenced the research 
findings negatively is guesswork. It is no secret that the military, police and security 
landscapes are macho and male environments, but women have successfully 
conducted valuable studies in this environment (Wakefield, 2003; Berg, 2004; 
Woodward, 2004).    
In South Africa the most obvious issue would be the one of race or skin colour. 
Certainly, being white might have opened doors when working amongst people in 
this industry, many of whom were active in the apartheid forces (police, prison 
service or military) and who today see a black person in a predominantly white 
neighbourhood as a threat. So race in South Africa, and in the global south in general 
(Smith, 2004; Scheyvens and Storey, 2007), always has a strong impact on 
perceptions, but an assessment of its impact on the research would be guesswork.      
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What can, however, be assessed to some degree is the issue of my German-ness and 
privileged intellectual background. Being German or talking with a German accent 
arguably influenced the research positively. When talking to non-whites and security 
guards they felt less intimidated as in many cases English was their second language 
as well. Furthermore, many residents of the townships have positive associations 
with Germany; presumably the fact that many NGOs and development projects in the 
township are funded by the German government might be one of the reasons for this. 
In addition, the fact that Germany did well in the World Cup at the time and had 
played attractive football was a useful point of departure for many conversations on 
the street. 
In interviews with white security representatives I had the feeling that in various 
instances my German-ness, or maybe non-British-ness facilitated the interview for 
historical reasons. Several times participants proudly pointed out their partially 
German roots. In addition to that, I had a very strong suspicion that the fact of I 
spoke English as a second language presented me as less of a threat and facilitated 
very open and honest conversations. Being ‗superior‘ in terms of their English and 
talking to a non-South African, it was sensed that they somehow felt that they needed 
to explain things very carefully to make sure I had understood what they were saying 
or were not presupposing I had some information, something that facilitated a rich 
data set. Talking about this with a black South African journalist, he confirmed that 
he could have never have conducted such interviews, although being a journalist 
would have been a barrier to this as well.  
On the issue of working in other cultures, I followed a pragmatic approach. Although 
relevant literature was studied (Smith, 2004; Scheyvens and Storey, 2007), the fact 
that the case studies were not the global south put their relevance under question. 
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Instead Sidaway‘s (1992) guidelines (see Table 5.2 below) were taken into account; 
most of these issues are confirmed or also picked up by Smith (2004) and Scheyvens 
et al. (2007).  
 
Table 5.2: Guidelines for the work in other cultures 
 The researcher should not ―violate fundamental ethical standards or cultural understandings‖ 
(Sidaway 1992: 406) 
 ―The ‗researched‘ should also be informed of the general purposes and the funding of the 
investigation‖ (Sidaway 1992: 406) 
 No risk or harm should be generated for the participants 
 No false promises should be made 
 The researcher should be aware of unintended consequences  
 The results of the research should be shared 
 ―[T]he merits of research should be put into perspective‖ (Sidaway 1992: 406) 
 
Source: Sidaway 1992: 406 
 
Despite the case study not being in the global south, Moser (2008) brings an 
interesting aspect to the discussion on positionality. Unless a researcher brings any 
attributes to the field that disqualifies him or her completely in the eyes of 
participants
14
, Moser (2008) argues that personality, meaning interest in what people 
say and think and social skills, can overcome positionality issues very quickly. With 
this Moser (2008) conceptualises what I sensed during most of the research. Here a 
bonding and understanding between a participant and myself was of more 
importance than the issue of attributes such as gender and skin colour.  
                                                 
14
 Here Moser (2008) mentions scholars of Chinese descent in Muslim Indonesia and their historical 
tension towards China. In this study‘s context, Visser (2000) provides an example of how his identity 
as a white Afrikaans speaking male who studies in the UK created difficulties with most of the groups 
he encountered when returning to South Africa to research the post-apartheid city. White as well as 
Black participants perceived him with reservations for different reasons, while a white researcher with 
no Afrikaans background did not share his problems to such an extent.  
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5.6 Ethics 
All ethical considerations follow the ‘Statement on Professional Ethics‘ as written by 
the Council of the Association of American Geographers (2009) and approved by the 
Faculty of Science, Plymouth University. These considerations included that  
[t]he dignity, safety, and well-being of informants and local colleagues should 
always have precedence over the goals of the project. Informants and local 
researchers should be asked whether they prefer anonymity or recognition, 
and the project should be implemented and its results should be presented in 
keeping with these individuals‘ preferences. Prior to participation, informants 
and local collaborators have a basic right to know the purpose of the project 
and the end uses of the information (Council of the Association of American 
Geographers, 2009).  
These ethical concerns were assured by a used consent form that outlined the aims of 
the research project (the consent form used can be found in Appendix C). All 
participants were given a consent form signed by me that guaranteed anonymity 
unless stated otherwise and gave the option to withdraw from the study completely 
any time. This form was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Science, 
University of Plymouth. A second copy of this form was signed by most of the 
participants and returned to me. Some felt uncomfortable with signing a form but 
gave verbal consent and kept a version signed by me.  
Although I had numerous chats with low-ranked security guards, urban poor and 
street people during the research, only the two longer ones formed part of the 47 
interviews. One was a spontaneous interview with a group of squatters who had just 
been evicted and were sitting with all their belongings on the street. I started talking 
with a woman and explained my background as a researcher to her. She was happy 
talking about her situation while her friends were preparing lunch on the busy 
pavement. However, since the whole situation was rather informal and no consent 
form was signed, this interview was not cited. The reason for listing it amongst the 
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interviews is that it informed me greatly in my understanding of the space and should 
therefore be listed as a source.  
Another interview was conducted with a group of street people. In a previous 
interview I had talked to a social development worker who had offered to set it up to 
give me a different perspective. After a couple of days the fieldworker was met again 
in the evening and we looked for a street person he knew that could usually be found 
in that area. When he found the person, the fieldworker introduced me and explained 
the situation. The street person agreed to being interviewed and invited the 
fieldworker and myself to his place the next day. Following the advice of the 
fieldworker, I bought a few Gatsby‘s (a Cape Townian sandwich) and some soft 
drinks for a late lunch. During the conversation with the street people the fieldworker 
stayed in the background to give reassurance to all involved. However, these data are 
not cited in the thesis because interviews with so-called vulnerable groups were not 
covered by the ethics form for the project. As the benefits gained from such data did 
not outweigh the difficulties and issues of ensuring ethical research, as well as 
obtaining the ethical clearance from the Faculty of Science and Technology of the 
Plymouth University, it is not possible to use these interviews in the thesis. 
Similarly the many conversations with low-ranked security guards are not cited 
directly to avoid possible negative consequences with their employees that could not 
be foreseen at that stage. This reflects their own concerns as well as the issues raised 
by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Science and Technology of the Plymouth 
University. Nevertheless, although not cited or referenced, data from these so-called 
‗vulnerable groups‘ influenced the research strongly in more indirect ways. It helped 
me to understand the space I was working in better. By listening to these groups my 
critical understanding was shaped which led to modifications of the interview 
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schedules with the more elite-level participants and shaped the critical interpretation 
of the findings. Since I believe that the thesis would look different if it were not for 
these conversations, they need to find mentioned at this point in order to be truly 
reflective.   
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Up to this point the thesis has worked out the gaps in the body of research and 
translated them into research questions. Furthermore, methods to answer these 
research questions have been introduced. Applying a triangular approach, semi-
structured interviews, different kinds of observation and a mapping exercise were 
carried out. While individual methods have their weakness when being applied on 
their own, a combination of them aimed to minimise the downsides and to emphasise 
their advantages. Assessing the effectiveness of the methodology, it is not perfect 
and the problems have been outlined above. However, it can be claimed with 
confidence that it enables a solid foundation for the research underlying this PhD 
thesis.  
Interviews, it has been argued, have the disadvantage of being vulnerable to the 
politics of the individual participants‘ agendas. By relying on them, potential 
problems might be denied, taken into perspective or overemphasised by critics. On 
the other hand, the observations focus merely on the street level and the day-to-day 
policing. What they do not show are things such as the ideas and developments 
behind the actual policing and in whose interest the policing is performed. However, 
combined with the interviews they are a powerful method that complements the 
insights of the interviews. In various cases an observed incident was pointed out to 
an interviewee who would then make some remarks to put it into perspective or 
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would use the situation to make honest self-critical insights. The mapping, which 
started out as a supplementary method, became of increasing importance and 
established itself as a core element of the research. Inspired by the approach of 
psychogeography (Paasche and Sidaway, 2010), the maps aim to communicate how 
the security setups work and how dominant they are in the public spaces in central 
Cape Town.  
Before analysing the results of these exercises in detail, it is necessary to consider 
them within the context of South Africa and its wider geographies of policing. The 
following chapter will outline some of the geo-political changes that have occurred 
in South Africa, particularly since the end of apartheid, and how these have affected 
the policing of its urban spaces.   
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CHAPTER VI: SECURITY AND SPACE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
6.1 Introduction 
It is the year 2020. Johannesburg has become a city of urban forts. These forts 
are scattered across the city, creating an intricate maze of illegible urban cells. 
Wealthy citizens live, work and play in these bastions of brick and iron. Many 
of these fortified buildings or protected enclaves are connected by enforced 
bridges across public throughways. However, when the residents of these 
enclaves are forced to leave their safety zones, they do so within the safety of 
their cars, dreading every moment they are ‗out there‘, exposed to the mercy 
of the ‗criminals‘ in the violent public realm. 
These public areas are the war zones of the city – a den of deadly forces that 
threaten the very existence of those seeking safety in their private fortresses. 
They are also the living places of the urban poor who have to face the dangers 
of unprotected areas. These people are without any means or choice. They are 
the street people of the ‗dead-spaces‘ – literally and figuratively. No longer 
are these public spaces used by and shared by all the urban residents as in 
times gone by. It is only those who do not have a choice that are left to live 
their lives in these derelict and dangerous areas. The city has been taken over 
by the many private micro-governments and the poor, the homeless and the 
unfortunate are left the victims of a system of enclosed fortresses for the 
privileged (Landman, 2000: 7). 
This chapter will introduce the case study site of Cape Town, South Africa. In order 
to do so the relevant urban changes and changes in policing over the last three 
decades will be introduced at the national scale to provide a context for 
contemporary Cape Town and its policing landscape. It will argue that the post-
apartheid city is characterised by new forms of urban segregation. The ones that can 
afford it withdraw to secured private spaces and the little public space that remains, 
as the quote above shows, is perceived as dangerous and hostile. The country 
suffered from high levels of segregation and racial discrimination during apartheid 
and now faces new forms of urban divisions that perpetuate old apartheid structures 
(e.g. Peyroux, 1996; Beavon, 2000; Samara, 2010a, 2010b) and create extreme 
examples of urban fragmentation and exclusion.  
The growth of secured private spaces caused a boom of private security in the 
country, which, as Chapter 3 showed, was needed to secure urban enclaves, or ‗forts‘ 
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as Landman (2000: 7) called them. However, while private space was booming, 
public spaces, especially the inner cities, went into decline. However, this 
deprivation caused a countermovement whereby private governance structures were 
established to push the renewal of public space using ideas of the revanchist city 
(Smith, 1996, 1998; MacLeod, 2002; Atkinson, 2003; Swanson, 2007). This thesis 
focuses on one example of urban renewal and the use of private governance actors 
and private police to secure it. However, before focusing on Cape Town, the chapter 
outlines the broader social and political contexts in which these changes occurred. 
Only by understanding the racist segregation of the past, does private policing in the 
present make sense. 
  
6.2 From the apartheid to the post-apartheid city 
The transformation and democratisation of space and society after the extreme era of 
apartheid was, and still is, a slow and difficult process. While there are many aspects 
that could be looked at, this section will focus on key economic changes, the de-
segregation process and changes in the policing landscape. However, in order to 
understand the current policies of the South Africa in which the findings of the thesis 
are embedded, it is necessary to grasp some aspects of the nature of the apartheid 
state first. Although the most obvious feature was the racial segregation rooted in the 
racist and strange religious ideas of white superiority, the core of the apartheid state 
was a deeply capitalist agenda that used the vast non-white labour force, making up 
about 80% of the population, to the advantage of the white population. As Davies et 
al. describe: 
Whites, or more especially the Afrikaans-speaking section of the white 
population, popularly known as Boers, are presumed to suffer from intense 
racial prejudice, and this system of racial discrimination is the result. It is 
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certainly true that most whites are highly racially prejudiced but this explains 
little. In our view, explanations which stress only the racial component of the 
apartheid system and fail to explain the historical development and current 
[note that year of publication was 1985] functioning of the system, are 
positively misleading. Such types of explanations actually conceal the most 
important elements of the system. 
The approach (…) assumes from the outset that the various changing 
historical forms of national oppression and racism in South Africa are 
organically lined with, and have provided the fundamental basis for, the 
development of a capitalist economy in that country. In other words, the 
various complex and intersecting class struggles through which capitalist 
forms of production and relations of productions were developed and 
consolidated under colonialism in South Africa, themselves generated racist 
ideologies and a racial structures hierarchy or economic and political power. 
The national oppression of black people in South Africa is a product of, and 
was indeed the necessary historical condition for, the development of 
capitalism in that country.  
Apartheid, then, is more than a system of intense racial discrimination. 
Fundamentally it, like that segregationist policies which preceded it, is a 
system of economic, social and political relations designed to produce cheap 
and controlled black labour, and so to generate rates of high profit (Davies et 
al., 1985: 2).   
O‘Meara (1983) makes similar arguments for the period from 1934 to 1948, in which 
Afrikaans‘ identity was consolidated. Although there is racism involved, the national 
identity served to mobilise the whites for a capitalist agenda of accumulation. This 
meant that apartheid was not only about racial segregation but was also an inherently 
capitalist project, or volkscapitalisme as O‘Meara (1983) calls it, which mobilised the 
Afrikaaner identity and racial segregation for economic growth. To understand post-
apartheid politics, it is important to be aware of the strong capitalist history of the 
country, as it explains not only the power and unequal distribution of wealth, but also 
the political changes occurring within the ANC, which again heavily influenced the 
urban policies. 
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6.2.1 Urban geographies 
The apartheid city was characterised by its tremendous level of segregation. Every 
aspect of social life, from public toilets to whole quarters were segregated and 
designed according to the idea of keeping the non-white population apart from the 
Whites in everyday life. The segregation was not complete in all areas however, as 
there was an interaction between races on economic and labour levels. Here the non-
white population was used as a cheap labour reserve to work in the factories and 
mines of the white
15
 elite, or as servants in white homes. The apartheid system 
further segregated the non-white population according to their origin, into Blacks, 
Coloureds and Asians (usually meaning Indians). At some point the level of 
segregation among the urban population reached over 90% and the small percentage 
that lived outside their racially-designated zones were often servants or employees of 
the white elite (Christopher, 1997). What has to be emphasised is that apartheid was 
a major governmental project that was initiated by the white minority that used all its 
power and repressive force to maintain it. In this context, two pieces of legislation 
are of special importance. The Group Areas Act (1950), which was the heart of 
apartheid‘s urban planning, and the National Key Points Act (1980), which allowed 
the South African Police (SAP) to give up certain duties, such as the protection of 
strategic installations, to private security companies whose growth the government 
actively facilitated (Baker, 2002; Goldberg, 2001; Christopher, 2005; Donaldson and 
Kotze, 2006)
16
. Figure 6.1 shows Davies‘ (1981) model of the old apartheid city. 
                                                 
15
 The terms Coloureds, Asians and Blacks refer to the majority of the population. Undeniably there 
were townships where Coloureds‘ lived under very poor conditions. However, at the same time there 
was a wealthy Black elite that actively continued the inequalities in the country.      
16
 Even before that, private security already played an important role in South Africa as the police was 
not centralised until 1913 and different security companies were therefore employed for various 
reasons, one of which was for protection of the diamond mines (Baker, 2002). 
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In the 1980s, however, the government started to change the apartheid system. What 
first appeared to be a loosening of the government‘s tight grip turned out to be an 
attempted modernisation of the system to keep it running for further decades. 
However, instead of securing the state‘s position, it created new tensions with the 
new black middle-class over the means of production (Simon, 1989). From that point 
onward the resistance against the apartheid system grew and finally ended in the 
repeal of the Group Area Acts in 1991 and the first free elections in 1994 when 
apartheid legally ended (Donaldson and Kotze, 2006).  
 
Figure 6.1: The apartheid-city 
 
Source: Davies 1981 in Landman, 2006: 4 
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Although officially overthrown, the apartheid order is still deeply rooted in urban 
planning, economic power relations and in society itself. Using census data from 
1996, Christopher (2001) argues that five years after the repeal of the Group Area 
Act, de-segregation had advanced very little, which is something he confirms again 
later with data from the 2001 census (Christopher, 2005). The post-apartheid city is 
instead characterised by new forms of segregation along class lines that correspond 
with the old race lines, linking the issue to the mentioned volkscapitalisme. The 
strong capitalist apartheid project used racial divisions to maintain a cheap labour 
force. With the end of legal racism this class structure still remains and is deeply 
rooted in the society and economy of the country. As Christopher explains, de-
segregation is more a re-composition of race according to class, which is the new 
dividing factor in the post-apartheid city (see also Beavon, 2000; McDonald and 
Smith, 2004; Samara, 2005; Miraftab, 2007)
17
. 
In the post-apartheid urban order, class has displaced race ‗as the determinant of 
residence‘ (Christopher, 1997). Having a large, poorer, mainly black underclass that 
builds a surplus labour reserve is one of the characteristic features of capitalism that 
appears in the implementation of neoliberalism on both global and national scales 
(Harvey, 2007). The group of Coloureds and Asians became the new middle-class, 
which had existed to a much lesser extent during apartheid, while the Whites were 
able to defend their position as middle- and upper-class. This new, but at the same 
time very old, social order describes the paradox facing the government in that on the 
one hand it has to satisfy the main tax-base, meaning the rich elite, and on the other 
                                                 
17
 This section uses the racial apartheid terminology to refer to the four groups of Blacks, Coloureds, 
Asians (manly Indian) and Whites. Although the author personally does not agree with using race as a 
demographic indicator, this is the common terminology used to analyse the contemporary post-
apartheid city as many problems inherited from apartheid are based on these racial divisions.      
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hand it has to meet its obligations towards the poorer majority of the population 
(Turok, 2001).  
 
6.2.2. Neoliberal Shift 
After the end of apartheid the new ANC government inherited these high levels of 
racial and class-based segregation. Nonetheless, the ANC gradually gave up the more 
socialist ideas of the Freedom Charter, as seen in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy (GEAR), which finally made room for a neoliberal agenda. About two years 
after the general elections in which the ANC was voted into power, neoliberal ideals 
were increasingly being applied (Magubane, 2004; Hanson and Hentz, 1999; 
McDonald and Smith, 2004; Richard, 2002; Bond, 1996; Cheru, 2001). In particular, 
Trevor Manuel, the minister of trade and industry at that time, has been identified in 
the literature as one key actors in pushing these policies (Hanson and Hentz, 1999). 
As Manuel himself explains:  
The RDP is the embodiment of the commitment of this government to the 
elimination of poverty in a rapidly growing economy and in the context of an 
open, peaceful and democratic society. For this vision to materialise, policies 
must be oriented towards the provision of basic needs, the development of 
human resources, and a growing economy capable of creating sustainable 
jobs. The success of the RDP is inherently bound by our ability to generate 
this developmental and redistributive thrust within a sound fiscal and 
macroeconomic framework. 
To give effect to the RDP in the context of a rapidly globalising and highly 
competitive international environment requires a significant change in the 
path of economic growth and development. The challenge to Government is 
to align economic policy in a way that will ensure an acceleration of 
economic growth and a substantial improvement in job creation by the turn of 
the century. The policies set out in the GEAR programme are designed to 
achieve these objectives. 
The GEAR strategy is an economic reform programme directed towards: 
a competitive fast growing economy which creates sufficient jobs for all 
jobseekers; 
a redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor; 
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a society capable of ensuring that sound health, education and other services 
are available to all; and 
an environment in which homes are safe and places of work are productive. 
(…) 
So yes, investment is important. Sustainable job creation requires a steady 
stream of capital investment. (…) For all these reasons, it is imperative that 
we take stock of the disciplines of the global economy. We need to examine 
continually how we integrate into that economy without sacrificing our 
fundamental and implacable commitment to social transformation (Manuel, 
1997). 
For someone who had originally wanted to become ‗a revolutionary with a big beard 
and a big gun‘ (Time Magazine, 2009), this is a clear commitment to forces of the 
free market. Nevertheless, to implement this kind of policy needs more than one 
person to apply an economic shift down to local councils (McDonald and Smith, 
2004).  
There are several reasons that can be identified for the neoliberal turn. One common 
factor identified is the international pressure the country faced in the first post-
apartheid years. In particular, the international financial institutions prescribed 
neoliberal reforms for South Africa that were linked to their financial aid. At the 
World Economic Forum in Cape Town, the former liberation movement broke with 
the socialist bottom-up ideals in favour of Western economic ideas, in a decision 
described by Hanson and Hentz (1999) as the neocolonialisation of the country by 
international financial institutions. However, it was not only institutions from the 
outside that were building up pressure. Richard (2002) describes the academic-
institutional-media complex, both inside as well as outside the country, as a powerful 
actor whose campaigns increased the pressure for neoliberal changes. The hegemonic 
discourse originating in elite places produced ‗policy prescriptions, position papers, 
press releases, popular columns, commentaries and programmes, news bites, expert 
interviews, and a vast panoply of well-written, illustrated books, reports, and articles‘ 
(Richard, 2002: 58) to keep up the pressure. Ultimately Richard concludes that this 
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pressure led to the neoliberal politics that are again responsible for the inequalities 
resulting in the high crime rates South Africa faces and the decreasing power of 
unions, among other effects. He therefore concludes his article with the strong 
statement ‗What terror on Robbens Island could not do to Mandela, the Davos 
culture could‘ (Richard, 2002:79). Bond (1996) and Cheru (2001) came to a similar 
conclusion when analysing the ideological shift from the RDP as the ‗social justice 
conscience‘ of the ANC toward neoliberal programmes such as the GEAR strategy, 
which was in favour of free-market and free-trade politics. Similarly, Richard (2002), 
Bond (1996) and Cheru (2001) see a betrayal of the old ideals and the ‗surrender on 
the economic front‘ as the foundation for class-based urban segregation.   
However, there is a tendency in the literature cited not to take the capitalist history of 
the country into account. Above it has been said that apartheid South Africa was a 
deeply-rooted capitalist society, and not a system in which the nation state owned all 
the assets, such as its mineral resources; instead these were held by private 
companies. The new government had to deal with the structural inequalities based on 
class and indirectly race as best as possible. This should not be read as an attempt to 
justify the policies of the ANC, but rather as an additional comment on the literature 
cited above.    
 
6.2.3 Policing in South Africa 
During apartheid the SAP applied a colonial-style policing concept, which means 
that the police were linked more closely to the military in terms of tactics and 
equipment than, for example, police forces in Western democracies (Bowling and 
Foster, 2002). One example of this is how the use of live ammunition was the 
standard tactic to disperse crowds in certain periods (Brewer, 1994), which leads 
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Cole (1999) to argue that the colonial police often had paramilitary characteristics. 
Therefore apartheid policing, as well as colonial policing, was characterised by 
violence and the use of strong force to ensure order, maintenance and internal 
security (Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Cole, 1999; Rauch, 2000; Bell and Ntsebeza, 
2003). Right from the beginning of apartheid, the SAP‘s policing strategy was 
shaped by the Whites‘ fear of the swart gevaar (black danger), and later by cold war 
rhetoric, which influenced the panic about the communism the apartheid regime saw 
approaching the northern borders.  
The focus of the apartheid government in policing tactics was, besides regular 
policing of white areas, mainly to police the boundaries between townships and the 
white quarters, leaving the non-white parts under policed (Brewer, 1994). Here the 
apartheid regime followed the so-called ‗own area‘ strategy, which means that every 
ethnic group was policed by officers of the same ethnicity. One outcome of this 
approach was, contrary to the misconception of a mainly white apartheid police 
force, that about half of the apartheid police was non-white in terms of relative 
numbers (Davies et al., 1985; Brogden and Shearing, 1993; Brewer, 1994; Rauch, 
2000). Indeed, the SAP always had problems in recruiting enough white officers, for 
a variety of reasons, leaving the police understaffed for wide periods (Brewer, 1994). 
In fact SAP was never an overly strong police force in terms of numbers, especially 
considering its authoritarian nature. With 1.4 police per 1,000 population, the ratio 
was lower than the contemporary South African Police Service (SAPS), as well as 
being lower than many liberal democracies
18
 (Brewer et al., 1988).  
                                                 
18
 For comparison: Police per 1,000 population in South Africa in 2002 was 2.24; in England and 
Wales in 2001 it was 2.09; in Germany in 2002 it was 3.03; in Canada in 2002 it was 1.86; and in the 
Netherlands in 2002 it was 2.12  (UNODC, 2011). 
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The fact that SAP did not focus on community policing and crime investigation in 
non-white areas, but rather on internal security and maintenance of order, led to 
increasing crime rates within the townships that in the period between 1946 and 1959 
faced an unemployment rate of up to 80% amongst the youth. Soon after apartheid 
policing was introduced, gangs and vigilante groups were ruling the townships 
instead of the police, which by then was mainly concerned with the dispersal of 
crowds etc. In African townships the tsotsi had control over parts of the territory, 
while in Coloured townships it was the skolly (Brewer, 1994). Resulting from this, 
Brewer argues that in townships law abiding citizens were caught between ‗the evil 
twins of the gangsters and the police‘ (1994: 335-336). Furthermore, this allowed so-
called Street Committees to establish the more traditional justice of elder councils to 
control space socially. Later, the anti-apartheid struggle advocated a policy of 
making the townships ‗ungovernable‘ for the racist regime, installing alternative 
criminal justice and policing bodies, such as the People‘s Courts (Burman, 1989; 
Schärf, 1989; Seekings, 1989, 1992). All of this could only happen due to the 
absence of actual state policing in these areas.    
With the continuing of apartheid, the resistance against SAPs grew, which in turn led 
the police to apply more aggressive tactics (Brewer, 1994). In the 1960s and the early 
1970s, torture and massacres became common, the police became more military-like 
and the state fell back on the army for policing and internal security as well (Brewer, 
1994). In the period between 1976 and 1984, SAP killed 1,764 non-whites compared 
to 28 Whites. In this situation  
ordinary crime went relatively ignored, both in terms of police resources and 
effort. Conversely, when it was dealt with, the police tended to use 
paramilitary, colonial-style methods as if ordinary crime was an extension of 
guerrilla insurgency (…) The policing of ordinary crime in the Black 
townships was amongst the lowest priorities of all (Brewer , 1994: 258-259).  
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Only towards the end of apartheid did de Klerk, who saw the end of his regime 
coming, introduce reforms and start to demilitarise SAP while shifting its focus onto 
the policing of ordinary crime and to communicating with the different parties in the 
struggle.  
Although industry started to boom after the end of apartheid, the private security 
industry had already existed during apartheid, resulting from a South African 
tradition of decentralised security bodies (Baker, 2002). Particularly in the 1970s and 
1980s, SAP needed the support of commercial security due to increasing security 
problems, resulting in the National Key Points Act in 1989 that enabled private 
security companies to protect, for example, strategic installations (Baker, 2002). 
Reading through a manual for the South African security industry from 1981, Vogel 
gives evidence about the seriousness of the security industry‘s involvement in the 
prevalence of the status quo, which includes managing aspects of security such as 
‗emergency security and terrorism‘, ‗crisis management and urban terrorism‘, or 
‗protecting vital industries‘ through private security. 
Nevertheless, despite all the para-military policing, the general elections of 1994 
ended the authoritarian apartheid regime, requiring a transformation of the repressive 
police force to an accepted police service; changing from SAP to SAPS; a very 
difficult endeavour:  
It never occurred to the leaders and members of the African National 
Congress (ANC) – the main democratic opposition party – that the police, 
who had been so ruthlessly effective against them, would be any less effective 
against criminals in the new era. However, coping with the political transition 
and adapting to policing in a democratic society have been difficult for the 
police service (Rauch, 2000: 119). 
The transformation from colonial policing towards community policing involved 
many symbolic changes. This included changing the name of the new police force 
and restructuring the military hierarchies to civilian ones, for which the British police 
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model was used (Rauch, 2000; Shearing and Kempa, 2000). However, despite all the 
changes, there is still a certain level of mistrust in the police rooted in the apartheid 
period that still prevails today. 
 
6.3 From the post-apartheid city to the neo-apartheid city 
Soon after the official end of apartheid, the country faced high crime rates linked to 
inequalities and continuing segregation processes. In 2007/2008 there were 4,456 
murders per 100,000 nationwide and 8,557 murders per 100,000 in Cape Town (Gie, 
2009). Although high crime rates are a common phenomenon of young democracies 
(Shearing and Kempa, 2000), they soon became so pressing and prominent that they 
started transforming the geography of the cities. In a situation where life is 
increasingly dictated by the fear of crime (see Figure 6.2), Hook and Vrdoljak (2002) 
suggest that people decide between emigrating or ‗gigging-in with style‘, referring to 
the creation of a new kind of security-led architecture, the ‗architecture of fear‘ 
(Lemanski, 2004). Although it can be certainly argued that neoliberalism creates or 
perpetuates inequalities and does not necessarily help to lower the crime rates, its 
roots have to be sought in the apartheid segregation and the volkscapitalisme 
favouring the white ruling class (O‘Meara, 1983; Davies et al. 1985). Due to an 
almost containment-like policing of the townships, gangs and unofficial policing 
structures could flourish, and still exist to the present day. Furthermore, apartheid 
allowed an atmosphere where the personnel or vigilante style settling of disputes 
became common. Shaw (1997) argues that this resulted in a society in which 
‗violence became endemic‘. 
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Figure 6.2: Pointed ways of communicating the high crime rates  
 
Source: Stephen Francis & Rico, 2010. 
 
Besides changes in urban geographies, this led to a situation where the police again 
could not handle the situation alone anymore, and created what academics (Shearing 
and Kempa, 2000; Minnaar, 2007; Zedner, 2009) called a ‗security vacuum‘, which 
was filled by various security companies, leading to a boom in the industry in South 
Africa. While the ‗others‘ were contained during apartheid (Brewer, 1994), today‘s 
urban landscape is characterised by the voluntary segregation of the elite in private 
spaces in order to avoid public space (Camerer et al., 1998; Lemanski, 2004, 2006a, 
2006), as described in Landman‘s (2000) graphic depiction at the beginning of this 
chapter. When looking for a set of research questions on the issue of private security 
companies, this portrays an urban landscape of privately-secured urban enclaves and 
a dangerous, potentially under-policed public space.  
 
6.3.1 Urban geographies of the post-apartheid city   
Although apartheid was officially dismantled, segregation still exists. Income and the 
distribution of wealth in particular are major dividing factors. As the wealthy elite is 
mainly white and the poorer groups mainly black, segregation still has strong racial 
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connotations. K‘Akumu and Olima claim that for Africa in general ‗it is impossible 
to think of residential segregation without going back to the colonial past‘ (2007: 
89). Amongst the white minority, a fear of the black ‗others‘ is ever present and fuels 
the segregation. As Beavon argues in his work on Johannesburg, the city faces a 
‗white flight promoted by white fright‘ (2000: 7). This fear does not necessary refer 
to the actual crime numbers. Instead it stands for the ‗old desire for privacy, and the 
new suburban reality of the fear of crime that provides the impetus for the growth of 
this phenomenon‘ (Luymes, 1997: 190). However, one should keep in mind that 
statistics show that whites are less likely to be victims of serious crime than other 
groups who cannot afford extra security. Gie states that in Cape Town (2009: 17):  
Out of the 58 police districts in the city, five police districts account for over 
44% of murders, Nyanga (13.18%), Harare (in Khayelitsha) (8.67%), 
Khayelitsha (8.47%), Gugulethu (7.58 %), and Delft/ Belhar (6.1%).  
All of these areas are non-white. Furthermore, the biggest part of the police force is 
stationed in and around the white parts of the cities. Despite this, what can be 
observed in white areas is the phenomenon that once someone has barricaded him or 
herself against the public sphere, the ‗outside‘ seems to become increasingly 
dangerous, even if there is no actual threat. Kempa and Singh explain this noting that 
‗[i]n this process [of segregation], powerful groups‘ perceptions of non-white racial 
identity are aligned with characteristics deemed to be undesirable, inferior and less 
worthy in the market value system‘ (2008: 344). Although today‘s segregation is 
strongly influenced by income and class, the dividing line often runs between black 
and white due to sociological and historical reasons (Spinks, 2001; K‘Akumu and 
Olima, 2007). There is therefore a trend towards the fear of the black ‗others‘ that 
evokes racism. The difference is that this kind of racism is not led by the idea of a 
superior race, but of inequalities and an increasing divide between rich and poor 
because statistically black equals poor. Therefore, even over a decade after the 
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official end of apartheid the fear of the swart gevaar (black danger) and the skollie 
menace (scoundrel coloureds) is evident. It is this renaissance of racism that 
reinforces the argument that South Africa is facing a neo-apartheid regime (Beavon, 
2000; Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2006). Although now slightly dated, Cheru 
exemplified the inequalities with the following statement: ‗If ―white‖ South Africa 
were a separate country, it would rank 24th out of 180 countries, while ―black‖ South 
Africa would rank 123rd.‘ (Cheru, 2001: 505). 
In this situation the neoliberal politics being applied and the abandonment of social 
ideas have perpetuated the inequalities, creating a dangerous social mixture that has 
exploded in unacceptable high crime rates (Landman, 2000; Baker 2002; Lemanski, 
2004; Lemanski and Oldfield, 2009) or the recent violence against refugees and 
migrant workers (Mail&Guardian-Online, 2011). The result is a general withdrawal 
from the public space by everyone who can afford it. Today, cameras, guards and 
new fences dominate the picture in wide parts of South African cities and have 
shattered the dream of a post-apartheid rainbow society. The wealthier part of society 
increasingly hides behind modern barricades, while the poor have to organise their 
security in alternative ways, which can result in vigilante structures that still police 
the townships (Schärf, 1989; Seekings, 1989, 1992; Shaw, 1997; Kinnes, 2000; 
Minnaar, 2001; Schärf, 2001; Gottschalk, 2005; Samara, 2005).  
Throughout the literature that describes these changes, the new development is 
described as a new- or neo-apartheid, as the most characteristic features of the actual 
apartheid period are being re-invented (Beavon, 2000; Shearing and Kempa, 2000; 
Spinks, 2001; Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). However, it 
should be clarified that this chapter does not argue that all inhabitants of gated 
communities are racists. Instead, Lemanski and Oldfield (2009) portray these citizens 
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as regular people who simply want the maximum protection for their families and are 
in the fortunate position to be able to afford this kind of security. Although the post-
apartheid city was able to manifest itself successfully in some regional and local 
cases (Donaldson and Kotze, 2006), the project as a whole has been unsuccessful so 
far. Instead, old apartheid divisions are being perpetuated along class lines, as 
mentioned above.  
Using Figures 6.1 and 6.3 as their point of departure, the following will now outline 
the changes in South Africa‘s urban geography, starting at the CBD and inner city 
high street and then moving outwards to the newly established suburbs that can be 
found around the bigger cities. As discussed in the previous chapter, today‘s cities 
compete against each other to attract capital and investments (Mitchell, 2001; 
Samara, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Miraftab, 2007; Kempa and Singh, 2008; Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). In order to participate in this 
competition, groups and individuals who do not fit into the picture of a safe, clean 
sanitised space are being repressed and moved away by the full power of the state. 
Whereas private security companies were mentioned in the policing chapter as just 
one tool to remove the unwelcome without giving further details, their presence in 
South African city centres is highly evident. Using the example of Cape Town, 
Miraftab (2007) describes how the colonial notion of a fear of disease is used to 
create sanitised spaces and reform Cape Town‘s centre. It is the same kind of 
perceived threat of contagious disease and ‗un-cleanliness‘ that led the apartheid and 
colonial powers to create buffer zones between the white and non-white populations 
(Maylam, 1995; Christopher, 1997; Miraftab, 2007). The first victims of these 
politics are the city‘s street kids. Miraftab (2007) reports that security companies 
who police parts of the public space, often on behalf of shop-owners, round these 
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kids up in trucks, drive them out of the centre and hand them over to NGO facilities, 
who thus have become part of the neoliberal security network (Baker, 2002; 
Miraftab, 2007). 
Moving further away from the centre, one will recognise an increasing number of 
enclosed neighbourhoods. In Johannesburg alone 300 legal and illegal road closures 
have been counted since 1996 (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). Continuing further outwards 
into the formerly undeveloped areas, one can see big security villages that were built 
over the last decade and are still increasing in numbers. In between the CBD and the 
suburbs, privately-secured malls, leisure centres and office complexes can be found 
in which the citizens of the gated communities work, shop and spend their leisure 
time. Although the police have a strong presence around these quarters, commercial 
companies provide the most proximate security. This has two main causes. First, the 
general trust and confidence in the SAPS throughout the population is low, and the 
majority of the people believe that the SAPS is unable to provide the constitutional 
right to freedom and security (Baker, 2002). The Economist (2011) recently 
confirmed that the police are not able to control crime. Secondly, during apartheid 
the white elite was in control of the police force, which policed the space according 
to its needs and wishes. Today‘s elite is not in that position anymore, so private 
security is being bought in and can be governed directly according to their own 
needs. As outlined in Chapter 3, the growth in private governance and spaces such as 
gated communities and shopping malls require private security to exist as such 
spaces are outside the public police‘s jurisdiction and, therefore, responsibility.    
When comparing the model of the apartheid city (Figure 6.1) to the neo-apartheid 
city (Figure 6.3) the changes are more obvious. The apartheid city shows a clear 
divide between different quarters of the model city with buffer zones between the 
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white and non-white groups. Furthermore, the ethnic groups are mainly subdivided 
along arterial roads. The clear centre of the apartheid city was the large CBD. in the 
neo-apartheid city, however, some of these spatial features persist, but there are also 
the vast new features that were mentioned above. Especially when looking at the 
micro enclaves, segregation happens on a much smaller scale.  
Furthermore, the labelling of the quarters has changed from racial to a more class-
based terminology. As Lemanski and Oldfield (2009) describe, African became 
synonymous with low income, Asian and Coloured with middle-class, and White 
with middle- or upper-class, keeping features of apartheid alive. As Figure 6.3 
shows, the informal settlements have spread into the suburbs, into former white 
areas, and around the CBD, which has shrunk drastically compared to the apartheid 
city. Instead, several large business and industrial nodes have emerged along the 
arterial roads that link them to the different gated communities, mainly in the former 
White quarters. New suburbs have developed outside the outskirts of the apartheid 
city, while inside the city‘s territory numerous enclosed neighbourhoods and other 
secured residential areas have been erected on formerly public space
19
. In the CBD 
and the former non-White quarters, the map shows several secured high-rise 
apartments have been built that mainly host non-White parts of the population 
seeking more protection for themselves and their families. In between the numerous 
private enclaves, informal settlements flourish, contributing to the perception of 
public space as hostile. Again, the comparison between the maps confirms the notion 
that public space is decreasing (shrinking CBD, widespread informal settlements) as 
private spaces boom (various micro-enclaves).  
                                                 
19
 In one context of the apartheid era, one has to be careful with the term ‗public‘ as different quarters 
were divided. If one part of a city was publicly accessible for a certain group, it does not mean that it 
was the same for a different part of the population.  
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Figure 6.3: The new-apartheid city 
 
Source: Own figure based on Landman, 2006: 13 
 
The key notion of the neo-apartheid city is the move towards private space, which is 
perceived as being safe. Public space, however, is in a process of decay. As the 
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introductory quote describes, it is often seen as hostile and to be avoided (also 
Camerer et al., 1998). Therefore the literature indicates that South African cities are 
on the way to becoming ‗urban forts‘ and public areas the ‗dead-spaces‘ of the cities 
(Landman, 2000). The literature communicates a picture in which the people who 
can afford to do so retreat behind gates and walls and where public space is avoided 
when possible.  
This chapter suggests that the new apart-ness of the post-apartheid city constitutes a 
danger for the South African society. Here Rose‘s (1996a) ideas on the end of the 
social and the importance of community help to understand the situation. Those who 
leave the public space enter a vicious circle of mistrust and fear, while thos left out 
are ‗aligned with characteristics deemed to be undesirable, inferior and less worthy in 
the market value system‘ (Kempa and Singh 2008: 344). In other words, the divided, 
exclusionary city that is maintained by private forces, as described by Sibley (2003) 
and others, is very real and visible in South Africa. This chapter therefore intends to 
show the strong notion of the deprivation of the city‘s public space and the flight to 
private space. As Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo (2009: 367) argue, enjoying a safe 
public space is ‗a rare treat in Cape Town‘. In these terms, Landman‘s (2000) 
depiction of the future of South African cities does not appear too farfetched.  
 
6.4 Counter movement to urban decay 
So far the chapter has shown how public space has decayed in South Africa. From 
1999 onwards, business communities started losing profits because of the general 
avoidance of their public space (Rose, 1996a). To reverse this trend the business 
communities formed governance nodes (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003), the most significant examples of which include City Improvement 
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Districts (CIDs) (Shearing, 2006, Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007) and residential 
security schemes or ‗extreme neighbourhood watches‘ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b).  
 
Figure 6.4: Case study site in the model of the post-apartheid city 
 
Source: Own figure based on Landman, 2006: 13 
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The spaces in which this private counter movement to crime and decay is researched 
is highlighted in red in Figure 6.4. It places the case study side (see Map 5.1) in the 
model of the post-apartheid city.  
Here the case study site represents a section of the city containing lower-middle- to 
upper-class suburbs, the city centre and sub-centres. Since private policing schemes 
require a certain amount of disposable income and wealth, these sites are the most 
relevant for the study and they are different to more impoverished spaces. In 
addition, these factors also enabled the researcher to live within the studied site, 
which strongly facilitated the research.  
 
6.4.1 City Improvement Districts  
CIDs are most commonly defined as urban renewal or regeneration setups that 
originate from North America, where they are known as Business Improvement 
Districts (Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Samara, 2010a, 
2010b). Once introduced, CIDs take over functions that were previously performed 
by the state in order to govern space; these functions include, but are not limited to, 
security, social development and urban management, i.e. street cleaning and the 
maintenance of parks. As academics working on the issue of CIDs in South Africa 
widely agree (Peyroux, 2006; Miraftab, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Samara, 2010a, 
2010b), these private governance institutions (Shearing, 2006) almost became 
synonymous with neoliberal urban change in terms of a growth-orientated, 
entrepreneurial agenda, as outlined in Hall and Hubbard (1996) and Harvey (1989), 
and the responsibilised community as outlined by Garland (2009). 
Samara (2010a, 2010b) argues that they turned ‗what should be public space into 
literal or de facto private, heavily policed enclaves‘ (Samara, 2005: 227). This 
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assumption is based on the observation that the private governments of the 
Improvement Districts identify certain people and groups as ‗undesirables‘ or 
counterproductive to the investment-orientated ‗world class city‘ and exclude them 
from these spaces. In Samara‘s case the focus is on the criminalisation of street 
children, who have been declared ‗public enemy number one‘ (Samara, 2005). In his 
papers Samara confirms for Cape Town‘s CIDs what others have argued in the past 
for the global North and described with concepts such as ‗urban revanchism‘ (Smith, 
1996), the exclusionary society (Young, 1999) or ‗geographies of exclusion‘ (Sibley, 
2003). Setting his findings in the particular local context, Samara (2005), like 
Miraftab (2007), draw parallels between the space CIDs produce and the racial and 
class segregation that occurred during the apartheid regime, as well as the continuing 
of features of apartheid policing that aim to defend the neoliberal world class city 
(Samara, 2010b), re-establishing an ‗exclusionary Cape Town‘ (Miraftab, 2007: 
607). 
 
6.4.2 ‘Extreme neighborhood watches’ 
The non-closed but privately secured residential areas or ‗extreme neighbourhood 
watches‘ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b) are less directly linked to the entrepreneurial city 
than with a notion of insecurity and the desire for exclusiveness, as explained by 
Garland (2009) on the issue of a neoliberal responsibilisation. Here neighbourhoods 
that do not, for one of a number of various reasons, erect a boom on their street, will 
club in and contract the services of a private security company, similar to the CID 
security to patrol the public streets monitoring suspicious or unwelcome persons.  
In terms of exclusion Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a, 2008b) and Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) 
make a similar argument as the above, although they do not refer only to CIDs in 
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Cape Town and Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008), 
but also to the cases of ‗extreme neighbourhood watches‘ in Atholl, Johannesburg 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b) and residential CIDs in Cape Town‘s suburbs (Bénit-
Gbaffou et al., 2008). The latter two security schemes describe public spaces that are 
tightly policed by private security in a similar way to the CIDs in Cape Town. These 
studies come to similar conclusions as Samara (2005, 2010a, 2010b), namely that 
these spaces conflict with the idea of an equality-based post-apartheid city, constitute 
state failure when it comes to the protection of its citizens, and therefore facilitate 
private governance structures that result in an urban fragmentation along race and 
class lines, similar to the apartheid spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b; Bénit-
Gbaffou et al., 2008). However, again these spaces are being compared to actual 
gated enclaves that together form part of the apartheid-like urban fragmentation.  
In more detail, Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a) compares closed roads and non-enclosed 
neighbourhoods in Johannesburg‘s suburbs with each other suggesting that ‗in non-
enclosed neighbourhoods, such human rights are often violated [meaning the 
exclusion of mainly black people and/or urban poor] in very similar ways (except the 
barriers are not so visible)‘ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a: 98).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Over recent years, there has been a counter-movement in South Africa against crime 
and urban decay, expressed through a desire to create a world-class city. Although 
many papers refer to private security companies as being the tool through which 
these governance communities operate, detailed studies on their operations have yet 
to be undertaken. Previous work focuses on the general objectives of the governing 
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actors and their practices, such as the displacement of ‗undesirables‘, rather than the 
mechanisms by which private security companies operate. 
To examine these issues in detail, the thesis presents the results of an empirical study 
of Cape Town.  Chapter 7 will identify the spatial variations in the forms and 
practices of private policing and private security companies in public space. It 
identifies different policing and security schemes and how they operate across 
different public spaces and their associated governance communities. Chapter 8 
focuses more specifically on private policing companies, which are most strongly 
associated with the development of public space in CIDs. It examines their impact on 
shaping urban territory and the lives of ‗undesirables‘ living in public space.  
Chapter 9 will then assess the significance of private policing networks on the social 
geographies of Cape Town. Without anticipating the results too much, it will show 
that although powerful, private policing companies do have limits when it comes to 
the ordering of space. However, to compensate for the short comings of private 
policing companies, their governing communities have introduced a policing 
network that is much more sophisticated than one might suspect on first view. The 
conclusion will then address the final research question concerning the consequences 
of private policing for Cape Town‘s public space and society. 
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CHAPTER VII: THE SPATIAL VARIATIONS IN PRACTICES 
OF PRIVATE POLICING COMPANIES 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter will introduce different governance nodes and how they implement 
power in their public spaces. In doing so, the spatial variations in the forms and 
practices of private policing and private security companies are identified and 
mapped. Two different kinds of space are identified that are privately policed in 
different ways. The first space consists mainly of commercial areas and is governed 
by City Improvement Districts (CIDs), the South African equivalent of Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs). The second is purely residential in nature and is 
governed by associations of residents. Mapping those private security schemes is an 
attempt to chart the qualitative as well as the quantitative growth of private security 
companies in public space, and will contribute to an understanding of the revanchist 
city. 
Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the legal limitations private policing agents 
face and how the security industry addresses or avoids them. It will show the power 
of some companies in maintaining social order, supporting the argument of the 
emergence of private policing companies. 
 
7.2 Private policing of City Improvement District  
The most visible governance communities in Cape Town‘s greater centre are the 
CIDs. Originating in North America, where the concept is known as Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs) (Morçöl and Zimmermann, 2006: 12), they were first 
introduced in Cape Town in 1999 and are regulated by the City Improvement District 
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By-Law (City of Cape Town, 2003). The idea of these institutions is to top-up a 
perceived lack of governmental services and to shape space in particular ways 
(Interview 20
20
). CIDs are financed by an extra levy that is paid by the businesses 
within their territory in order to facilitate their community. As the CIDs are strongly 
supported by the state, represented by the City of Cape Town, a by-law has been 
introduced that commits all businesses and property owners to pay this extra levy if 
at least 51% of the businesses have voted in favour of a CID (Peyroux, 2006; City of 
Cape Town, 2003; Interview 35
21
). All CIDs are non-profit organisations financed by 
the mentioned levies. Aside from that, it is up to the management to generate more 
income through various enterprises, such as paid parking lots, deals with gardening 
schools to save costs for the maintenance of parks etc. (City of Cape Town, 2003; 
Interview 31
22
). An overview of the CID structure is outlined in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Structure of the CIDs: 
- Each CID has to be approved by the City council only after a detailed procedure of meetings and 
advertisements.  
- To approve a CID over 50% of the future rate payers have to approve the plan (‗Rateable property‘ 
“means immovable property on which a rate may be levied in accordance with the Constitution or any 
enabling legislation‖ (City of Cape Town, 2003: 5)). 
- The CID also needs a managing body that manages ―for the purposes of managing and controlling 
the implementation of the City Improvement District plan‖ (City of Cape Town, 2003: 15). 
Furthermore the managing body runs the day-to-day business of the CID, such as organising security 
schemes, street cleaning etc.   
- Once this has been set up and approved, the City (meaning the City of Cape Town) collects the levy 
from the rateable properties. Here levy is defined as ‗an additional rate‘ on top of regular taxes. The 
collected money is then paid to the CID after their budget is approved (―The management body must 
provide the Council with its audited financial statements for the immediately preceding financial year, 
within 3 (three) months of the end of each financial year‖ (City of Cape Town, 2003: 16)).  
 
                                                 
20
 Representative of social development sector 
21
 Member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security  
22
 Representative of CID 
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However, this does not mean that that the city turns a blind eye to the problems. 
Instead it is a politically-motivated shift of responsibilities and priorities regarding 
what happens in a chronically underfinanced and understaffed city such a Cape 
Town. As a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security explained 
(Interview 35),  
only about 35% of the city‘s population meaningfully contributes to the rates 
base, which have to be enough to keep the whole of Cape Town running. The 
entire funding model for local government throughout South Africa is heavily 
dependent on cross-subsidisation. While everybody accepts that this must be 
so, it does make it very challenging to provide the levels of services to rich 
and poor that they expect and need and presents a very different level of 
challenge that cities in well-developed and more affluent countries have to 
face.  We have to establish services for the people who have been left behind 
by the former apartheid government or who have migrated to the urban areas 
rapidly and in high numbers in a short time-span, while not allowing the 
existing infrastructure and services to fall apart – this is very challenging. 
Under such constraints the city council‘s focus moves towards areas where there are 
no CIDs or other comparable private governing bodies. Although the city is far from 
withdrawing entirely, this supports the argument that community bodies (Rhodes, 
1996; Rose, 1996a; Kearns and Paddison, 2000; Woods and Goodwin, 2003) have 
become full-grown partners in the governing of space interacting with the city 
council (Shearing and Wood, 2003). 
In the case study area, CIDs (see Map 7.1) were introduced in a manner that mirrors 
Smith‘s (1996) original argument on the revanchist city and how exactly it came 
about. These governance setups are a response to the increasing (one could say 
dramatic) process of urban decay. Here businesses and property owners that suffered 
financial losses due to the abandonment of public space have identified themselves 
as a geographically-consistent community with the aim of stopping the economic 
decrease and to re-establish their territory on the map. Here the honest mission 
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statements of the CIDs confirm Smith‘s (1996) argument that they are an economic-
growth-orientated urban renewal project to foster investment (see Table 7.2).  
  
Table 7.2: Aims and targets as outlined by City Improvement Districts 
Woodstock Improvement District: 
―The increased demand on municipalities for infrastructure and services has not been matched by 
incoming revenue. In many cases this has led to reduced services on the ground which, if left 
unchecked, would ultimately lead to degeneration and urban decay; clearly an unacceptable 
situation for property owners. 
Its core responsibilities are: 
 To supplement and enhance the basic services offered by the City of Cape Town 
 To facilitate a cooperative approach between the city and private sector in the provision 
of municipal services 
 To facilitate the upliftment of distressed business and mixed-use areas 
 To promote economic growth and sustainable development 
 To facilitate investment” (Woodstock Improvement District, 2011a) 
Central City Improvement District: 
―The Cape Town Partnership is a collaboration between the public and private sectors working 
together to develop, promote and manage Cape Town Central City. The Partnership was formed 
[…] to address issues of urban degeneration and disinvestment in the Central City and related social 
problems‖ (Central City Improvement District, 2010a) 
Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District: 
―To be the City of Cape Town´s leading supplementary service provider for nurturing a safe, clean, 
attractive and accessible business and residential environment‖ (Green Point and Oranjekloof 
Improvement District, 2011a) 
Sea Point Improvement District: 
―The aim of the CID is to manage and maintain the public environment at a better and superior 
level to that provided by the local authority, The [sic] establishment of the CID is to ensure a more 
effective management of public areas, address issues of crime and grime, promote business 
confidence and play an all-embracing role in the promotion of the designated CID area. (...) To be 
an integral part of a world class city‖ (Sea Point Improvement District, 2010) 
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Map 7.1: City Improvement Districts 
 
Own graphic. Source: Central City 
Improvement District, 2011; Green Point and 
Oranjekloof Improvement District, 2011b; Sea 
Point Improvement District, 2010; Woodstock 
Improvement District, 2011b. 
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To tackle urban deprivation, all five CIDs in the case study area have two core 
responsibilities: cleaning (called urban development) and security. As senior 
representatives of all five CIDs explain, to make the space successful in economic 
terms it has to be safe and clean so that people and investors will perceive it as a 
positive and vibrant space. In return it is hoped that the local economy will prosper 
and property values will increase (Interview 07
23
; Interview 13
24
; Interview 14
25
). 
Although it comes through in the mission statements and the fact that the main tasks 
are security and cleansing, the emphasis on safety and security became much more 
evident during the conversations.      
There were a lot of office blocks springing up all over outside the city 
[centre] […] And what was happening, business was moving out of the city, 
because as I said it was run down, it was perceived not to be safe and it 
wasn‘t a good place to be […] The city was just losing its feel and was 
becoming a rundown place and business got together […] (Interview 0526). 
Cape Town had a bad rep[utation]. There was no control, the area was dirty 
and the businesses in the city said we can‘t let this happen; we need to do 
something to stop this and turn it around. (…) So they formed a partnership 
amongst all the businesses and went to the city council and said we know that 
the council has a tight budget and they can‘t cope with everything (Interview 
07
27
).  
The described idea of space is encouraging people to come to the CID by 
creating an environment that is clean and secure (Notes taken during the 
interview 13
28
). 
These statements illustrate the governance structure of the CID (Harvey, 1989, 
Garland, 2009; Rose, 1996a) and confirm the aims and objectives of the creation of a 
revanchist city (safe and clean space) (Smith, 1996) in central Cape Town, as others 
have also suggested (Berg, 2004; Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-
Gbaffou et al., 2008). Within this structure it is important to consider how private 
security companies are used on the ground to implement and maintain these 
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 Representative of CID 
24
 Representative of CID 
25
 Representative of CID 
26
 Representative of social development sector  
27
 Representative of CID 
28
 Representative of CID 
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revanchist ideas, and whether policing philosophies such as the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ and ZTP are being exercised by these actors. The following section will 
start mapping the data for the individual CIDs and the ways they utilise private 
security companies for their gains.   
As the chapter will show, according to the characteristics previously outlined to 
identify governing nodes, the CIDs tick all the required boxes. They have a clear 
mentality to govern, and in fact that was their purpose in the first place. They also 
have a sophisticated institutional structure, as well as the technologies and resources 
required, as the following section will outline in detail.   
 
7.3.1 Practicalities of CID Policing  
The security department of the largest CID in the City Bowl area employs around 
220 people, although the numbers in smaller CIDs are significantly lower and range 
around 20. The number, appearance and equipment of guards depend on the size and 
geography of their territory and the threats they are facing (together with the 
philosophy of the individual CID managements).  
The key to all CID security is the deterrence of crime in a proactive manner and 
public reassurance, including active contact with community members. The element 
of a proactive crime deterrent is achieved through maximum visibility, often 
involving bright vests and constant visible patrols all day and all night (Interview 
04
29
; Interview 07
30
; Interview 10
31
; Interview 13
32
; Interview 14
33
; Interview 25
34
; 
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 High ranking Metro Police officers 
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 Representative of CID 
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 Representative of security company 
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 Representative of security company 
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Interview 43
35
; all observations). Proactive deterrence and public reassurance 
through visibility is ensured firstly through the uniforms: 
We wanted a visible policing presence so that people feel safer. (…) So it is a 
perception change. I mean look at the bright bib [pointing at a vest]. I mean 
how can you miss that. So we made the guys [private policing officers] as 
visible as possible. (…) And that‘s how I want them. I want them like 
Christmas trees you must see them so you must go to them and ask for help 
when you need it (Interview 07
36
). 
It also involves constant presence in the community‘s space. In a different CID it was 
explained that the private officers act as public-relations officers or ambassadors for 
the area (Interview 13
37
). Everyone sees them, criminals and the public, and feel safe 
or approach them for advice and help; this was confirmed by Metro Police
38
: 
―Uniforms inhibit crime, this includes private security. (…) Additional uniforms are 
a plus and it needs to be capitalised on that‖ (Interview 4339). 
Also CID security pushes active engagement with the community. Most CIDs have 
placed books that officers on patrol have to sign in the various shops along the patrol 
route. This way the officers have to enter the shops to see or ask if everything is in 
order. In particular, senior CID staff are also in constant communication with the 
community, chatting and discussing everything from CID-related issues to the 
weather (Observation 04). Here the CIDs are pursuing an agenda that makes them 
the first port of call for anything related to security, complaints etc., trying to become 
the central node of the community (Interview 14
40
; Interview 10
41
). To guarantee the 
anonymity of all participates of the study (e.g. through cross-referencing with later 
sections) all interview numbers in sections on specific locations have been removed.   
                                                 
35
 Senior Metro Police officer 
36
 Representative of CID 
37
 Representative of CID 
38
 Metro police is the police of the municipality not the state. The state run police is SAPS. 
39
 Senior Metro Police officer 
40
 Representative of CID 
41
 Representative of security company 
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7.2.2 Woodstock Improvement District  
Within the greater City Bowl area, Woodstock is the least affluent quarter. Although 
gentrification processes have started (Visser and Kotze, 2008), Woodstock has a 
reputation of being more dangerous than the rest of the case study areas and has a 
visibly poorer appearance in terms of the poor condition of the buildings, litter on the 
streets, etc. However, information on the effectiveness of the policing setup in terms 
of crime reduction could not be obtained. 
There has been a number of incidents where our guys have almost been 
injured. From various incidents, from XYZ street behind me that used to be a 
hotspot. That was a very violent gangster road, you must remember, there is a 
lot of gangsters (Interview with representative of CID). 
As the map suggests, the territory of the CID is a patchwork of residential and 
commercial areas. Although the residents do not contribute financially towards the 
CID, the residential area has to be policed as well since the boundaries between 
residential and commercial spaces are too blurred to differentiate. This puts more 
constraints on the CIDs budget than the manager would like.    
A: Ok, let me get the map … [points at the map] This is my area. From here 
that‘s just outside of town (…) And now if you look at it there are business 
here, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, residents, 
business, business, residents…(…) I cannot take my cleaners and let them 
clean up a business and then airlift them ten houses [the same goes for the 
security]. (…) I would love to, absolutely. Because then I got the residents off 
my back. See the problem is that I have tried convincing them to start paying 
towards our service. But they have been receiving it for free for the last three 
to five years (…). And bear in mind that a lot of them don‘t have money to 
spare. They do live hand into mouth (Interview with representative of CID). 
This combination of topography, built environment (referred to by the participants of 
the study as the ‗geography‘) and higher crime-levels determine the policing 
measures and equipment of the security officers.  
Woodstock Improvement District (WID) contracts the local company, Orbis 
Security. The security contract is financed out of the security budget of the WID, 
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which is again financed by the local businesses through an extra levy that is collected 
by the city and then given to the WID. Although details of (non) accountability are 
discussed below in greater detail, in simple terms the company is, as long as it 
conforms with the law, only accountable to the governing body, the WID, and to the 
‗Private Security Regulatory Authority South Africa‘ (PSIRA), although this power 
is only theoretical since PSIRA has no resources to exercise its control (Interview 
with researcher; Interview with local politician). This system of accountability and 
finance of the security companies applies to all CIDs. 
 
Figure 7.1: WID patrol car with holding facility 
 
Image taken by the author, July 2010 
 
The security on the ground wear what Wakefield (2003) would call ‗military style‘ 
uniforms, exemplified by black army pants tucked into combat boots. They are 
equipped with tonfa batons (a tonfa baton is one of the most powerful batons one can 
141 
 
find; it is commonly used by riot police in Germany due to its effectiveness), pepper 
spray and two-way radios. The officers patrol on foot and in vehicles that look 
remarkably like police vans, including a holding facility in the back (see Figure 7.1) 
(During one interview I called it a cage, something the respondent did not like at all, 
responding ‗It`s a lock-up facility, not a cage. A lock-up facility!‘). Although the 
exact numbers of officers were not communicated, they patrol 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week checking in at about 20 clock points
42
 during their patrols. The control 
room is also staffed all of the time.    
However, they do not carry firearms. According to a CID representative this would 
endanger them instead of providing protection‖       
You must bear in mind that for my guys to walk around with a gun makes 
them a target. Because now you are not only attack them out of pure 
frustration, you are gonna attack them because you want that weapon. 
(Interview with representative of CID) 
For the guards‘ security and the policing of the territory, the CID instead falls back 
on the wider policing network, including the public police. As Map 7.1 indicates, 
there is a gap between the WID and the next CID, the CCID. As parts of this area 
have been identified as crime hotspots, the WID has extended its area and, together 
with CCID officers, bridges the gap along the road that connects the two CIDs. 
Again, no actual crime statistics could be obtained; however, when talking to a 
representative of the CID he stated that major crimes had dropped, although petty 
theft was still around (Interview with representative of private security company) 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Clock Points are spread strategically over the territory to control the productivity of the guards. 
Clock points record the time and date a guard is checks in with a handheld device he or she carries all 
the time. When reading out the data the supervisor of the guard can see how long it took the guard to 
travel between the individual points, whether it was according to schedule etc. A detailed description 
of this control of security personnel can be found in Rigakos (2002).   
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7.2.3 Central City Improvement District  
The Central City Improvement District (CCID) was the first and largest of the CIDs 
in Cape Town. It includes the city centre and most of the main tourist destinations, 
including Long Street, Companies Garden and several museums. It also includes the 
CBD, the train station and the central mini-bus and taxi rank. In other words the 
CCID covers one of the busiest areas in Cape Town. While the contract used to be 
with G4S, the new security contract for the CCID went to two local companies, 
Illisio and Alexa Security; the reasons for the change in security providers are 
unknown. Between them, the two companies detach about 220 security officers for 
the CCID. Of all the CIDs, the CCID has one of the most advanced private security 
forces in town. According to their own account, ‗the crime rate has dropped 
significantly and many incidents are prevented from happening‘ (Cape Town 
Partnership, 2011). In 2008 a newspaper stated that the ‗Central City Improvement 
District (CCID) has managed to reduce crime by 28 percent‘ (Iol News, 2008). 
Furthermore it refers to a statement by the CCID chair at the time claiming that the 
crime rate of the past five years (before 2008) has ‗come down by more than 60 
percent‘ (Iol News, 2008). 
When asked what their duties were, the person in charge replied ―Jeez, we do 
everything‖, although their core objective is crime prevention through visibility (as 
with all other CIDs). They have achieved this with 80 officers on the streets at all 
times. If one stands on the corner of a main street, one can literally see (if traffic 
allows) three officers: one close by, one at the corner further down, and another one 
even further up the same street. At night the security setup changes and officers are 
pulled together around the bars and clubs on Long Street, with fewer officers 
deployed in the centre. The officers on foot or bicycle are backed up by five vehicles 
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with holding facilities. As already mentioned, their duties have become more 
complex over the years. A person in charge adds ―[s]o yes, we do everything. We are 
doing by-laws from illegal dumping to drinking in public to graffiti to illegal 
posters... We basically police across the spectrum across the city
43.‖ A representative 
from a contracted security company was also very proud of the fact that they do a 
similar job on the ground as the police, with whom they co-operate very closely and 
have good working relations.  
The security officers are monitored by ‗notebooks‘ that have been strategically 
placed all over the territory in for example shops or backpacker hostels. The officers 
will sign in, noting the time and a short statement of the situation, and check if 
everything is in order (see Vignette 8.1). Furthermore, the officers have certain 
targets for arrests. During the first fieldwork period a representative of the CCID 
stated that they have a rough target of around 20-30 arrests a week by each individual 
officer. During the second fieldwork period the same person explained that they have 
now changed their strategy and today it is all about getting the statistics down 
(Interview with representative of CID (follow-up)).  
Nevertheless, if all security officers carry out about 50 arrests per week over the 
course of a year, this would make about 2,600 arrests in this CCID alone. In its 2008 
annual report (the last report that lists these specific numbers), the CCID states that 
their security assisted in 9,570 arrests during the year (Central City Improvement 
District, 2009), showing a much higher number. Like the WID, CCID security wear 
military-style uniforms including tonfas, pepper-spray, handcuffs and a two-way 
radio. Some of the supervisors carry firearms, or (so-called) non-lethal guns (see 
Figure 7.2).  
                                                 
43
 The issue of law enforcement through CID security is being discussed below in greater detail. 
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Figure 7.2: CCID security officer 
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
 
7.2.4 Oranjekloof and Green Point City Improvement District  
Although the Oranjekloof City Improvement District (OK CID) and the Green Point 
City Improvement District (GK CID) are by name different CIDs, they are run by the 
same manager and security company. They also share the same website and are 
therefore introduced together in this chapter. The security contract for both CIDs 
went to Vetus Scholar, which in this case is policing mixed neighbourhoods of 
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businesses and residential areas. In the GP CID six security officers patrol are backed 
up by officers in a vehicle with a lockup facility. There are four separate foot patrols 
and two vehicle patrols in the OK CID. A shift manager for the security company 
also patrols both CIDs in mid-class cars, one of which states ‗crime prevention team‘ 
on the side, referring to the idea of visible patrols as a deterrent (see Figure 7.3); 
senior staff of the security company patrol the area whenever their schedule allows it. 
According to the security manager and a senior representative of the CID, the crime 
rate has dropped by a high percentage due to the efforts of the policing network 
active in the area (Interview with representative of security company; Interview with 
representative of CID). On their webpage, the CIDs claim that ―[s]ince July 2001 
crime has dropped by some 65%, according to the South African Police Service 
(SAPS)‖ (Green Point and Oranjekloof Improvement District, 2011). Like the WID, 
the GP CID has been extended in form of the ‗Green Point Median Upgrade 
Initiative‘ along Summerset Road, which passes by the World Cup stadium and 
various associated shops, cafes and restaurants, ending where the next CID, Sea 
Point Improvement District, begins.  
In contrast to the previous CIDs, the security officers wear non-military uniforms. 
Instead they wear suit trousers and a white police-style short-sleeved shirt or rain 
jackets with their badges, which reflects their claim of lower crime rates in the 
middle-class neighbourhood. This less aggressive uniform reflects the perceived 
lower crime rates and a desire for more proactive policing. The deterring character of 
the uniform and equipment has always been carefully measured against the existing 
threats of the area and the safety of the officers. However, the guards in the OK and 
GP CIDs still carry tonfas, pepper-spray, handcuffs and two-way radios to stay in 
contact with their control room.  
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Figure 7.3: OK/GP patrol car 
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
 
7.2.5 Sea Point City Improvement District 
The security contract for the Sea Point City Improvement District is also held by 
Vetus Schola, who therefore police a considerable geographical area that is newly 
contiguous due to the aforementioned ‗Green Point Median Upgrade Initiative‘ (see 
Map 7.1). Although the Sea Point City Improvement District hosts affluent residents, 
especially towards its south end, several years ago Sea Point was known as a 
prostitution and drug hotspot. Nigerian gangs
44
 gave the suburb a bad reputation. As 
a response, the businesses introduced the Sea Point Improvement District, which 
showed quick results. Although there are a handful of sex-shops and an occasional 
prostitute on the street, Sea Point‘s main street now presents itself as a vibrant place 
                                                 
44
 Throughout the study ‗Nigerian gangs‘ were used as an exemplar for the ultimate criminal. 
However, it is not known if all members of the so-called Nigerian gangs were indeed Nigerian citizens 
or of Nigerian descent.    
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with mixed stores that reflect the gay and Jewish communities that live there. After 
having ‗cracked down‘ on prostitution and drugs, the suburb faces low crime 
numbers (although unfortunately no crime statistics have been shared and this 
statement is based on statements by two senior staff of the CID) and is safe enough 
for security officers to wear non-military uniforms and not carry batons. All the 
officers carry are their two way radios and pepper spray.  
Due to topography as well as the built environment of the CID, which is one long 
stretch along the main streets, it is easy to police. During the day, six officers patrol 
on foot and there are two vehicle patrols with a lock up facility. At night, four 
officers patrol in the two vehicles. According to the CID, officers can respond within 
two minutes after being called by the control room.        
 
7.2.6 Policing Networks in CIDs 
Unlike Wakefield‘s example in the UK, the policing network or multi-agency 
policing within the CIDs presents itself as being very elaborate, especially from the 
CID security‘s point of view. Something all CID actors confirmed is the notion of 
close cooperation with the police. This occurs on a daily basis, through regular 
meetings or operations that are being carried out together (Interview 04
45
; Interview 
08; Interview 10
46
; Interview 13
47
 Interview 14
48
, Interview 16
49
, Vignette 8.1).  
[R]emember the CIDs were all designed as top up services. We are not the 
primary service provider. The police, Metro, law enforcement, they are all the 
primary guys. (…) Our guys must rather go in a more supportive role. Go 
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49
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meet up with the police. How can we assist you? How can we support you? 
(Interview 15
50
). 
We have weekly meetings with SAPS, where we chat and say right hotspot 
last week was there. (…) From that perspective, we work very close with 
them, we do a lot of what we call VCPs, visible checkpoints, roadblocks, 
stop-and-searches that sort of thing we do with them. However, when it 
comes to going into a drug house and looking for ammunition, arms, drugs, or 
whatever, we pull back because that is not our mandate (Interview 14
51
). 
Due to the shortage of police officers, all related policing bodies have to dispatch 
some of their staff before larger operations, something all CIDs have confirmed as 
well. So when planning an operation they show a ‗united front‘ (Interview 1452). 
To sum up, the CID security works closely with the police as a partner in the policing 
network. Due to staff shortages, the police will request resources from the CIDs to 
carry out larger operations. Also the police share confidential information with the 
CIDs, and vice versa, to be more effective. However, in contrast to Shearing and 
Wood‘s (2003) argument of equal security nodes, all the key actors in the CIDs 
emphasise their junior role in the multi-agency setup. Talking about this issue, one of 
the interviewees described the relationship using the following example: 
Because we have good relationships with the police. We then say: Look  there 
is something there, you need to do something [in this case a drug house]. 
They trust the information is true. They obtain the search warrant and they 
raid. We go with them and we assist. They do the actual raid, we will cordon 
off the street to make sure nobody comes there and disturbs. But yes, that‘s 
the intervention that we play (Interview 07).  
However, the police (here represented through high ranking Metro Police officers) 
are more sceptical about this relationship. During a focus group they confirmed that 
the CIDs ‗talk to them‘ (Interview 0453) and confirmed cooperation in times of 
limited resources. For the same reason they appreciate the additional uniforms as, 
according to them, all uniforms inhibit crime, something Crawford et al. (2005: 45) 
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have termed ‗cross-fertilisation‘. However, the police would prefer to work with 
trained officers rather than security guards as they feel that security guards lack 
training, exclude people and overstep legal boundaries (this latter point will be 
discussed more fully later). In addition to these networks that are part of the plural 
policing landscape, the CIDs have a weekly meeting where they discuss issues and 
strategies amongst themselves (Interview 05
54
; Interview 07
55
; Interview 15
56
). The 
good working relationship claimed by private policing agents also applies to the 
residential security schemes that will be discussed in the following section (Interview 
09; Interview 25
57
) 
 
Table 7.3: Overview of different identified CID security schemes 
 City Improvement Districts 
WID CCID OK/GP CID Sea Point CID 
Security 
Company 
Orbis Ilisio Security, 
Alexa Security  
Vetus Scholar Vetus Scholar 
Scale Wide parts of the 
inner city suburb 
of Woodstock. 
The CID includes 
the two main 
roads (Albert Rd 
and Victoria Rd) 
where most of the 
shops are located 
and the residential 
area in between. 
Encompasses the 
city centre of 
Cape Town 
including the 
CBD and many 
tourist attractions 
such as Long Str. 
or Company‘s 
Garden. 
Mixed 
commercial and 
residential 
neighbourhood. 
Many shops are 
situated within the 
residential area.  
CID runs along the 
Main St. with almost 
all of the shops. It is 
therefore possible to 
exclude the non-
paying residential 
areas from the CID.   
Kind of 
area 
Of all the CIDs, 
the WID is the 
poorest and most 
run down one. It 
also has high 
crime rates. 
Busy, bustling 
centre of the city. 
As it is most 
central it attracts 
all classes, 
leaving the 
security busy 
maintaining order. 
Wealthy area with 
several shops on 
the higher-end of 
the scale 
The area used to be 
known for 
prostitution and 
drugs but is now 
middle-class and 
connects affluent 
areas with each other  
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Appearance 
of security 
officer 
‗Army-style‘ 
uniforms 
including combat 
boots and tucked-
in army pants  
‗Army-style‘ 
uniforms 
including combat 
boots and tucked-
in army pants 
‗Civilian-style‘ 
uniform. Black 
shoes, suit pants, 
uniform shirt or 
rain jacket with 
the company‘s 
logo and a badge.   
‗Civilian-style‘ 
uniform. Black 
shoes, suit pants, 
uniform shirt or rain 
jacket with the 
company‘s logo and 
a badge. 
Objective Patrolling the territory, checking on suspicious persons and ‗others‘ 
 
 
7.3 Residential Policing  
This section will analyse the two residential security schemes that have been 
identified and mapped, in addition to having a section on armed response. In contrast 
to the CIDs that are embedded in detailed and extensive discussions on the 
revanchist, neoliberal city, gentrification and urban renewal programmes, the 
residential security schemes are surprisingly simple. They are about personal safety 
and are a response to people‘s worries about their lives in a high crime environment. 
In the past similar residential security setups have been called ‗extreme 
neighbourhood watches‘ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b).    
Although the residential security schemes are not about attracting capital (although 
this is indirectly the case due to increasing property prices) or about public-private 
partnerships in commercial centres and BIDs (Harvey, 1989), they are inevitably 
linked to the idea of urban revanchism. As Chapter 6 argued, on the one hand public 
space is being avoided as far as possible because of high crime rates and the public 
police‘s, and ultimately the state‘s, failure to protect its citizens sufficiently 
(Shearing and Kempa, 2000; Dupont et al., 2003; Gie, 2009; Paasche and Sidaway, 
2010; Baker 1999). On the other hand, Section 6.2.2 argued that South Africa faced a 
political turn away from a socialist/nationalist agenda towards a more neoliberal one. 
Based on work by Garland (2009), Shearing and Wood (2003) and Rose (1996a, 
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1996b), Section 2.3 explained that this involves a reconfiguration of citizenship; here 
the key factors are ‗responsibilisation‘ and ‗active citizens‘.  
The combination of those two points caused parts of the citizenry in the case study to 
organise their own additional safety so they did not have to rely on the police, even 
replacing the police when it came to their immediate safety. On a small residential 
scale they reclaim space so they can use it free from worrying about their wellbeing. 
The private policing officer‘s boots on the ground are implementing revanchist 
urbanity in central Cape Town‘s suburbs; only the detailed mapping of private 
policing schemes reveals this transfer of wider discussions on urban change.          
The organisation and sophistication of these schemes is considerably less than those 
described in the previous section. However, the schemes discussed here are part of 
the security governance landscape and play their role in the reshaping of space. It is 
important to understand their role as part of a more nuanced interpretation of policing 
and security companies. However, it should be said that armed response companies 
and static security schemes are forms of security rather than policing. In the case of 
the bobby-on-the-beat scheme, this is more akin to policing due to its wider 
functions. However, compared to the CID policing schemes their policing functions 
are limited, especially since the bobby-on-the-beat officers do not police by-laws.   
As Chapter 3 has shown, the attention of academics has been on privatised or private 
spaces that are characterised by actual gates or booms. Residential areas in central 
Cape Town differ from Johannesburg‘s or Cape Town‘s suburbia for two reasons. 
Firstly, the geography of the city bowl and parts of the Atlantic seaboard, locked 
between the sea and the mountains, limits new gated developments. Where enough 
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privately-owned space is available, gated complexes have been introduced. In streets 
where houses are built along public roads, however, this is difficult
58
.  
Secondly, the legislation and the city are stricter on the barricading of streets using 
barriers (or booms) and fences (something commonly referred to as the ‗booming 
off‘ streets a la Johannesburg). If a neighbourhood wants to erect a boom barrier in a 
street and de facto privatise it, the legislation says that the particular community has 
to take on responsibility for the whole street, including everything that lies both 
underneath it and above it (e.g. gas and sewage) as the city will not be responsible 
for it anymore. Due to the high costs, therefore, the gated community or boomed off 
street is not common in the case study site. The practice of booming off streets is also 
politically disputed. In the example of one neighbourhood in the case study area, the 
member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security in charge physically tore 
down a boom using the city‘s police force. However, this does not mean that 
residents in the case study area relinquish private security measures and rely for their 
personal safety on the police. Different concepts have been identified that show 
innovative ways to get tight residential security without having to erect booms and 
fences. Again, an overview of the findings is provided in Table 7.4. 
 
7.3.1 Armed Response  
Although the armed response services are only of limited relevance for the private 
policing of public space, they should be mentioned as they are omnipresent. 
Wherever one goes, the signs of an armed response service will be there. However, 
saying that they are of no relevance is not quite right. Indirectly they do play a role in 
the private policing of public space as they cooperate with the mapped schemes and 
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 It has to be emphasised that this refers explicitly to a form of community. Individual houses 
commonly do have gates, walls and/or electrical fences.  
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function as their backup. Either way, due to their presence as well as the fact that 
they are under-researched, armed response services will be discussed in this section.   
In residential areas the numbers of houses without a visible armed response sign are 
the clear minority, and in many cases the absence of a sign will mean that it has been 
stolen; at the same time this means that some houses with a sign may not actually 
have a contract with an armed response provider, but instead use the sign as a 
deterrent. The reason for the wide spread of armed response services is the limited 
trust in the police. Although a high ranking Metro officer spoke about the ‗myth of 
slow response times‘, at a later point in the focus groups several officers explained 
that they use the service of an armed response themselves (Interview 04
59
). However, 
as will be outlined below, armed response companies do not play a role under the 
research questions being examined as generally no community or governance setups 
contract them for the policing of public space. They are highly individual security 
setups, only for private space. However, in combination with some of the schemes 
that will be discussed below, this changes and they do become an actor of the 
policing of public space, which is why they are being discussed here.      
The basic armed response service costs about 230 Rand (£20) per month and entails 
an alarm system, including a panic button that is linked to the control room of the 
armed response company. Furthermore, the client can call the company if something 
does not seem right or if he or she wants protection from the car to the door, for 
whatever reason. An additional service offered by the companies is an increase in 
patrols of the property while the residents are on holiday. Larger apartment 
complexes might have more complex contracts. Usually, one area, such as the 
neighbourhood of Sea Point, will have two armed response providers that share the 
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 High ranking Metro Police officers 
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contracts between them. This guarantees enough competition to keep the costs stable, 
but at the same time the numbers of clients in one area is high enough that the 
companies can dispatch at least one car to keep the response times down. Although 
this is the norm, one does occasionally find sign for a third company sticking out. 
However, they are often, as one of the participates who is an expert in the armed 
response industry calls them, some ‗Mickey Mouse company‘ that will have 
response times that might be too long in the case of an emergency, and in South 
Africa long response times can result in the violent death of the client. Throughout 
the research in Cape Town and occasional visits to other cities, one of the two 
companies is usually a multinational security contractor such as ADT or CUBBS 
Security (surprisingly, only rarely was it G4S). In the case study site the dominant 
multinational company is ADT. The second prevailing company is usually a local 
security provider that specialises in one small area. Examples in the case study are 
City Bowl Armed Response, Avenue Response Fresnaye, or Avenue Response 
Green Point. While ADT gets clients through their size and dominance in the 
industry, the local providers in the case study site advertise their local knowledge of 
the area and a concept they call ‗area-bound-security‘. Area-bound-security means 
that a response car is dispatched in one zone within their relatively small area. This 
means that the geographical area they operate in is subdivided into several smaller 
zones which the dispatched response car is not allowed to leave. In their words, this 
enhances the quality of their service as, unlike the ‗CHUBBs and ADTs‘ who might 
leave their zones, the client is always covered and safe. While industry associations 
demand a maximum of a 15 minute response time, the local providers promise 
between three and five minutes. Although it has not been empirically tested, the 
researcher‘s experience from incidental false alarms confirms the short response 
times.   
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Figure 7.4: Warning signs of an armed response company  
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
 
The armed response providers arguably carry out a classic security function, which is 
personal safety and loss prevention on private property, as outlined in Section 4.4. 
Although crossing through public space to get there, there are elements of a policing 
function as well. While foreign tourists will occasionally mistake the armed response 
cars for police patrols, the city‘s criminals know the difference. Therefore the armed 
response patrols offer some deterrent but do not keep the criminals out. Also their 
key function is armed response; if they become involved with harassing street people 
and an emergency call came in they would not be able to respond so quickly, which 
they cannot afford.  
In practice, the armed response patrols have no powers in public space that are 
different to those of any other South African citizen. This means that they can carry 
156 
 
out a so-called citizen‘s arrest if they witness a Schedule 1 Offence60; aside from that 
their hands are bound. However, as this chapter shows, the security industry is very 
creative in evading their legal boundaries, or in some cases even breaking them. In 
this case they might ask a suspicious person what they are doing in the area. If the 
suspect does not answer, which he or she is not obliged to, the armed response will 
follow the person and call in SAPS via their operations room to check out the person, 
following the motto ‗If you are not doing anything wrong, why will you not talk to 
us?‘. Nevertheless, the actual policing function of the armed response is limited. 
Their main mandate is to arrive at the client‘s place as fast as possible to carry out a 
security function and to be a possible deterrent. To live up to the idea of security and 
to meet the demands of the residents, two residential security concepts have been 
introduced that supplement the armed response service.  
 
7.3.2 The Bobby-on-the-Beat  
One of the armed response companies and a security company in the case study site 
offer a ‗bobby-on-the-beat‘, a term that has been adopted from one of the security 
companies offering this scheme. Here a particular neighbourhood (see Map 7.2) 
receives a complex additional private policing setup to increase their security and so 
not having to rely on the police for anything except carrying out an official arrest 
after a suspect has been detained. 
 
 
                                                 
60
 ―Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in respect of the following offences: Public 
violence, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault, robbery, assault (when a dangerous 
wound is inflicted), arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any premises with intent 
to commit an offence, theft and escaping from lawful custody‖ Department: Justice and Constitutional 
Development. Republic of South Africa. 1977. Subordinate legislation in respect of the criminal 
procedure act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2002). 
157 
 
Figure 7.5: Bobby-on-the-beat patrol 
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2011 
 
The idea of this concept is crime prevention through visibility and public 
reassurance, which Crawford and Lister (2004: ix) described as the ‗mobile 
scarecrow‘. However, if a crime is witnessed the guard on patrol will act, possibly 
supported by an armed response officer; alternatively an armed response officer may 
need to deal with ‗undesirables‘ but also needs to be able to respond to emergency 
calls. Like the CIDs, the officers have no formal legal powers. However, as they do 
not police the by-laws, the legal limitations are not a major obstacle. In residential 
areas the problems by-laws address, such as informal traders and street people, are 
either not an issue or the available means are sufficient to deal these problems. The 
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mandate of the officers on patrol is to show a presence and to watch out for 
suspicious behaviour.   
The foot patrols are ‗deadly‘. They are quiet, they are swift guys. You know, 
criminals in the middle of the night for instance can see a patrol vehicle 
coming along, they can hear a vehicle coming along, but a foot patrol ... they 
don‘t smell it. (…) You observe more, being on a bicycle or walking patrol 
than in a vehicle (Interview with representative of security company). 
However, if they spot suspicious behaviour they have two options: first to ask the 
suspicious person if they can search them. If the person replies no, the person in 
question becomes more suspicious and the officer will call in the police to perform 
the search. 
If it‘s suspicious behaviour you can‘t arrest a person for suspicious behaviour. 
(…) But at the moment you have got the same powers of arrest as average Joe 
citizen on the street. The police service obviously have the right to stop-and-
search, I know we do it too and generally the criminals comply with us, you 
know if you see a guy carrying a bag around we have stopped plenty people 
in the past, you know at four in the morning why are you looking into cars 
with a bag that contains screwdrivers and other ... what are you up to? What 
are your intentions? So generally we notify via radio from that suspicious 
person that we observe, they would speak to our control and generally notify 
the South African Police Service (Interview with representative of security 
company). 
The second option is to watch a suspicious individual until they commit an actual 
crime or Schedule 1 offence. In this case the officer can execute a citizen‘s arrest, 
just the same as anyone else.  
So I rather wait for that guy to almost to break a window and then arrest him 
than ... at least you got you a good arrest, because to stop a guy when he has 
got a screwdriver in his bag and everything else, tools that implement to be 
used for criminal activity ... you can‘t really charge him for being in 
possession of a screwdriver, it‘s not a law. Whatever his intentions were it 
will not stand up in court (…). So we rather wait until the guy committed a 
criminal offence and then there is no excuse, we‘ll catch the guy in the car. 
We had that plenty. We wait to the point where ... if you can‘t take the guy 
now, yes you will prevent ... taking him too early the guy is gonna ... it will 
prevent that crime from happening and he will leave the area and he will walk 
down the road and he will be gone. In 20 minutes he could be in another 
street doing exactly the same thing. That is what he is there to do. And you 
can see these criminals (Interview with representative of security company). 
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The areas where this concept applies are marked by large signs with the company‘s 
logo saying ‗This area is protected by X‘, warning all potential criminals about their 
presence (see an example on Figure 7.4). Furthermore, the companies have camper 
vans in their company colours and with their logos. The camper van is parked around 
crime hotspots in accordance with the city as an additional deterrent and is used by 
the guards during their breaks.  
The actual area where the concept applies has clear geographical boundaries and the 
patrolling security officer is not supposed to leave them. His patrol route is checked 
using electronic clock points. The officers patrol either on motorcycles, Segways or 
bikes (see Figure 7.5). As mentioned above, the armed response market is saturated, 
so providers need additional services in order to gain contracts. In this case extra 
patrolling is a free service that is offered if the client cluster in a neighbourhood is 
high enough. The geographical area for the bobby-on-the-beat usually encompasses a 
few blocks, depending on client density, the crime rate and the geography of the area. 
Depending on these conditions, security officers will be dispatched and will patrol 24 
hours a day, seven days a week.  
This setup constitutes a win-win situation for all parties concerned. While the crime 
rate in the area will drop, the residents get the service for free, which might motivate 
potential new clients to sign up with the company or to change their provider. The 
armed response company, on the other hand, increases their reputation through 
offering a free extra service and low crime rates in their core areas
61
.  
The security officers patrol an area of several blocks and although mobile, they 
cannot be everywhere at once and residents, especially those in very affluent areas of 
the case study site, prefer more policing, even if this means extra costs. Again, the 
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 This was not confirmed for one site where extra levies might apply for this service. 
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bobby-on-the-beat scheme ticks the boxes for playing a governance node. Having a 
professional security company organising the scheme, they not only have the same 
mentality, because the governance of security is all they do, but they also have the 
institutional structure that is required. Drawing on a large pool of experienced 
security officers as well as the company‘s infrastructure, cars, motorcycles, bicycles 
and armoury, they also have the technologies and resources to govern their 
designated space. Overall, the bobby-on-the-beat schemes have enough policing 
power to keep a neighbourhood safe, to become the first port of call for residents in 
need, and to allow the police to remove their resources from these spaces (Interview 
with representative of security company). 
 
7.3.3 Static Security 
Of all the policing schemes identified, static security is the smallest in size and has 
an organisational community structure behind it. These setups commonly entail a 
cul-de-sac or a section of a residential street between two junctions. In these cases 
the governing body behind them is the residents of the particular block who want an 
extra bit of additional security and a guard that patrols the section of their public 
street 24/7 (see Figure 7.6). Wealthy residents who feel a need for extra protection 
may hire these officers
62
 or residents along one street will club together and contract 
a security company to patrol the area. In the case study site this kind of setup 
appeared in the affluent neighbourhoods of the south-western edge of the City Bowl 
and on the Atlantic Sea Board up from the north end of Sea Point (see Map 7.3).  
 
                                                 
62
 In these cases the requirements of insurance companies play an important role as well as only 
sufficiently secured property and positions will be insured.  
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Map 7.2: Bobby-on-the-beat policing 
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Arguably, of all the forms of policing setups, static security shows the fewest 
features of policing and the most of a mere security task. Its focus is proactive crime 
deterrence and reassurance for the residents, while aspects of order maintenance on a 
wider community level are mostly irrelevant due to the small size of the schemes. A 
representative of a security company explains that their main purpose is the deterrent 
of crime.      
My idea of security is that security … we are not there to arrest people; even 
though we do, that‘s not our job. Our job is to deter the crime. If the crime 
takes place on our premises than we have already failed in our primary task of 
being proactive. The police, it‘s their job to catch people and convict people 
and all these kind of things. It‘s not our job (Interview with representative of 
security company). 
This deterrence is done through a security officer being visible in the same street 24 
hours a day seven days a week; additional signs are also used as a signal of the 
additional policing service (see Figure 7.8). The only element that associates the 
scheme with other private policing companies is its positioning in public space. As 
mentioned earlier, this scheme is almost irrelevant because of its small size when it 
comes to the actual policing of urban space, as Map 7.3 shows. However, it does 
contribute to the fragmentation of space and differs from actual gated complexes, and 
so needs to be mentioned.   
The idea of static security itself is rather simple. The contracted security company 
dispatches an officer to the site. For his breaks and some shelter the company 
provides a hut and a mobile toilet so he does not have to leave the site during his 
shift (see Figure 7.7). The officer is equipped with a baton, pepper spray, possibly an 
electroshock or a non-lethal gun, and a torch. For communication with the residents 
within the street he will carry a mobile phone, and a two-way radio for 
communication with his control room. With the radio he can also contact the control 
room of an associated armed response company (see Vignette 7.1), so there is an 
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element of rapid response to the scheme. In some cases he might also carry a panic 
button that allows immediate contact with the armed response company who will 
locate the button when it is pressed and send their vehicles. In other words, there is a 
private security setup in place that entirely replaces the police as a first call of action.  
 
Figure 7.6: Static officer 
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
 
Once the immediate threat is under control, or if the private forces are insufficient, 
the security companies will contact the police to officially arrest the possible 
intruders to the public properties. 
So if we see a suspicious person or suspicious car, bang, get it on the radio, 
White Corolla, sierra registration one two three just coming in our area, not 
happy with it, please advise. Bang, the armed response company comes along 
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checks it out, if necessary calls the police because they are involved in the 
situation and the whole process, so they would come along and check the 
vehicle out. It has now left our area, it‘s going towards your area; police will 
monitor the vehicle and see what is going on. Get description to the people to 
get as much information across as you can. Just make it uncomfortable for 
them [the people identified as a threat to the safety of the policed site] 
(Interview with representative of security company; the used excerpt is from a 
site outside the case study and includes a boom. However, it reflects the 
situation especially in the cul-de-sac).  
The objectives of the security officer are regular patrols of the public space, using 
electronic clock points to give justice to the expectations of their supervisors and the 
financing bodies. If residents return home or have to leave in the dark, they will call 
their officers to wait at the gate so no one can linger there to hijack the car or to 
intrude the property while the electrical gates are opening and closing. Furthermore, 
suspicious behaviour will be observed and reappearing cars noted. As always, the 
geography of the area determines the policing. On a street in the middle of Fresnaye, 
for example, it is more difficult to control the people and cars, as there is the normal 
urban traffic (see Le Sueure Ave. or La Croix Ave. in Fresnaye). However, in the 
case of a cul-de-sac that goes up the mountain, such as Nettleton Rd, tight policing 
measures are much easier. Here the control of every car or person is in the interest of 
the residents, their governing body. As no one other than the residents or people 
associated with the residents will come to these secluded streets, the surveillance of 
the street will stay legally unchallenged.  
[W]e put a permanent team on site so they know the residents, they know 
who the contractors are, the cleaning companies that come in, the gardening 
companies that come in, the painting companies et cetera. So if there is 
anybody else, they stop him and say ‗good morning, can I help you?‘ ‗Yes I 
come to number 3 bam bam bam‘ ok. He will have a sheet so he knows 
exactly who the residents are ‗so you come to see Mr Jones. Ok, thanks you 
very much‘. And when he goes on his patrol, he pops past and makes sure 
that they are at M Jones‘s and they are doing their thing et cetera. And at 
night it is purely a deterrent, patrolling. So we have our guys literally just 
patrolling (…) [I]f we are not sure of who you are, we will ask you and sign 
the visitor register. If you do not wish to sign in, we can‘t force you to sign in 
but now immediately the alarm bells are going. Who are these people … So 
we will find our closest vehicle in the area, send him back and go and watch 
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and see what the hell is happening. So it‘s just a proactive approach, because 
our aim is to make him go somewhere else (…) (Interview Interview with 
representative of security company; the used excerpt is from a site outside the 
case study and includes a boom. However, it reflects the situation especially 
in the cul-de-sac). 
 
Figure 7.7: Street with static security including hut and toilet  
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
 
Another issue is street people and the urban poor. In paying for this additional 
policing, the financing or governing body, i.e. the residents, expect no street people 
to settle in the street. As these setups are in residential areas and not on main routes, 
as well as being fairly small in size, vagrancy is not a big problem. If street people 
show up, the security officer will ask them to leave, which is described as not a 
problem (see Vignette 7.1). If the person does not want to move on, ‗more forceful 
arguments might be applied‘; what ‗more forceful‘ means exactly was not outlined in 
greater detail, but from the context it can be assumed that it refers to some form of 
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force which would not be within the limits of the law and has therefore not been 
explained in greater detail. 
 
Vignette 7.1: Observation on static security  
Observation number: 13; Objective: Static guarding of public space between two junctions in 
residential area; Position of participant: Basic security officer; Duration: 2 hours  
On all four sites the security officers welcomed me very friendlily after I had introduced myself. On 
each introduction I gave my business card to the officer and showed my University of Plymouth 
student card, which has my picture on it. I explained that I had talked to their boss, who had given the 
OK for me visiting and that they should feel free to call their control room to check the information. 
Furthermore I ensured them that I was in no way interested in any kind of sensitive or operational 
information.  
In our conversations we talked about their job and what they do if suspicious individuals or groups, or 
cars show up. What constitutes a suspicious person could not be established, but has been described as 
something you learn during the job. If street people show up they would ask them to move on, as they 
are legally not allowed to do much more. Usually this is no problem, although one officer claimed that 
the street people can sometimes ‗be a bit bully‘. If they cannot handle the situation or feel under threat 
they can call backup from the armed response and via their own control room. All officers are in 
contact with an armed response company in case backup is needed. On a different radio frequency the 
officers were also in contact with their own control room. Altogether the encounters were very 
friendly and I felt that the officers on site enjoyed bit of change to their routine.  
 
However, this kind of security has its downsides as well. As most of the companies, 
as well as their associated armed response companies, will confirm, people in Cape 
Town are not willing to spend a lot on security; a number of interviewees said, ‗Cape 
Town is not Johannesburg‘. However, not paying a lot has to be seen as relative. The 
average resident in this scheme will already be paying for an armed response service, 
electric fences and electric gates, and the static security officer (see Figure 7.8). To 
keep their additional costs for the extra service down, security companies have to 
respond with, for example, limited training of their personnel. As the head of such a 
company explains:           
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The problem with that is that it‘s a cut-throat business. If I come and offer 
you a guard and charge you 18,000 Rand, and another guy comes and charged 
you 14,000 rand, you don‘t really know the difference. That my guys are 
better trained, all you want is a guy in a decent uniform, patrolling, looking 
like he knows what he is doing. So that is at the end of the day is what 
security is. It‘s a perception. It‘s really not … you are not getting what you 
are thinking you get… security. Ok, and I tell people this and people hire 
from us … you are not getting Jean Claude van Damme Bodyguard. You are 
getting a security guard. At best he is going to warn us if something is 
happening. You know. Or deter something by his presence. But further than 
that … we are not capable (Interview with representative of security 
company). 
 
Figure 7.8: Different warning signs that communicate with potential criminals 
 
Picture taken by the author, July 2010 
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Nevertheless, considering the legal and geographical limitations to boomed off 
streets, the concept of static security is the closest alternative and offers the tightest 
security, besides an own guard on the property or close protection, one can buy. As 
outlined in the example of the bobby-on-the-beat, these schemes fulfil the criteria 
required to be classified as a governance node with two professional security 
companies behind them organising the scheme; namely the company that provides 
the static guard as well as the cooperating armed response company. However, in 
terms of their policing functions, static security is limited to crime deterrence and 
elements of rapid response, although operating in public space, it should therefore 
rather be called a security setup rather than a policing one. 
 
Table 7.4: Overview of different identified residential security schemes  
 Armed Response Bobby-on-the-beat Static security 
Security 
Company 
Mainly ADT, City Bowl 
Armed Response, and two 
local Avenue Response 
companies 
Armed response 
company and a security 
company 
Security companies 
Scale Encompasses the entire 
case study site 
Includes large section of 
residential areas. 
Between four and ten 
blocks 
Micro-scale of only one 
residential street between 
two junctions. Total 
length of about 50-100m 
Kind of area Heavily present all over the 
case study site, 
encompassing residential 
and commercial areas of all 
classes. 
Middle to upper-class 
residential areas. 
Used by affluent 
households. 
Appearance 
of security 
officer 
‗Army-style‘ uniforms 
including combat boots and 
tucked in army pants, 
reflecting the idea of crime 
deterrent through visibility. 
‗Army-style‘ uniforms, 
including combat boots 
and tucked in army 
pants, reflecting the idea 
of crime deterrent 
through visibility. 
‗Army-style‘ uniforms 
including combat boots 
and tucked in army pants, 
reflecting the idea of 
crime deterrent through 
visibility. 
Objective Showing presence by 
circling the territory they 
are dispatched to. Main 
objective is to respond to 
private alarm calls.   
Patrolling the territory, 
checking on suspicious 
persons and ‗others‘. 
Patrolling the street and 
checking on suspicious 
persons and vehicles. 
Being on stand-by to 
protect residents when 
accessing their house. 
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Map 7.2: Static security 
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7.4 Legal limitations for private policing companies  
The legal limitations as well as the (non-) accountability of private security 
companies, which will be discussed in the next section, are of importance as they 
reflect the de facto power these companies have on the street, although de jure they 
are rather limited. This is again of importance as it supports the claim that these are 
private policing companies. It has been argued that policing is about controlling 
social order and that social control is being translated into laws, especially by-laws. 
In so far as private security companies are able to police laws, it is therefore 
important that policing companies exist. The following two sections will show the de 
facto power of private security companies. 
Legally, private security officers have no more rights than any other citizens; 
however these are considerable and include the arrest of a person suspected of an 
offence (Berg, 2007)
63
. On this Singh explains: 
‗[P]rivate persons‘, [and] security personnel are empowered to arrest, without 
a warrant, anyone seen to be engaged in an affray and anyone ‗reasonably‘ 
believed to have committed any offence and who is fleeing a pursuing 
individual who ‗reasonably‘ appears to be authorized to effect an arrest for 
particular offence. The term ‗reasonably‘ is open to wide interpretation. 
(Singh, 2008: 50, emphasis in original) 
However, as various participants outlined, an arrest for an actual crime, especially 
Schedule 1 offences
64
, is legally more effective. In that case private policing officers 
                                                 
63
 Citizen powers: ―Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
In South Africa, the private security industry derives its powers mainly from 
the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977), allowing private security personnel 
as ‗private persons‘ to: 
• arrest persons without a warrant on the basis that the person committed, 
or was suspected of committing, an offence; 
• pursue that person; 
• break open premises in order to effect the arrest; 
• use force – even deadly force – to effect the arrest should the person offer 
up resistance, and 
• seize articles from that person (as long as they are delivered to a police officer as soon as possible).‖ 
(Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 42(a)(b)(2); section 48; 
section 49(2)(a)(b)(c) in Berg, 2007: 8) 
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have the power to arrest and the obligation to contact the public police to exercise the 
formal arrest. In the case of a citizen‘s arrest by a private policing officer, the 
arrested is only allowed to be detained in the lock-up facility for the time it takes the 
police to arrive. However, the following section will show that private securities in 
the case study site have managed partially to move beyond these legal limitations on 
two levels. First, they found gaps in the legal texts that they use for their advantage, 
and secondly, they have become such important actors in the policing network that 
they appear to be tolerated by the state, represented by the city, and the public police 
if they stretch or even break the law in certain situations (Interview 04
65
). Although 
the police and city representatives would not agree with that notion in the interviews 
(Interview 04; Interview 35
66
), the self-understanding of the security guards 
throughout the observations suggest they take certain liberties, for example, when it 
comes to stop-and-searching of suspects as outlined below.            
 
Table 7.5: List of relevant by-laws regulating public space 
By-laws relating to streets, public spaces and the prevention of nuisances 
Illegal to bathe or wash oneself in public space ―No person shall in a public place- 
(d) bath or wash himself or herself, except- 
(i) in a bath or shower‖ (City of Cape Town, 
2007: 1351) 
Illegal to urinate or defecate in public space ―No person shall in a public place- 
(c) urinate or defecate, except in a toilet‖ (City of 
Cape Town, 2007: 1351) 
Illegal to make a fire in public space ―No person shall in a public place- 
(I) start or keep a fire‖ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 
1351-1352) 
Illegal to sleep over night in public space ―No person shall in a public place- 
(m) sleep overnight or camp overnight or erect 
any shelter‖ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1351-
1352) 
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64
 ―Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in respect of the following offences: Public 
violence, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault, robbery, assault (when a dangerous 
wound is inflicted), arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any premises with intent 
to commit an offence, theft and escaping from lawful custody‖ Department: Justice and Constitutional 
Development. Republic of South Africa. 1977. Subordinate legislation in respect of the criminal 
procedure act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2002). 
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Illegal to play music that can be heard from the 
neighbouring property 
―No person shall in a public place- 
cause or permit to be caused a disturbance by 
shouting, (a) screaming or making any other loud 
or persistent noise or sound, including amplified 
noise or sound‖ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 1352) 
Illegal to wash clothes in public space ―No person shall dry or spread washing, bedding 
or other items in a public place or on a fence on 
the boundary of a public road except where 
conditions in an informal settlement are such that 
it is not possible to do otherwise‖ (City of Cape 
Town, 2007: 1353) 
Illegal to skateboard in public space ―No person shall-  
(a) on a public road skate on roller-skates or a 
skate-board or similar device except where 
permitted by the City‖ (City of Cape Town, 2007: 
1353) 
One has to follow the instruction of a peace 
officer or can be fined otherwise (‗peace officer‘ 
means a law enforcement officer or traffic 
official of the City who has been declared a 
peace officer (Cape Town, 2007)). Peace officers 
exclude private policing argents but include law 
enforcement officers that can be ‗rented‘ from 
the city. 
―Any person who contravenes or fails to comply 
with any provision of this By-law or disobeys any 
instruction by a peace officer or a member of the 
Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 
enforcing this By-law, shall be guilty of an 
offence and with the exception of a contravention 
of sections 2(3)(g), (h), (i), (j) and (k), where 
there is a maximum penalty as provided for in 
analogous national legislation, be liable to a fine 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months, or to both a fine and such imprisonment‖ 
(City of Cape Town, 2007: 1355)  
Informal trading by-laws 
The by-law refers to trading in any kind of public 
space  
―Informal trading may include, amongst others:- 
street trading; (...) trading in public open spaces 
(...)‖(City of Cape Town, 2009: 6)  
To trade informally one needs formal permission 
from the City of Cape Town 
―Informal trading is permitted in any area within 
the jurisdiction of the City, subject to any trading 
plans adopted by the City, the provisions of this 
By-Law and any other applicable law‖ (City of 
Cape Town, 2009: 7) 
The required trading plan must, among other 
things, define its geographical boundary (see 
Figure 05) 
―A trading plan must: define the geographic 
boundary of the trading area; and demarcate 
informal trading bays and markets where informal 
trading permitted, outside of which informal 
trading shall be prohibited in that trading plan‖ 
(City of Cape Town, 2009: 7) 
The city had to consult with the role players in 
the affected area 
―Before adopting a trading plan, the City is 
obliged to- consult with interested and affected 
role players including the informal and formal 
sectors with the view to compiling a draft trading 
plan‖ (City of Cape Town, 2009: 9) 
The informal trader has to pay a fee to the city. ―The City is entitles to charge a par-holder a 
trading fee; an applicable; and an additional fee or 
tariff, which is to be determined by the City in its 
sole discretion, in respect of additional costs 
incurred or services provided by the City, 
including but not limited to circumstances were 
the permit-holder trades within the market‖ (City 
of Cape Town, 2009: 11-12)   
Anyone not complying with the by-law can be 
fined up to R5,000.00 or three months in prison. 
―Any person who – contravenes any provision of 
this By-Law (...) is guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding R5,000.00 
(...) or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
3 (...) month (...)‖(City of Cape Town, 2009: 22-
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23)  
Graffiti by-law 
It is illegal to paint graffiti on public and private 
property 
―Any person who intends applying a mural or any 
one of or a combination of any inscription, word, 
figure, letter, sign, symbol, sketch, picture, 
drawing or design to any natural surface or man-
made surface on any property, which will be 
visible to a person from a public place, must 
apply in writing to the authorised official for a 
permit to do so‖ (City of Cape Town, 2010: 1095)  
Not complying with the by-law can lead to fines 
of up to R15,000.00 or three months in prison. 
―11. (2)Any person convicted of an offence in 
terms of this By-law shall— 
(a) upon conviction for a first offence be liable to 
a fine of R15 000 or 3 months imprisonment; 
(b) upon conviction for a second offence or 
subsequent offences, be liable to a fine of R30 
000 or 6 months imprisonment, or to both such 
fine and such imprisonment. 
(3) In addition to a penalty contemplated in 
subsection (1), the convicted person may be 
liable— 
(a) to pay an amount equal to the cost or 
estimated cost of removal of the graffiti from the 
affected property, and where the cost of removal 
of the graffiti from the affected property has been 
borne by the City or by the owner of the property, 
to pay the amount so ordered to the City or to the 
owner, as the case may be‖ (City of Cape Town, 
2010: 1096) 
 
 
Dealing creatively with the legal limitations is a phenomenon exclusive to the CIDs. 
The territory of residential security schemes is usually much smaller than one of the 
CIDs and they generally face problems of a different nature; generally residential 
security either witnesses a Schedule 1 offence and apprehends the suspect 
themselves, or the companies involved, being more secluded from the public eye, 
have other methods to deal with problems such as vagrancy, something that will be 
discussed later in this section. CIDs, however, deal not only with Schedule 1 
offences but also police by-laws. In these cases their jurisdiction is limited to 
detaining a suspect, possibly using the lock-up facility of the mobile, while waiting 
for a peace officer or police officer to take over. This is of importance as the CIDs 
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have made an agreement with the City of Cape Town to get either a Metro, Law 
Enforcement or Traffic Officer dispatched to them (SAPS is not under the authority 
of the municipally, but is a national body). The agreement is that the CID pays the 
city the wages of particular officers for them to stay in the area.   
Council passed a resolution that Law Enforcement and Metro officers and 
Traffic officers could be contracted out to specific organizations. They still 
fall directly under the command control of their division, which is either law 
enforcement or traffic under city council, but they operate always there; the 
service agreement was paying the contract fees. So in other words it‘s a force 
multiplier for the city, without them having financially contribute to it. (…)  
Q: So you pay the council their salary and they kind of … 
A. Operate in our area of jurisdiction.  
Q: And you can put them of shifts as well … 
A: We negotiate the times. Look when I contacted the city council, I said I 
would like so many people to work these hours and those days. And they 
have to be deployed at the guys in that area on those times and those days 
which I have requested. So we have a formal contact with the city (Interview 
15
67
). 
As mentioned in the excerpt, the officers are legally still under the city‘s command. 
Observations of CID managers, however, have shown that the power relations are 
very much top-town in favour of the CIDs. It is argued that in reality the hired Law 
Enforcement officers work for the CID.   
During the walk several people have been greeted, including many street 
people. They know all the street people by name and can send them away. He 
also directed guards and Law Enforcement to a group of street people. When 
confronted with a large group of street people a discussion started with the 
street people arguing that they [the CID] do not have the right to send them 
away. After a while the manager went and told the Law Enforcement officers 
to start fining them because of disobedience of an authority (so it was told 
me), with fines of R150. The result was that the people moved outside the 
CID area (Section from the field notes; Observation 07
68
). 
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When a CID authority orders Law Enforcement to act, they will
69
. The Law 
Enforcement is essentially on standby to back-up the guards who are spread 
strategically over the territory. As soon as any offence is witnessed, they can detain a 
person and call in ‗their‘ peace officer to make the arrest. Having a Law Enforcement 
officer in the car also enables the mobile units to bring suspects directly to the police 
station. This scheme enables the CIDs to police their territory very effectively at a 
minimal cost. Crawford et al. (2005) describe the support of the police force in 
Wales and England by Community Support Officers, but here it is the other way 
around; in this case public Law Enforcement supports the private policing entities.  
Arguably this is the reintroduction of the ‗rent-a-cop‘ system that was in place in the 
post-1994 years but was later dismantled (Berg, 2004). However, as the legalities are 
not as direct as the de facto practice, this seemed to happen with very little public 
attention. 
In a way it‘s the most dangerous because it is insidious. You are actually 
privatising a function of the state without any accountability, without any 
public interest debate. And because you might live in Cape Town, but you are 
not asked is it OK for us to buy up policemen basically. Because that means 
that you as a private citizen have your own policeman, who has all the powers 
of another policeman, but you can instruct them what to do. It‘s totally 
outrageous. It‘s completely undemocratic and it‘s dangerous. I know there 
was a huge uproar when they introduced, what they called the rent-a-cop. 
Very dangerous (Interview 24
70
). 
I look at all this private security and I think our rent-a-cop scheme has been a 
big success. That‘s where we take law enforcement, traffic or Metro police 
members, we rent them out to these CIDs and they remain under the normal 
command and control because you cannot have private militias, and they then 
partner with the private security so they have the power of arrest and to be 
able to give tickets and stuff
71
 (Interview 35
72
). 
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70
 Local politician 
71
 In a email from the 28
th
 January 2012 the wording ‗and stuff‘ has been clarified and unpacked in the 
following way: ―[T]he Law Enforcement officers have the power of arrest and search and seizure and 
that when they work closely with the private security employed by the CIDs it has the very positive 
outcome that we see reduced complaints of brutality or abuse by street people and other people in the 
area. The standards they set as properly trained staff that are subject to disciplinary procedures and 
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The reintroduction of a system that has been abandoned by the city in the past for not 
conforming with existing legislation (Mashele, 2009) demonstrates both the private 
and political will to introduce this kind of neoliberal spatial order entity.            
Part of the private security‘s job in public spaces is to stop-and-search suspicious 
individuals. Although having asked different security employees what makes a 
person suspicious, no clear answer could be obtained. It seems to presents itself as a 
combination of dress, behaviour (i.e. looking into different cars), appearing out of 
place in a particular area, or skin colour. Ultimately the identification of suspicious 
people is a practice security actors acquire over time and it cannot be described in 
words. One obvious indicator, however, is a shopping trolley that is not filled with 
shopping bags but with the belongings of a street person. So if a suspicious person or 
a street person with a trolley enters the territory of a private security officer, he will 
stop-and-search him or her for stolen goods, drugs and such like. Using the example 
of the trolley, the officer has the option to open a case of theft, which is a Schedule 1 
offence, because trolleys are marked by the different supermarkets and can be traced 
back; he could therefore execute a citizen‘s arrest. Mentioning this option can be 
enough motivation for a street person to move on.          
However, if a direct offence is not witnessed then answering to questioning or 
allowing stop-and-search is voluntarily. However, security companies use the 
argument used to introduce many security measures, ‗if you have nothing to hide, 
why would you not allow us to search you/video tape you/surveillance you?‘. 
Consequently this makes anyone who does not agree to a search or who does not 
answer the questions suspicious, and once you are suspicious they will call in SAPS 
                                                                                                                                          
effective oversight means that the private security improve their enforcement as well and behave more 
ethically‖. 
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to do it for them. This consequently provides the security with the de facto power to 
question or stop-and-search whenever they deem necessary (various structured and 
unstructured observations). Furthermore the power relations, especially between 
security officers and ‗others‘, are distinctly top-down, which means that on the 
streets the whole part of threatening to call the police can be skipped and they can 
just search the person. In some of the interviews this has been presented as 
something that is being done normally, without mentioning SAPS at all (Interview 
13
73
; various structured and unstructured observations). Here Berg (2007) refers to 
the ‗façade of power‘ and a general misunderstanding of the law. 
The by-laws (City of Cape Town, 2010: 1096) have a clause making noncompliance 
with a law enforcement officer an offence. Besides the fact that private security 
officers are no law enforcement officers and therefore have to legal grounds for these 
actions, they would ask homeless people to move on (based on the researcher‘s 
various observations). If they do not follow the order, they would hassle them for not 
complying with an authority, something which is of questionable legality since Cape 
Town has no anti-loitering laws. In other words, private security agents have found a 
way to become de facto policing bodies by policing the laws and therefore social 
order effectively.  
 
7.5 Accountability  
The legality of private security, especially their interpretation of the legal limitations, 
raises the question of accountability. Again, in combination with the de facto power 
to police the by-laws, a lack of accountability makes the case for the power these 
companies can exercise on the street, since the security industry is widely 
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unregulated and complaints can only be dealt with by an overburdened public police 
force in cases where a law has actually been broken (The Economist, 2011).   
Although the Private Security Regulatory Authority South Africa (PSIRA) 
supposedly regulates the industry and communicates the potency of the state on the 
issue, in reality it is toothless and very limited in its actions unless it develops its 
capabilities according to Interview 34 with a local ANC activist and Head of the 
Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of Community 
Safety and Interview 33 with a researcher who critically watches the security 
industry, as well as Berg (2007). Therefore, both the interviewees make their claims 
on the basis of some authority.   
Members of the private security industry will refer to voluntary membership 
organisations, such as the South African Intruder Detection Services Association 
(SAIDSA) or the aforementioned PSIRA. When asking the same question of 
politicians, Metro police or researchers, they all agree that there is no actual 
oversight.  
SAIDSA is a voluntary organisation within the industry and is therefore unsuitable as 
a controlling body. On PSIRA, a researcher explained that it has no capacity to 
investigate or control security companies (Interview 33
74
). This means that the 
regulations of the industry refer only to the companies who comply with the law in 
the first place by registering with PSIRA. Nevertheless, when it comes to claims of 
abuses, there is no oversight body. Again, representatives of the industry would 
claim that anyone can file a complaint against the police, but, as one interviewed 
researcher says, particularly for the street people and urban poor who are most likely 
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to become the victims of abuse, it is difficult to challenge the security officers. In a 
follow-up interview, a Metro director states that: 
the problem with CID security is that they can infringe the constitutional 
rights of others, and it might cause a conflict of interest between the 
objectives of Metro and the ones of private security. There are legal 
boundaries that might not been known or followed by private security, 
relating also to the lack of training. If the legal boundaries are, however, 
being followed under the guidelines of Metro, they can be useful considering 
a lack of resources by the police and crime situation. (…) However, the 
coordination needs to be right and it needs to be coordinated by Metro. At the 
moment they work in isolation, they train in isolation. This relates back to the 
way they have been introduced without consultation with Metro (...). They 
can also abuse their power. Private security needs to be remained of its 
limits
75
 (Excerpt from interview notes. Interview 43
76
). 
Cape Town‘s politicians critically observe the issue as involving a lack of 
accountability for private security companies as well. Here a member of different 
oversight committees of the police states:  
―I think one of the problems with private security is that of accountability. I 
think that in the main that they are only accountable to those who pay them.  
They are compliant with the regulator as far as certification of the company 
and personnel is concerned and for their legitimacy in as far as meeting the 
requirements for their legal existence, but that is where accountability and 
legitimacy end. That they need to register with PSIRA, train people to a 
certain level, have compliance certificates et cetera, are conditions that can be 
easily met. But beyond that they are not accountable, in the geographic sense, 
to a community where they operate.  Maybe to the specific community, e.g. a 
business entity who pays them, but not to people who occupy the space they 
are securing. So if you take Long Street as a case in point, a security company 
is paid by the city. The city municipality is supposed to look after the 
interests of the business and the broader community in that geographic space, 
whether they are visitors to the city, transitional communities, displaced 
(homeless) people or residents in the city – not only the business community 
whose interest trumps everything and everyone.  So accountability of private 
security on the payroll of municipalities and government, provincial or 
national, should be held to account by government and not only serve 
business interest (Interview 34
77
). 
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Despite this, a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security plans to give 
full law enforcement powers to the private security commented: 
All of this [shows a pile of papers]. Is about … when these homeless people 
complaining about being victimised or bullied … a lot of that is actually the 
private security. Their complaints really are primarily about private security, 
particularly in the Cape Town CID. So I have observed over time how 
disciplinary process against those staff members and the ability to identify 
them for them and for there to be legal consequences are weak. Against our 
own members we can take far more effective action. We have a proper 
internal affairs department that runs with clear scrutiny, there is an agenda, 
there is a civilian oversight committee that looks at it, which monitors it, 
which looks at these agendas, it looks at exactly who‘s in trouble for doing 
what and monitors and makes sure what is being done with all the grievances, 
that monitors and makes sure that these cases are being attended to, they 
check to see what the outcomes of these cases are and that‘s their primary 
function.  
Q: Who is doing something similar for private security? 
A: Nobody. That‘s the problem. It is unregulated. You rely on the 
management of that private security company to be conscientious. If they 
have a good security guard, it is difficult to replace him, so they just won‘t 
sack him; at best they move him to another area. Whereas government is 
governed by legislation and civilian oversight and the criminal procedure act 
and internal affairs department which has a turnaround time of 6 to 36 days in 
this city for a disciplinary complaint. If a guy is accused of something, there 
is going to be some kind of consequence.  
Q: With no oversight over private security, you can have extreme cases where 
for example a reputation for being a very violent company becomes …  
A: … a plus. 
To sum up the issue of accountability up, private security companies in reality police 
parts of the public space that are privately governed. Although they are exercising 
police functions, they are not accountable to or controlled by anyone (Interview 08).  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the various spatial forms and functions of the most 
significant private policing and security companies. It has been shown how these 
companies exercise power which can be, depending on the size and sophistication of 
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the security scheme, substantial. The role and function of policing and security 
companies is to create space according to the aims and objectives of their governing 
bodies.  
The chapter also analysed the de facto and de jure legal situations and the limited 
oversight mechanisms for private policing companies. It showed that if required, and 
depending on the geography of the setup, private companies can police the law. 
Having this power to police by-laws, the legal translation of social control, they 
exercise control over space and become, according to the policing definitions 
outlined in Section 4.3, policing agents. The argument that private security actors 
have started to become serious policing agents has therefore been confirmed, and this 
argument will continue to be developed in the following chapters. However, it also 
shows that there still are important differences with the public police in terms of their 
de jure powers, which, as the following chapters will show, might change in the 
future, as well as their equipment and weapons. However, it already appears that 
some private policing agencies do exist and that they have a considerable influence 
on the formation and power in public space.  
Charting the various forms of private security and policing companies showed that 
the degree and level of power and policing functions varies strongly with the size and 
type of space. The CIDs which are not only the largest schemes in size but also 
operate in the busy commercial areas have the highest degree of power and policing 
functions. To order space they do not only need a strong presence on the ground but 
they have to police the by-laws as well.  
This is not an issue in the bobby-on-the-beat sites. They are in residential areas and 
here the problems faced by the CIDs do not occur to the same degree. For example, 
if homeless try to settle they can simply be sent off using pressure such as calling the 
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police or utilising the physical strength of the officers through actions such as 
speaking loudly or shining a strong torch in their eyes (Observation 02). In the case 
of the armed response companies and the static security schemes the policing 
functions are very limited. Instead they should be assessed as ‗classic‘ private 
security companies, as outlined in Section 4.4.  
Because this research as most interested in private policing companies in public 
space, the following chapters will focus on private CID policing. However, as this 
chapter has shown, this does not mean that other security schemes are irrelevant in 
any way. They too are under-researched, but contribute strongly to issues of the 
segregated, exclusive, or enclave city.  
To summarise this chapter on the various spatial forms and functions of private 
policing companies and private security companies, Map 7.4 shows all the schemes 
identified. As Section 5.3.3 has already argued, key public spaces are occupied and 
policed by commercial private agencies, including, with only minor exceptions, all 
commercial areas as well as wide residential neighbourhoods. Here the shear extent 
of occupied space suggests the power these private agents have.   
Having identified spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing 
companies in public space, the following chapter will go on to examine the impact 
these companies have on urban territory. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, urban 
revanchism is characterised by the desire of sanitised, consumer-friendly spaces.  To 
achieve this desired space, groups who do not fit in with the image of the space are 
being excluded or pushed out. In this case the governance nodes involved occupy a 
clear cut space or territory they feel responsible for. How this strong sense of 
territory combines with the exclusion of ‗undesirables‘ will be outlined in the next 
chapter.     
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Map 7.4: All private policing schemes 
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CHAPTER VIII TERRITORY AND DISPLACEMENT 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter structured the different community nodes and gave an account 
of the different policing schemes. It also analysed the ways the security industry 
deals with its, in theory, tight legal limitations that, together with inefficient 
oversight structures, have made companies in this industry such powerful policing 
entities. This chapter will continue the argument that a strong private police force 
exists. More specifically, it will deal with the issue of territory. The research has 
shown that private policing is characterised by a strong sense of territoriality. 
Measuring success in the client-customer relationship of governing bodies and 
policing companies is linked to the state of the client‘s territory; is the territory safer 
in terms of measurable crime numbers? Are there more arrests, or less visible urban 
poor? It is therefore not surprising that a strong territoriality fosters a policing that 
involves the exclusion of undesirables to spaces beyond the individual territory. 
Furthermore, the chapter will argue that strong territorialised policing not only 
displaces undesirables and crime, but indirectly replaces the actual police as well. 
Through this, the impact of private policing on urban territory will be analysed. 
 
8.2 Policing territory 
As Map 7.4 suggests, private security schemes have clear-cut boundaries. These 
fixed boundaries are of fundamental importance in the researched cases, as securing 
the territorial boundaries are the only reason for the ‗privates‘ to be there in the first 
place. Their financing governing bodies have little concern about what happens 
outside their space, even if it is just a few metres away. Therefore, the security 
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company only polices its designated space as that is what it is contracted for. In other 
words, they ensure that the financing bodies of the particular areas get value for their 
money. Moreover, each of the privately policed units has a centralised, governing 
power and is the financing body and these entities expect the money they pay to be 
spent within their territory, for their benefit. Only the social development projects 
that will be introduced later are not bound to a territory, which can happen when 
different organisations come together to co-finance a fieldworker, or when it has a 
positive impact on the situation within their boundaries (Interview 15
78
, Interview 
31
79
).  
As has been explained, officers are free to move around creatively within their space, 
and to avoid routine and the same routes to stay ahead of the criminals (Interview 
10
80
; Interview 30
81
); however, they are never permitted to leave the space on their 
patrols. In other cases the ‗invisible boundary‘, as it is called by the security, is much 
stricter. On several occasions the researcher witnessed how ‗undesirables‘, such as 
street people, rent-boys or groups of young males, had to leave the privately policed 
territory. In most cases it was enough if the removed went only a few steps back until 
he or she crossed this invisible boundary that marks the officers‘ territory. Many 
examples showed that if a troublemaker moved step-by-step backwards, out of the 
territory, at some point the security would be content as they had done their job, 
excluding a targeted person from the territory, even if the person is only metres 
outside it on the other side of the invisible boundary (see Vignettes 8.1 and 8.2).  
However, some CIDs also dispatch security personnel outside their territory when it 
comes to larger operations with different partners in the policing network, as they 
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cannot afford to isolate themselves and have to tackle some issues with a wider 
network of partners, such as comes to the larger operations described in the previous 
chapter (Interview 31
82
). There are also exceptions in emergency situations where 
security officers will either step in themselves or will contact the police via their 
control room. In the case of an emergency or a tense situation the officers may 
respond outside their territory or leave their post to cross a street. An example of this 
was made through an observation, although not one of a particularly academic 
nature, in which the researcher and a friend were approached by two gentleman who, 
at first politely, requested money. When the situation became tense and the use of 
blades was threatened, the researcher, by then an expert on the private policing in 
that area, signalled a nearby-stationed officer that his authority would be welcomed. 
After registering the carefully placed nod, the officer ran across the street, resulting 
in the immediate retreat of the suspects. In this case, leaving the territory to clear the 
situation was natural for the officer. 
As described in the previous chapter, the idea of contracting private security is to 
establish clean and safe spaces by introducing maximum control over the territory, 
either by reinventing the law creatively or by stretching, if not breaking, their legal 
restrictions. In this context, the boundary is of importance because its geography 
defines the space that has to be created and maintained (Sack, 1983). Therefore the 
abstract issue of the boundary becomes a core idea in daily policing practice. This is 
also why the theme of the invisible boundary is closely linked to issues of 
displacement of crime and people. 
At this stage the question would be whether the policing schemes work in terms of 
crime reduction, and if there are any statistics available to prove this. While there are 
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statistics, they have unfortunately not been published publicly. The only information 
available therefore comes from newspaper articles and the statements of the policing 
actors involved, as referenced in the previous chapter, which indicate that crime has 
dropped substantially. The only publicised statistical data do not give much insight 
into the crime situations and trends in the precise case study sites. Furthermore, it can 
be assumed that the amount of unreported crime remains very high, with Camerer et 
al. (1998) claiming that only half of all crimes are being reported; this is especially 
true in South Africa where confidence in the police is low (Shaw, 1997). In addition, 
there is a difference between reported crime numbers and convicted crimes which 
can distort crime statistics substantially since a reported crime might turn out not to 
be a crime after being addressed by the criminal justice system. Another problem is 
the phenomenon that additional policing does not necessarily decrease crime rates, 
but can cause an increase as arrests and reported cases die to the higher level of 
policing.  
Within the CIDs, the SAPS unfortunately uses absolute crime numbers that make 
comparison impossible and show only crime trends. Furthermore, the sites for which 
the crime statistics apply were not the exact case study sites, but much larger spaces. 
However, a broad picture can be portrayed using the published crime data in order to 
give context to the study. Statistically Cape Town is a high crime city, with crime 
rates nearly twice the national average. In 2008 the total of all crimes per 100,000 
population were 4,456 nationwide, and 8,557 in Cape Town. Similar trend are seen 
in both the murder rate, which in 2007/2008 was 39 nationwide per 100,000 and 60 
in Cape Town, and drug related crimes, which in 2007/2008 was 228 per 100,000 
nationwide but 830 in Cape Town (Gie, 2009).  
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However, within Cape Town crime is very unevenly distributed. Consulting the 
crime statistics per police district in 2007/2008, the township areas with little 
commercial activity reported murders between 74-153 and 154-383 (Gie, 2009). In 
contrast, the police stations in the case study site, which is key commercial areas 
around the inner city, reported murder numbers between 0-11 and 12-30. In the case 
study areas, the rate for reported drug-related crime is between 234-483 and 483-974 
while in poorer precincts the numbers are between 483-974, 975-1908, and a 
staggering 1909-5121 in Mitchells Plain, a known drug centre. In reported business 
crimes, central Cape Town, an area that includes the three case study sites, leads the 
league with 834-1581 cases (Gie, 2009), while, with exceptions, it is much lower in 
many poorer areas where one finds less commercial activity.  
The SAPS has released data on two individual areas in which some of the case study 
sites are located, namely Sea Point and Central City. However, again the data are 
given as total numbers and so it is not possible to put them into context with the rest 
of the city or with national data. In addition, the data does not correlate exactly with 
particular case study sites, so these are the figures being outlined here, rather than 
specific date for, for example, the Sear Point Improvement District. Nevertheless, the 
crime trends do give at least some evidence on the effectiveness of private policing 
on particular crimes. While full details can be found in Appendix D, in summary it 
can be said that the crime trend is decreasing or stagnating in both Sea Point and 
Cape Town central. Numbers that stick out in Cape Town Central are the decreasing 
murder rate and the decreasing number of cases of assault with the intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm. Also decreasing are non-residential burglaries and theft of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles (South African Police Service, 2011a). In Sea Point 
a positive trend can be seen in the decrease in various contact crimes, such as assault 
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with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, common assault and common 
robbery, as well as robbery with aggravating circumstances. On the increase however 
are drug related crimes and commercial crimes as mentioned already above (South 
African Police Service, 2011b).         
In Woodstock, various forms of murders and attempted murders, assaults, robberies, 
thefts, burglaries and carjacking have decreased substantially while drug-related 
crimes, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and shoplifting have 
increased (SAPS, 2011c). This could, however, be related to stricter controls linked 
to increasing security, and could therefore actually indicate their effectiveness. 
Interestingly, everyone encountered during the research, including actors, critics and 
people not linked to the study at all, stated that the schemes do work in their own 
right, although no one has actually seen clear numbers. Spending money on 
advertisements, modern websites, and shiny brochures, CIDs sell their space as a 
success, whether based on statistics or not.  
 
Vignette 8.1: Observation in City Improvement District  
Observation number: 04; Objective: Routine patrol of CID on foot; Position of participant: CID 
representative; Duration: 3 hours  
During the patrol we covered most of the CID‘s territory. Unlike other observations the patrol was 
very relaxed and ‗de-militarized‘, meaning no uniforms were worn and no weapons carried, at least 
not openly to my eyes. Only a radio was carried to stay in touch with the control room.  
The objective was to check in on the guards, to talk to the various shop owners that form part of the 
CID, and to keep an eye on the ‗others‘ as well as being additional ears and eyes for the police. During 
the walk I was shown different ‗hot-spots‘ that attract criminals and street people, and from where 
these groups were removed in the past by the CID security and the police.  
Throughout the patrol he emphasized the importance of territory and that they were not to act outside 
the CID‘s territory. If they witnessed a crime outside they called SAPS. When being asked if the 
‗others‘ know the boundaries, he confirmed they did. The street people and urban poor are left alone 
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as long as they behave within the boundaries. If not they are removed, which usually means that they 
cannot break any by-laws. He also emphasized that it is important to keep the ‗others‘ moving because 
otherwise they settle in and use the time to observe until they see an opportunity to commit crime 
(although this contradicted the previous statement). 
When talking about the by-laws he described the kind of ‗zero tolerance approach‘ found in the 
literature without actually using the term. Using the by-laws it is possible to maintain a very specific 
image of the territory. This means, for example, that tables on the sidewalk can be removed or people 
arrested when urinating or defecating on the streets. When asked about the lack of public toilets and 
the fact that the by-laws enable a kind of annihilation of space, he kind of agreed with the 
contradiction, but also said that toilets would soon become places for the sex trade and drug users and 
would therefore need to be secured as well, something no one would finance.  
Indeed, soon after this conversation we encountered three ‗rent-boys‘ hiding all of their belongings in 
a gully in just a few bags. I was surprised that this was not pursued but realized that this had happened 
just outside the territory of the CID. Later in the office, he showed me the folder with the identities of 
all known street people and urban poor. This included pictures and details taken from their ID cards. 
The folder was introduced in case someone gets mugged so the victim can possibly identify the faces. 
I was astonished about this, as this is classically police work and in Europe can only being done after 
a person has committed a crime, not vagrancy.  
Talking about the ‗others‘, he told me that he knew the whereabouts of several people. He pointed out 
different ‗others‘ on the street and told me their names, sleeping places and stories. He confirmed that 
if they were being looked for he could find them right away. His security guys also know their 
‗clients‘ well, often by name. While local street people and urban poor are not hassled as long as they 
‗behave‘, new ones are identified and asked to continue on their way to outside the CID.  
Back in the office the fieldworker had three guys with her that were being photographed and identified 
for the book mentioned above. He said that photographing helps to scare them and to make sure they 
don‘t think about committing a crime. He also explained that dealing with the ‗others‘ is ‗like table 
tennis‘, as they keep excluding them from different CIDs and constantly send them around. Talking 
about policing and security, he agreed that they do policing as one actor in a wider network. As they 
are un-armed they rely on SAPS. However, in the case of a crime or problems the CID security are 
generally first on the scene. 
He emphasized that cleaning and security in a CID go hand-in-hand, although security might be 
slightly more important. A dirty environment attracts urban poor. A lack of security also attracts 
criminals. If both are tight, it is a good mixture.  
During the walk we also check in using the books the security officers have to sign. These books are 
placed in various shops along the way. In these books the officers sign in and report what has 
happened during the patrol. With this system they can prove to their governing body that they have 
been doing their job. He calls the checking of the signatures and signing it himself the ‗double 
checking of the double checking‘. Along the way we also chase some guards if it is felt that they are 
‗lazy‘, or spend too much time talking to female shopkeepers. 
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When talking about the responsibilities of the city, he agrees that the city should do it but they have no 
money or manpower. One has to make his peace with the situation and sort out the problems as best as 
possible themselves. Altogether the day was exciting and provided valuable information on the space. 
We talked for about three hours and clarified everything that I could think of. The situation was very 
friendly; I shook a lot of hands and got introduced to several people along the way. 
 
8.3 The displacement of people and crime 
This section describes the displacement from designated public spaces for urban 
renewal, as outlined by the literature on the revanchist city (Smith, 1996; Belina and 
Helms, 2003; Visser and Kotze, 2008; Fyfe, 2009). That there is a general 
displacement of undesirables and groups that have been identified as criminals was 
confirmed by most of the participants from both sides (the ones displacing and the 
ones being displaced) and through the observations. The difference is, however, in 
terms of the importance this aspect has in the different security schemes. The 
formula is that the smaller and more secluded a site is, the less important the issue of 
vagrancy and petty crime becomes. To give two examples, while a residential static 
security setup around a cul-de-sac on the slopes of the mountain has little to no 
problems with these issues, the Sea Point CID, especially in an area around cheapish 
supermarkets and budget liquor stores, constantly struggles with groups of street 
people occupying the sidewalk and petty crime in the area
83
. An example of petty 
crimes is the so-called smash-and-grabs where someone sees objects of value left in a 
car, breaks the window and runs off with the goods. 
Although no detailed actual crime statistics have been shared, for the reasons 
mentioned in the previous chapter, none of the 47 interviewees doubted the 
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 This chapter does not want to equate street people with petty criminals in any way. Although this 
connection has been repeatedly made by participants of the study, no data have been collected to 
explicitly prove or challenge this perception. However, accumulations of ‗others‘ and an area in which 
many street people settle seems to create an environment that might foster the presence of criminals as 
well, whether they come from inside or outside these groups cannot be determined in this context.        
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efficiency of the private security schemes
84
. All participants saw a positive 
correlation between the presence of guards and the absence of crime as well as a 
regeneration of the areas in which the scheme has been applied. A provider of a static 
security scheme explained that crime and vagrancy would move to residential areas 
without any additional private policing. According to this person, crime would than 
cumulate in the spaces without these setups and the problems in their areas would 
increase until the residents there become ‗clever enough‘ to introduce similar 
schemes (Interview 25
85
), something confirmed by most CIDs as well (Interview 08; 
Interview 31
86
).  
As the head of a security company working for a CID explains on the issue of 
displacement and borders: 
If you go there late afternoon, pardon me, early evening, depending whether 
it‘s winter or summer, just on the other side of X Street you will see where 
they have their sleeping places and stuff like that cause they know on this side 
of the street they are going to be picked up. So now they go just … we can 
see them stand there … ‗cause they know there they are safe (Interview 0887). 
On the case of the CIDs, Metro Police confirms this and worries about this 
development: 
[I]n terms of the cons of private security, is that just if we like have an 
operation in an area, you kind of displace that crime to another area. 
Sometimes the affluent areas suggest going to not so affluent areas. You got 
your private security there that does have an impact on your crime whether 
you want to acknowledge them or not, but all it does basically, is push that 
crime to less privileged areas that cannot pay for the security, which 
aggravates the situation on that side. That‘s also another con of it as well 
(Interview 04).   
For Metro (one of the public police forces) this means that they have to follow crime 
patterns and end up being reactive instead of doing proactive policing (Interview 43). 
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 Here the question is instead how much this costs and what it means for wider society. 
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 Representative of security company 
86
 Representative of CID 
87
 Representative of security company 
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The CIDs themselves make no secret of this either. Here they state that 
‗unfortunately this is just par for the course (…) You‘re never ever gonna alleviate 
the crime throughout‘ (Interview 1488). Instead of regretting the issue for other, 
possibly less privileged areas, they argue in the way Garland (1996) and Rose 
(1996a) describe in their work, with a shifting of responsibilities toward the 
communities. If you do not want crime, vagrancy etc. in your area, come together 
and organise instead of waiting for the state in the form of the police to solve it.   
I mean in the areas where we don‘t have CIDs … we have a system with 
volunteers, the community police forums where Cape Town used to have 
nothing (...) Now we have seven registered neighbourhood watches in our 
area. And this is also where private people, people that are living in the areas 
come together and they start taking care of the areas. So yeah there is a 
definite shift into people taking more responsibility for their area (Interview 
15
89
). 
Another head of a CID confirms that they are only responsible for their own area and 
cannot respond to calls outside their area, causing a constant displacement of crime 
and problems. In their case they get people from other CIDs and then displace them 
again (Interview 14
90
). In fact on one of the observations it was explained that the 
constant displacement is an integral part of crime prevention; if you keep ‗them‘ 
moving, they do not have the time to plan their next theft (Vignette 8.1; Vignette 
8.2).   
Map 7.1 shows that the CIDs cover wide areas of Cape Town‘s centre. Organised 
displacement strategies therefore have wider implications on urban space than simply 
a removal beyond the CIDs‘ boundary. Ultimately the data suggest that there is 
rather a drift of people towards the poorer areas west and northwest of the centre. 
The first CID was the CCID, right in the centre of Cape Town. From there, the 
displacement moved groups of people outside their boundaries causing increased 
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numbers of ‗undesirables‘ and a possible increase in crime. As a reaction they might, 
for example, introduce a CID themselves to counter this development. This could be 
mapped in concentric rings of private policing schemes, the most prominent of which 
are CIDs, around the epicentre, the CCID. A CID‘s head of security describes it as a 
‗vicious circle‘ which prompts the introduction of new CIDs. Another CID‘s head of 
security explains: 
(…) crime is never eradicated. You displace it (…). And I have seen a lot of 
times where we were very successful in the city that you could see that the 
displacement was better than all the crime dots all around us and then we 
started assisting all our neighbours and those dots spread even further into the 
next policing area and not into our area. (…) Like you know the kids that I 
found begging and snatching changed here in Cape Town, I‘ve just seen them 
in Claremont again. Why are they in Claremont? Because they are not being 
given the right to be in Cape Town. Cape Town is too strict. Cape Town is 
arresting them or catching them or preventing them. So obviously they‘re 
gonna go somewhere else where they might get it right (Interview 07).  
Staying with the example of the City Bowl, the head of a security company that 
offers the bobby-on-the-beat schemes notes the following, using the example of 
Cyclops
91
: 
Cyclops, they monitor for the police. So what in theory that has done is 
displaced all the crime from the centre of town. I‘m not saying that there is no 
crime, but it has displaced crime a lot from the centre of town to the 
periphery. So we are picking up a lot of it here ... there is an element hanging 
around ... I saw it today six or seven guys really not up to good, guys at the 
crossway. Instead of the walking to town and robbing tourists and everything 
they kind of wait on the peripheries where the cameras don‘t cover. So it has 
effect, that definitely has an effect on where crime transpires (Interview 09).            
When leaving the case study site, there are about 26 CIDs and other private policing 
schemes, all of which were introduced within the last ten years. Looking at the 
developments west of the CCID, it is not only the WID that has been introduced. 
Outside the case study site it continues with the Observatory CID, a new CID that is 
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 The CCTV project run by Cyclops is spread over parts of the case study site, mainly the commercial 
areas. Cyclops is liked up to all relevant private and public security providers on public space; this 
way response times are low, arrests can be coordinated and fleeing suspects quickly arrested.    
195 
 
being introduced by the University of Cape Town to bridge the gap to Claremont 
CID, followed by the Wynberg CID and so on.     
As mentioned before, the CIDs and a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and 
Security see this development as a natural process, in Garland‘s (1996) and Rose‘s 
(1996) meaning. As the member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security 
points out, the displacement is an integral part of the CIDs‘ crime prevention scheme 
alongside issues of social development, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Without going into too much detail and to avoid being drawn into the Western 
Cape‘s party politics, it should at least briefly be noted that representatives associated 
with the ANC, SACP (South Africa‘s Communist party which is in a historically 
grown tri-alliance with the ANC and COSATU, the biggest union) and COPE all see 
this development with scepticism. In an interview a critical local politician argued 
that Johannesburg has been liberated since the anti-apartheid struggle, while Cape 
Town has been lost, linking this to issues around displacement. 
It is totally different with Cape Town and other towns. Cape Town is still a 
no-go area for the poor. I am not saying for the white or black, because they 
are affording black people who stay in town (…). The black poor, the white 
rich (…) If you compare it with Jo-burg [Johannesburg]. In Jo-burg, the town, 
you will see a lot of black faces. Because in other towns where this 
development with malls and all that, they abandoned towns. The bourgeoisie, 
the capitalists, they have abandoned the town substituting them with malls. 
(…) But in Jo-burg the town is still a working class town. In Cape Town, it is 
a totally different situation (Interview 26). 
As outlined in greater detail in the previous chapter, in the case study different 
residential and business communities have organised themselves and clubbed 
together to introduce governance structures that control their community‘s 
space/territory (Rose, 1996a, Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 
2003). As a result, positive effects in terms of the appearance of these areas as well 
as dropping crime rates soon materialised, and this needs to be acknowledged. In fact 
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the researcher profited from this development when staying in the suburb of Sea 
Point during the second fieldwork period. Being part of a gentrification process it 
was possible to live in a nice property in a prime location while the rent was still 
affordable. This was due to the fact that it is only in the last few years that the Sea 
Point Improvement District had been introduced and made the area (by displacing 
criminal elements) safe enough to have relatively safe living.  
Having argued for the effectiveness of private policing of public spaces, their impact 
on the space should also be put into perspective. The researched spaces are not gated 
communities with three-metre-high walls and electrical barbed wire on top. As the 
maps have shown, they cover some of the busiest parts of the inner city. Even with a 
strong and strategically-placed private police force, exclusion and control is, 
according to the governance bodies, done in the pursuit of an ideal state. Massey and 
Jess (1995) have theorised on the porosity of boundaries and territories, which means 
that the space is constantly negotiated, challenged and enforced.  
As mentioned, I lived just outside Sea Point CID during the second fieldwork trip to 
the city. The corner of that block and the edge of the CID was populated by a group 
of one male and two female street people. Just outside, the three street people would 
hide their belongings between two walls or in water drains, drying their clothes on 
the residential barbed wire fences etc. However, they spent their days on the invisible 
boundary of the CID. On uncountable occasions the foot patrol sent them out of the 
territory, just a few metres into the residential street so they were not a problem 
anymore. The male in particular would relocate the box he was sitting on to observe 
the busy street back over the line into the CID, just to be sent away a few minutes 
later when the next patrol walked by. There are several such observations that could 
be listed here, which all exemplify the continuing struggle for space and the porosity 
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of the boundary. The clean and sanitised space of the revanchist city is always an 
ideal in the research area, but it does not exist as there are too many urban poor in 
Cape Town as a whole, including the vast township areas with millions of people. 
What it does, however, is create a space that comes closer to a sanitised space and 
does not have to be avoided because of fear of crime. The constant displacement and 
control of urban poor enables a space in which ‗they‘ (using ‗they‘ to convey the idea 
of the ‗other‘ as has been used in the literature review) do not take over and space 
can be populated by all without fearing crime, and actually enjoying the public space.         
Nevertheless, displacement and negotiation of space does reduce population of 
visible street people (Vignette 8.1; Vignette 8.2). It also makes a tight network of 
policing companies more difficult. This has implications on the police force, which is 
driven by statistics, hotspot mapping etc., and which is chronically understaffed since 
lower crime rates in one area demand a lower public police presence there. In the 
following case an example of this will be given for the Metro police.         
Referring back to the wider debates on the ‗othering‘ of undesirables (Sibley, 2003; 
Young, 1999; Herbert and Brown, 2006), the section on territory and exclusion 
confirms this notion and shows how private policing agents contribute to it. The 
emphasis on geographic areas especially where the spatial divide coincides with 
socio-economic and apartheid legacies combined with current economic exclusion 
leads to a racial and class profiling (Interview 34
92
). As a commander of Metro 
police said angrily, he was once targeted by a residential, in this case police, patrol 
when he was running in a nice affluent neighbourhood in his tracksuit to stay fit 
(Interview 04
93
). A member of a police oversight committee and another Metro 
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commander complain that the strict private residential patrols make it almost 
impossible for residents of the townships to enjoy the fruits of freedom and crime 
reduction when trying to spend leisure time in nice parts of the city, hinting at a 
further perpetuation of apartheid segregation given the spatial legacies of racial 
separation (Interview 34
94
; Interview 04
95
).    
 
Vignette 8.2: Observation in City Improvement District  
Observation number: 06; Objective: Mobile patrol in CID territory; Position of participant: 
Head of security; Duration: 1 hour   
Today I am shadowing a mobile patrol with the head of security. The idea of the patrol is to show 
presence and to enhance the visibility of the CIDs security. Soon we stop at a store that is known for 
attracting urban poor, who we spotted right away. As soon as they saw our car pulling up, they walked 
away from the CID territory. This chasing away of the ‗others‘ was the only purpose of the stop. On 
continuing, we contacted the next foot patrol to keep an eye on the corner when he gets there to 
establish our presence. Again, the importance of territory was obvious. As it is explained to me, when, 
for example, drug dealers are in the area, they might just send them into the club they are lingering in 
front of. ‗Go in there, then it is not my problem‘.  
Talking about drug dealers, he also explained that years ago they had massive problems with them and 
got involved in fights. Now this has been taken care of and the area cleaned of dealers. When 
following the story up, he stated that they had moved to spaces which had no CID in the past. Now 
there is a CID there as well because of the crime, hinting at the issue of displacement of crime. When 
they ‗clean up‘ the dealers might come back to our CID. When the dealers come back, they would 
organize an operation with SAPS to take them out again. He argued that as a guard in charge you need 
some kind of reputation: ‗I warn only once‘. 
About the social programmes for the urban poor, he states that there are almost useless. They come 
back anyway, because they prefer living on the street and that is where they make a living. When he 
followed this up, he states that some residents pity them. They complain about the street people, but if 
they try to move them they pity them. They also feed them or give them money (I did not tell him that 
my housemates do the same).  
Talking about the local street people and the foreign ones he confirmed that the local street people 
know how to play the game. They do not carry weapons etc. because they know that they will be 
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searched regularly. The foreigners are different; they should be prevented from settling down. Often 
they are on the run etc. It is all about keeping control over the ‗others‘.  
During the drive up and down the territory we checked on the foot patrols by signing off the little 
books they carry around. He described this as looking at the wider picture of what‘s going on in the 
space from his car he uses to keep an overview. Finally, when I finally asked if the job was dangerous, 
he said that it is because they are always the first ones on a crime scene and someone might pull a 
blade etc. I got the feeling that he was glad to carry a firearm, something the foot patrols did not.  
 
8.4 The ‘displacement’ of public police 
The title of this subsection is deliberately provocative. By using the term 
‗displacement‘ in the context of the police, the power of the governance bodies as 
policing actors is being underlined. Like the displacement of ‗others‘ the police have 
a tendency to re-locate their resources away from the privately policed areas. No 
private security agent in Cape Town will completely supplement the police; 
however, indirectly, it will be argued, this is the case. Producing lower crime rates 
through displacement practices and social development, the CIDs and other 
privately-policed areas demand less public policing (Interview 43). Metro police is 
mainly complaint driven, which means that their mode of operation is to respond to 
citizens, and so they follow the crime patterns to areas outside the private security 
spaces, while CIDs and others are evolving to become the first port of call for any 
complaints
96
 for businesses at the same time. A member of Mayoral Committee for 
Safety and Security: 
―What happens at least from the Metro Police‘s perspective is that it leaves 
the City free to concentrate on the higher crime areas. We constantly adjust 
our policing resources to where the highest crime rates are and in response to 
new crime patterns and trends. As the areas within the CIDs see reduced 
crime we are then able to reduce our resource allocation to that area, which 
might not be a popular thing to admit to, but it is true. Obviously we give less 
energy to an area where the crime rate reduces and this is not due to the fact 
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200 
 
that they pay for additional policing services so that we can then remove the 
police they are entitled to, but rather it is a decision that is made consciously 
as an operational decision: once crime has been stabilised in an area, the staff 
resources can be prioritised in other areas. You don‘t sit somewhere and say, 
this staff member gets removed from this area and get sent there. It happens 
as an automatic feature of deployment through joint planning with SAPS, 
through the automatic prioritisation that happens through the response to 
complaints and emergencies from the call centre and through ongoing 
planning by police management. You have within a district a certain number 
of staff deployment and I can show you the full district model and the 
breakdown of staff. The Metro Police use a ‗soft border‘ approach and aren‘t 
tied to a specific police station like SAPS and a lot of their time is spent 
responding to complaints, but this also allows them to plan saturation 
operations and focused operations in which the staff can target different areas 
of their deployment in different operations as the crime patterns dictate. In 
other words calls that come in to the Metro Police call centre to which they 
respond. If they are tied to a whole area, and this portion of the area is 
generating fewer complaints because there is an effective city improvement 
district there, or some other private security arrangement, they spend more of 
their time in the outlying areas. And we do start getting complaints from an 
area where Metro Police are not currently active, because their time is now 
addressing complaints in other areas. So as an automatic feature of who picks 
up the phone and calls, you have reactive dispatching‖. 
When crime rates drop and/or criminals are being displaced outside the privately 
policed spaces due to their strong presence and exclusion policy, the police follow 
the crime, while the private policing companies keep maintaining order only on their 
territory. This notion is confirmed by Metro police as well. While a member of 
Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security describes it in the light of the realpolitik 
of what can be called a policing crisis, Metro also emphasises problems around the 
consequently perpetuated divisions of urban space and leaves no doubt that they 
would rather see more of their officers on the street than all the private security.   
It is not, however, only the public side that confirms the observation of an indirectly 
‗displaced‘ public police, but different private security entities as well. A 
representative of a CID argues idealistically for the positive effects of this 
replacement.  
Q: Is there a danger, that for example poorer areas [referring to townships] 
have less protection or less policing? 
201 
 
A: No, it‘s a case of these actual cops are maybe freeing up other cops to go 
to that these poorer areas. You must remember. Like you said earlier, could 
elevate certain people and they could say look we used to have 500 police 
there, now because there is a joint partnership we don‘t need 500, we could 
do with 400. That now 100 could go to the poorer areas where nobody is 
paying (Interview 07
97
).  
Although this might overemphasise the effectiveness of ‗his‘ CID as well as its 
advantages for the poorer communities, it confirms the general notion that by 
displacing people and crime through strong private policing, the police follow the 
crime and/or need fewer resources in the privately policed areas. Having a 
chronically understaffed police service, this is the logical response. In other words 
the formula is: effective private policing in one space limits or displaces crime into 
other spaces. An understaffed police force cannot afford to dispatch the same number 
of officers when crime is down, but follows the crime patterns to spaces with no 
private police force. As a Metro commander admits: 
If you really want to be transparent, none of my members patrol residential 
areas. They don‘t because I can‘t afford to let them patrol residential areas. 
And I don‘t think that there is anybody here [referring to the rest of Cape 
Town‘s Metro commanders] that with a clear conscience can say that they 
have daily deployment in residential areas. You [referring to the researcher] 
made an example yourself earlier, in fact you see one police van you see two 
private security. That‘s the reality. So ideally … it would be ideal to have 
enough policemen so we would not need private security, but that comes with 
a lot of financial implications. Myself as a prime example, at my residence I 
have got an alarm which is serviced by a private security company, and I am 
sure that there are many people around this table that have the same [later on 
the Metro chief confirmed that he has a contract with a private security 
company as well] (Interview 04). 
This suggests that private policing contributes to a ‗displacement‘ of the public 
police and therefore possesses considerable power when policing their territory. At 
the same time they become the guarantor for order maintenance in their territories, 
which are key public spaces. However, it has to be kept in mind that the governance 
body of this very private police force is a private one. These governance bodies are 
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not elected, nor do they have to care about anyone else except for themselves and so 
they can pursue their own agendas. It should also be noted that the above describes a 
trend and does not mean that there are no public police in the privately policed 
spaces anymore, which led Berg (2004), taking the example of the CCID, to make 
the statement that the space is being ‗over-policed‘. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The exclusion of undesirables and the strong working relationship with the police 
both support the claim that private companies have a policing function. Indeed it 
appears that private policing agents strongly interfere with the politics of public 
space and maintain a social order that forces some people to partially retreat to areas 
with higher crime rates, possibly on behalf of the police. If private companies 
effectively displace crime, the under-staffed police have to dispatch fewer resources 
in these spaces. This leaves increasing power and responsibility with the private 
policing companies.  
Furthermore, the strong sense of territory distinguishes private policing bodies from 
the police. Although the police do have a territorialised structure (Herbert, 1996a, 
1997), it is not about excluding people from it in the ways described here. The 
observed exclusion strategy instead gives evidence of the selfish objectives of their 
governance bodies and even shows parallels with security tactics one expects in a 
mall. However, this displacing of ‗undesirables‘ is what the private governments 
expect them to do as it creates and maintains the desired ‗clean and safe‘ space (clean 
referring to the absence of street people and urban poor). Displacing urban poor and 
street people is, next to the policing of law, another role and function of private 
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policing companies in public space. Thus the impact of private policing on urban 
territory has been outlined. 
Having introduced the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing 
and private security companies in public space (Chapter 7) and analysed the impact 
of private policing on urban territory (Chapter 8), the next chapter continues to 
explore the increasing power over space private governance communities or nodes 
have, through using their private police force as well as through other means. Here 
the significance of private policing networks on social geographies will be assessed. 
  
204 
 
CHAPTER IX: PRODUCTION OF SPACE THROUGH ‘HARD’ 
AND ‘SOFT’ POLICING  
9.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have shown the power private policing companies have in 
public spaces. This chapter will focus on the increasing power private governance 
nodes have above and beyond private policing companies. Thus, the significance of 
sophisticated private policing networks on social geographies will be assessed. This 
chapter argues that governance nodes not only draw on direct power in form of 
private policing agents, but that governance communities have established a private 
policing network that extends far beyond the visible private policing officers on the 
ground. This represents less direct, more subtle ways of shaping space to their 
interests.  
This chapter then goes on to argue that private policing companies are powerful 
actors in the reclamation of public space. However, the chapter also identifies 
shortcomings of this type of ‗hard‘ private policing. As a response to these 
shortcomings, governance communities have invested in social development projects 
and workers in order to close the gaps private police cannot fill. Furthermore the 
chapter shows how the institutions of the criminal justice landscape are being utilised 
by private governments in order to establish the desired sanitised ‗safe and clean‘ 
spaces. By unveiling these private policing networks, their significance on the on 
social geographies of central Cape Town will be introduced. 
This chapter will argue that social development has become a part of the policing 
landscape, drawing on the tight nodes between many social development bodies and 
the private governments of the revanchist urban landscape. The argument will be 
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framed by Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) ‗visions of social control‘ and his ideas on 
supplementing the formal hard social control landscape, such as policing and 
criminal justice, with a soft end that includes, but is not limited to, social work.  
Samara stated ‗police and private security become front-line ―social development‖ 
workers, because they are the ones who enforce the quality of life by-laws through 
which urban space is reclaimed and renewed‘ (Samara 2005: 224). He goes on to 
argue that repressive forms of policing still exist (referring to forms of colonial 
policing), targeting the poor in an attempt to create ‗sanitised spaces‘ for 
consumption. As the main actors to police and maintain these urban renewal 
programmes he identified the state police as well as private security forces employed 
by the business communities (Samara, 2005).  
Agreeing with the notion of the security officer becoming a frontline social 
development worker, this paper will expand the argument to the social development 
sector becoming part of the policing landscape as a response to the limits of actual 
policing or social control. Furthermore this chapter will explore how community-
based legal institutions, such as community courts and community service, have 
become enrolled into a criminal justice system that criminalises poverty, building on 
Mitchell‘s (1997) annihilation of urban space and Wacquant‘s (2001, 2003, 2009) 
work on the punishment of the poor. However, as said in Section 7.6, the smaller the 
governance node in size, and therefore the security unit, the less complex this setup 
is. For instance, in the example of static security, the focus would merely be on the 
direct policing, as this would be sufficient to implement the governance body‘s 
expectations.   
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9.2 Private policing companies or hard policing 
The research confirmed the argument made in Chapter 4 that some security 
companies in the case study site are indeed better described as private policing 
companies. They carry out social control and urban ordering functions through their 
widespread presence and crime deterring function. They do not only contribute to 
perceived feelings of security, but are also of assistance when someone requires help. 
At the same time, they are most likely to be the first on the scene when a policing 
body is required. By following the aim and objectives of their governance bodies 
they have a strong social control and urban ordering function, especially when it 
comes to urban poor, informal traders or any contravention against the 
comprehensive by-laws (see Table 7.5). In combination with the ‗rent-a-cop‘ scheme 
outlined in Section 7.4 and their ability to call in back up in the form of foot and 
mobile patrols, they possess considerable coercive force and power to uphold the 
law. Irish (1999) and Berg (2007) claim, without going into much detail, that the 
boundaries between police and private security get blurred as they each have 
increasingly overlapping tasks.              
Returning to the argument of Chapter 4, by carrying out these roles in combination 
with a withdrawal of the police from these territories (Chapter 8), the private 
securities become increasingly a de facto private police force on the ground. In the 
case study area private policing has become not only one of the primary physical 
security providers, but in many instances also police the norms and regulations of the 
city and the neoliberal society. By finding ways to avoid their legal limitations, or 
even breaking them as described in Section 7.4, as well as establishing a network 
with other security companies, these agents have a power that exceeds their 
guidelines on paper. Although the work also entails pro-active security elements, at 
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the same time the officers have many other functions that exceed the specialised field 
of security but are much wider. To sum up the empirical evidence of this argument: 
 Crime reduction through pro-active displacement of persons identified as 
problems (urban poor and street people) (see Chapter 2).  
 Operate often in key public spaces (see Map 7.4)  
 Visible patrols as public reassurance (everyone setting foot in the mapped 
spaces will see the officers right away) and ’community ambassadors’ 
(Interview 04
98
; Interview 07
99
; Interview 13
100
; Interview 43
101
). 
 Contact with the community through constant checking in at shops, hotels 
etc.; chats especially held by patrolling senior staff. Furthermore, private 
governments are establishing themselves as the main organisational nodes 
and the first port of call for the community (Interview 10
102
; Interview 14
103
; 
Observation 04; as well as many unstructured observations).   
 Rapid response to disputes through strategic placement over the territory 
(car, foot, possibly bicycle or motorcycle) and most prominent policing 
actors in terms of numbers (Interview 07
104
; Interview 14
105
; Interview 27
106
; 
Observation 06; Observation 08; as well as many unstructured observations). 
On this Minnaar and Mistry argue:  
In South Africa, members of the public are more likely to come into 
contact with a private security officer than a member of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS). In their areas of operation, private 
security companies are generally able to respond faster than the SAPS 
to calls for assistance from the public. (Minnaar and Mistry: 38) 
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 Order maintenance through de facto enforcing law (see Section 7.4). As 
Singh (2008) correctly observes, using the considerable powers private 
security personnel (here meaning private policing personnel) have, makes 
them a policing actor.     
Fulfilling the listed functions arguably makes these companies actual policing actors; 
however, they are not to be mistaken for the police. There is still a vast difference 
between those two bodies in terms of legal powers and status, training and 
equipment. As all the interviewed representatives of the security industry suggested 
or confirmed, they either work below the police or are their junior partners, and 
therefore still depend on the police.  
Nevertheless, as a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security explained, 
there are plans to extend the powers of private policing bodies to give them full law 
enforcement powers:   
And you can guess what I am gonna do with that [referring to the Law 
Enforcement Reservist Policy, which since been adopted by the City 
Council]. You don‘t need to be a rocket scientist to see where I am heading 
with it [pause in which the researcher is reading]. So that I can give law 
enforcement powers and the power to enforce our by-laws, to private citizens 
in neighbourhood watches, just like the South African Police reservists, with 
the difference that the law enforcement Reservists will patrol with their local 
neighbourhood watch so that they do not have to travel to volunteer (which is 
a big issue in poorer communities as travel is costly) and so that they can be 
more efficient through the excellent knowledge of the local area. We will start 
with the neighbourhood watches and with some of your civic bodies (not all 
neighbourhood watches take the traditional form, but we may well be able to 
draw volunteers from various civic bodies as well which may deal with other 
safety needs, such as reserve traffic wardens that help out at school crossings, 
etc.) You will have to be a registered neighbourhood watch; you have to be a 
registered member of a registered neighbourhood watch in good standing. 
You won‘t be allowed to have a criminal record or be under investigation for 
a pending offence. A criminal record check will be performed through the 
fingerprints of the applicant. You will have to go through the same training 
that the normal policing staff of the City go through. You have to wear a 
uniform, clock in normally as the other staff, you do fingerprint clock in and 
clock out. You are subject to the same laws and same code of conduct and 
police procedures and same disciplinary measures.  And you will work a 
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designated shift. And those shifts coordinate with your neighbourhood watch. 
But you can go out with your neighbourhood watch as a peace officer 
patrolling in uniform like a police (SAPS) reservist. But your focus is those 
petty thefts, those by-law offences and the quality of life complaints that we 
receive most commonly. And eventually when I am finished with that 
experiment, if it works, the City might extend it to some of the private 
security. That is where I am heading‖ (Interview 35). 
By taking this step, private security would not only be a de facto, but a de jure 
private police, including receiving advanced training. To make the point once more, 
not acknowledging the de facto policing role and the position these companies 
occupy in the policing network is a misjudgement of existing urban power structures. 
Nevertheless, as has been argued, private policing companies already have a 
considerable degree of power that enables them to shape space, even though private 
policing also has its limits when it comes to certain problems. Private governments 
have to acknowledge that not every issue can be solved only using hard policing, 
which is an argument that will be expanded below.   
 
9.3 Limits of private policing companies 
Implementing the ideas of sanitised space as described above and in Chapters 2 and 
3, the CIDs rapidly became potent actors in the policing network (Berg, 2004). In the 
interviews, both CID representatives and a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety 
and Security underlined the success the implementation of the ‗broken windows 
syndrome‘ had in Mayor Giuliani‘s New York and claimed that its implementation 
had proven to be successful in Cape Town as well (Interview 07
107
; Interview 20
108
; 
Interview 35
109
). In the case study area, the focus is on nuisance behaviour and 
people that the city, as well as the CIDs, had decided were not to be tolerated in their 
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spaces, reflecting the ‗zero tolerance policing‘ approach. As Chapter 8 outlined, on 
the street this means that ‗others‘ are being pushed out of the CID to where they do 
not disrupt the spatial order (see Figure 9.1 suggests the power relations at work 
here). The result of this policing strategy is a constant displacement and arresting of 
street people and urban poor from the territory. On this, Samara (2005) described 
how street children in the city have become ‗public enemy number one‘.  If a new 
street person turns up, the security can send him or her away and he or she will then 
appear in the territory of a different CID. This policy repeats itself over and over 
again until the person ends up outside the areas being policed by private 
governments.  
 
Figure 9.1: Security guard in conversation with ‘others’  
 
Image taken by the author in July 2010 
 
However, at some point, the persons involved realise that the constant displacement 
and arrests of street people is not a sustainable solution to the problem. In fact, it 
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becomes a routine in which the same ‗others‘ and the same security guards or law 
enforcement officers play cat and mouse every day, but it does not solve the problem 
as the urban poor keep coming back. As a member of Mayoral Committee for Safety 
and Security in charge openly admitted, this is not only unsustainable but also 
frustrating for all involved and can ultimately end in a dark backstreet where a 
security guard or police officer might manhandle a suspect (Interview 35
110
). A CID 
representative describes it as follows: 
There are numerous violations that these guys were doing. And it was easy 
just to pick them up and to arrest them [‗others‘]. But is that the solution? 
That‘s not the solution what are we doing? We are perpetuating a circle […] I 
cannot police this issue; I can‘t police a homeless man away. Cause I end up 
playing […] chase with him. I chase him from this corner to that corner to 
that corner back to that corner. That‘s all I am doing with him […]. So I 
stressed that we need a social intervention and I also said that we need to look 
at strategies, long term strategies […] (Interview 07111). 
The response to this limit in hard policing measures was twofold. Firstly, the CIDs 
and other private governments, such as the Community Policing Forums (CPFs) 
started to put social work, or soft policing on their agendas. Secondly, private 
governments utilised the city‘s criminal justice system to their advantage.  Both 
points will be examined in the following sections.  
 
9.4 Social development or soft policing 
This section will show how social development became the soft side of policing, 
complementing the hard policing and therefore addressing the limits private policing 
companies have when it comes to the establishment of sanitised spaces. Until this 
point, social control had been defined in a very formal structured way, as is common 
in the literature on policing and security (see Chapter 4). To define the idea of social 
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control, Cohen‘s work has been used112, as others did before (Jones and Newburn, 
1998). However, in his main argument on the ‗visions of social control‘, Cohen 
(2001 [1985]) is actually less concerned with the formal end of the social control 
landscape and its agencies (police and security etc.), which are something he almost 
takes for granted, but instead he is interested in the plethora of new forms of control 
he sees establishing themselves beside the criminal justice and policing landscape. 
While the conventional social control system remains powerful and expands, which 
is precisely what the previous chapters have argued, new actors appear to 
complement the conventional system. As one example of these new social control 
actors he repeatedly mentions the social development sector (Cohen himself used to 
work in this sector before turning to academia).  
To describe the changes in social control, Cohen (2001 [1985]) uses the analogy of a 
fishing net. While previously the net had large holes to catch only the biggest fish 
(actual criminals), today the net of social control is very fine, catching more and 
more fish that used to be left out before (such as mental patients and street people). 
Furthermore, the net is now more difficult to spot as its boundaries become blurry. 
What this describes is a control landscape where policing agents can now address a 
problem, issue, targeted person or groups either by traditional means, such as arrest, 
or by diverting them to various programmes, including social work. In return, this 
integrates social work agencies into the social control network where they address 
groups who previously ‗slipped the net‘ but are now in it. 
[T]hese diversion clients [target groups] might not have committed any 
offence at all. The ideology of early intervention and treatment and the use of 
psychological or social-work selection criteria, allows diversions to be 
incorporated into wider preventive strategies. Legal definitions and due 
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process give way to low visibility, ‗discretionary decision making‘ by 
administrative or professional agencies. The drift is to work with parts of the 
population not previously reached, variously defined as young people ‗in 
trouble‘, ‗at risk‘ or ‗in legal jeopardy‘, ‗pre-delinquents‘ or ‗potential 
delinquents‘. These trends are not primarily a widening of social control into 
‗empty‘ spaces, but an intensification and formalization of previous methods. 
(Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 53).         
On the example of addressing young people, Cohen (2001 [1985]) shows how 
various agencies are being ‗co-opted in to the criminal justice system‘ and 
deliberately blurring the boundaries between formal social control and social 
development. As an outcome of this process, he classifies social work as the soft end 
of social control.  
[T]he hard end [the criminal justice system] and soft ends [agencies such as 
social work] are symbiotically related to each other. The hard end is the 
backup – to reassure the public, to serve as a deterrent to trouble-makers in 
the soft end, to be a dumping ground for its unamenable clients, to serve 
status degradation functions by emphasising the boundary between good and 
bad (Cohen, 2001 [1985]: 99). 
This means that through this setup, the good intentions of social work become 
corrupted and form part of the social control system, or as Cohen (2001 [1985]: 99) 
says ‗[t]he devil lies in the machine‘. 
The following will translate Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) arguments onto the case study to 
explain the data. Social development in Cape Town is a complex issue involving 
various organisations characterised by a network of co-financing and mutual 
financial support. Furthermore, even social development representatives describe the 
complex network of different governing bodies as being confusing (Interview 44
113
). 
Although a detailed structure cannot be given, the non-transparent social 
development landscape already exemplifies some of the arguments that will be made 
below. The complex network of fieldworkers and the possibility of co-financing 
make a stage for various non-state governing nodes with individual, usually 
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territorial, interest to get involved in the sector and to link certain expectations to 
their support. Referring to the limited number of fieldworkers employed by the state, 
represented by the city and its limited budget, gives evidence for the planned 
outsourcing of social development issues, but also opens up the sector for various 
governance bodies to get involved. As has been confirmed by employees of the City 
of Cape Town, they heavily rely on other governance partners. For example, the state 
does not run any shelters for the homeless, but co-operates with NGOs specialised on 
this (Interview 19
114
; Interview 37
115
). In return a representative of an NGO who runs 
several shelters throughout the city described that financial support of the City of 
Cape Town was given in return for their work. Other governance bodies besides the 
various NGOs are CIDs, Community Policing Forums (CPFs) and Neighbourhood 
Watches, who either have their own fieldworker and/or support fieldworkers or 
social development projects financially. While the state and NGOs have been active 
in social development in the post-apartheid city for a long time, the private policing 
bodies became active in recent years as a response to the above mentioned 
limitations of hard policing. Using the example of the first and largest CID in the 
case study, it was established in 1999 with a focus on security and cleaning, after 
acknowledging its limitations, in 2005 a social department was introduced (Interview 
05
116
, Interview 07
117
). This has been seen with other CIDs and policing 
communities, such as CPFs. Nevertheless, compared to security, social development 
plays a more marginal role in the priorities of the CIDs as the spending of the annual 
budget of the CCID, the largest of the CIDs, reveals. While security is allocated 51% 
of the resources, the social development section has to work with only 3%, which is 
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linked to the costs of the high number of security staff (Central City Improvement 
District, 2010b: 14).  
The central argument of this chapter is that communities such as the CIDs and CPFs 
are concerned with a territorialised form of governance community to maintain 
spaces in a secure and investment-friendly way. However, the presence of street 
people, seen as dirty and dangerous, conflicts with this notion. As they ‗can‘t be 
policed away‘ (Interview with representative of CID), community organisations have 
invested (literally) in social development, using similar territorial ideas to get street 
people, the identified problem, out of the way. The actual argument that social 
development bodies have become part of the policing landscape will be laid out in 
two sections. While the first section describes the daily operational routine of 
fieldworkers, the second will refer to a much wider bias in the whole setup of social 
development in the researched sites. 
Daily operational routine: Besides specialised NGOs who, for example, run shelters, 
the fieldworker‘s task is to assist homeless people. This can be in the form of 
emergency interventions and diversions in cases of substance abuse, mediating 
shelter space, the creation of jobs, or re-unifications with their families. Furthermore, 
they run public awareness and education campaigns (e.g. the ‗give responsibly‘ 
campaign) to stop tourists from giving money directly to homeless and instead to 
channel it to, for example, shelters. Fieldworkers will spend time in their allocated 
area contacting the homeless, talking to them and checking if they are okay.  
In this daily routine there is a strong cooperation between fieldworkers and security 
as well as the police. To stay on top of the street people population, the security 
forces of some CIDs would let the fieldworkers know when a ‗new face‘ shows up in 
their territory. This person will then be approached by a fieldworker and in some 
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cases be taken to the police station, potentially in a security van, to have their 
criminal record checked (Interview 16
118
). Furthermore, some CIDs might take a 
photo and ID details from the new street person so they know who they are dealing 
with and to be able to show the database to the potential victim of a crime in order to 
identify the perpetrator (Vignette 8.1).  
Due to the close links or dependencies between social development and CIDs and 
others, the territorialised aims and objectives of the governing bodies have to be 
incorporated in the fieldworkers‘ operational practice. As outlined above, this means 
getting street people off the street, and so out of the territory. This can happen by 
convincing a person to move into shelters (which are all run by NGOs) or by 
reuniting people with their families. Although re-uniting people with their families is 
generally nothing to criticise, it appears that the pressure to produce a safe and clean 
space goes into the cost of sustainable social development, and sometimes even has a 
repressive, potentially dangerous movement to it. There is a pressure to produce 
statistics that show so-called success stories (Interview 20
119
; also see Vignette 8.1). 
To quantify the social deployment work with numbers from the CCID‘s annual 
report 2010, as the only CID that is communicating these numbers, ‗36 adults have 
been placed in a shelter; 35 adults have been reunified with their families; 26 
children returned home‘ (CCID, 2010: 28). 
While there are some natural overlaps between social development and the security 
concerns of the CIDs, there is a pressure from governing bodies to produce a desired 
space. As a CID representative explained, the fieldworkers have the same goal as the 
security and law enforcement, namely a territory with a limited presence of street 
people, but they approach it from a different angle (Observation 08). As Cohen (2001 
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[1985]) argued, and participants in this study confirmed (Interview 20
120
), the line 
between security and social development gets blurred. Another fieldworker stated on 
this issue that her work, social development, can be seen as the ‗softer side of 
security‘ (Interview 16121); again, this statement could have been taken directly out 
of Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) ‗visions of social control‘. 
Nonetheless, despite the critique outlined above, most of the individuals involved 
came across as very helpful, engaged people who want the best for their clientele, the 
street people, and this needs to be stressed. In fact, some fieldworkers describe their 
role as being a counterpart to the security to avoid potential violent assaults against 
the homeless population, or they push a process of sensitising the security staff 
toward street people (Interview 18
122
). However, although not all fieldworkers 
actively contribute to the ‗softer side of security‘, because they are placed in an 
environment that is dominated by territorialised ideas of cleanliness and security and 
where security remains the leading paradigm, and this puts pressure on the CIDs‘ 
employees, not only the security, but the social development actors as well. 
Structural bias in the social development setup or the devil in the machine: This 
section argues that although a social development worker might not actively 
contribute to the ‗softer side of security‘ in his or her daily operations, their work 
nonetheless becomes part of a policing landscape, referring to a structural bias in 
Cape Town‘s power and governance landscape. To make this point, a common line 
of argument, as taken from an interview with a representative of the social 
development sector, will be used. 
It [the city] means to be a place for all the citizens and that includes to some 
extent our homeless and destitute people (…) part of our role is also to 
                                                 
120
 Representative of social development sector 
121
 Representative of social development sector 
122
 Representative of social development sector 
218 
 
educate homeless people to what is socially acceptable behaviour within the 
city, they need to adhere to the bylaws. (…) your behaviour needs to be such, 
there are not sufficient toilets, public toilets in the city, but you can`t urinate 
and defecate on the streets. (…) That needs to be an understanding which we 
have in empowering homeless people, to know what their own rights are, but 
on the other hand there also needs to be acceptable behaviour that goes with it 
(Interview 05
123
). 
As argued during the interview, the city is there for everyone including, ‗to some 
extent‘, homeless and destitute people, but, as is emphasised, they have to comply 
with ‗socially acceptable behaviour‘ – referring to the issue of social control, norms 
and values. As she herself says, this refers to the by-laws. Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008) outlined in the case of North America that ‗socially 
acceptable standards‘ are commonly being translated into laws that address quality of 
life offences, such as banishment laws or, in the case of Cape Town, the by-laws. 
That laws such as by-laws are being used to create space has been outlined by 
Mitchell (1997) and Wacquant (2009) in the past. Using these by-laws can make it 
impossible for some to exist in spaces where these laws are being policed. Possibly 
incidentally, the interviewee cited above uses the infamous example of urinating 
when there are no toilets around without being able to answer this conundrum 
herself. Looking at the by-laws that apply in the case study site, it is impossible for a 
homeless person to exist (see Table 7.5)
124
. Indeed, they apply de jure for every 
citizen. However, de facto they target urban poor (Mitchell, 1997, 2003; Wacquant, 
2001, 2003; Beckett and Herbert, 2008; Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Herbert, 2010).      
Returning to the argument above, once the socially acceptable standards/by-laws are 
violated, social development turns into a policing issue, and in the CIDs, the main 
security body on the ground are the fieldworkers‘ own colleagues. In central Cape 
Town, the issue of by-laws and the annihilation of people and space by law 
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(Mitchell, 1997) have to be seen in the context of the social development 
programmes. In this setup, participating in a social development programme is not a 
voluntary act. If not participating, a targeted homeless person just has to be watched 
long enough until he or she has to violate a by-law and the matter becomes a policing 
issue, or, as Cohen might say, the smaller holes of the net capture the ones who 
would previously have escaped the social control system.  
This connection between social development on the one hand and the rule of 
law/policing on the other is called the ‗carrot-and-stick approach‘ (Interview with 
local politician; also Interview 07
125
; Interview 19
126
). Social development agents, 
likely to be paid by a CID, will offer their assistance to mediate shelter places and 
reunite people with their families, which will get a person out of the space; in other 
words, they offer the carrot. However, if the ‗carrot‘ is not accepted, the ‗stick‘ can 
come into play. While in the past the ‗stick‘ could literally mean a stick, such as a 
baton, the system to put pressure on street people is nowadays more sophisticated. 
With the support of the City of Cape Town which introduced a variety of by-laws, 
security possesses more powerful tools to create a willingness to participate in social 
development programmes. Watching one of the ‗others‘ long enough with the 
strategically-placed security personnel, he or she will eventually violate one of the 
by-laws. In this case an arrest can be made and the person will be processed in the 
new community court, which will also be discussed below. In short, social 
development and security, or the ‗soft side of security‘ and ‗hard security‘ measures 
complement each other, confirming Cohen‘s (2001 [1985]) argument.  
This setup, as schematised in Figure 9.2, describes a win-win situation for private 
governance structures, as both approaches create space with fewer street people. In a 
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governance landscape where powerful private bodies pursue their ideas of space and 
social development, it is not a voluntary offer but part of a wider policing concept; it 
then becomes the ‗softer side of security‘.          
Discussing this with a member of the Mayoral Committee for Safety and Security, he 
confirmed that besides displacement, social development has become a part of the 
security landscape. Here it is being called a holistic approach in order to get street 
people out of certain spaces, ultimately contributing to the territory‘s understanding 
of safe and clean.  
―The sad truth is that the bulk of social development has been supplied and 
paid for by the so-called ‗bad guys‘ as some NGOs might describe them (the 
City Improvement Districts which used to be often criticised as being 
insensitive towards the poor and homeless into their pursuit of urban 
renewal). Their actions might not always be for noble reasons – but they end 
up doing the right thing for their own selfish reasons; they have realised that 
the policing approach does not work. It is only a small part of the solution. 
And they have funded, very substantially, the social work and social 
development projects, which government should be doing and which 
government does not do adequately […] Yes, it is the soft side of policing. 
Social development programmes should not have to depend on CIDs for their 
survival, but in the last five years Council and provincial government have 
started making much larger contributions and giving more support.‖ 
(Interview 35). 
When private bodies become one governance actor, inheriting key functions from the 
state and supported by the state through the introduction of by-laws, social 
development becomes part of the policing landscape. In the eyes of a critical 
geographer, this shows a bias in the governance landscape, while in the eyes of the 
governance bodies involved it is presumably just right. However, it is not only the 
soft side of policing that that facilitates the urban revanchism; in addition to that, 
private governments are able to utilise parts of the criminal justice system for their 
own gain to make space.   
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Figure 9.2: Overview of policing and social development structure 
 
 
9.5 Community courts 
While literature often focuses on the role of by-laws as an example for urban 
revanchism (Mitchell, 1997; Belina and Helms, 2003; Samara, 2010a), this thesis 
will extend the argument to the role of the criminal justice system, and particularly 
the model of community courts. As Figure 9.2 shows, community courts are the next 
step after being caught for the violation of a by-law. Therefore the analysis of a 
community court in the case study site not only exemplifies the state‘s support for 
this governance and policing setup, but it is also important to fully understand the 
powers of the private governing bodies, despite them not having any jurisdiction in 
the court. It will be argued that in the case study site the community court tries 
people for being a nuisance to the space in the eyes of the governing bodies. 
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Therefore, the court has the tendency to serve the interest of the governing elites and 
does not represent the community as originally intended.    
When introducing by-laws, a court system is needed to address the issue 
appropriately, otherwise there could be an arrest without trial, something that 
contradicts the constitution (Interview 35
127
). The community courts have been 
introduced because South Africa‘s juridical system is struggling under its workload 
due to high crime rates. This idea goes back to an initiative launched in 2004 by the 
former president Mbeki, who demanded at least two community courts in each 
province (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South 
Africa, 2006). In the greater Cape Town area three community courts were set up in 
2006. Using the Hatfield Court in Pretoria as its role model, minor offences are 
prosecuted within days of the arrest and in the community in which the crime was 
committed. The idea is to introduce the approach of restorative justice, meaning that 
if one breaches the rules of the community, one has to make up for it in the form of 
community work (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for 
South Africa, 2006; Interview 21
128
; Interview 47
129
). The courts' sentencing options 
are being carried out in conjunction with different NGOs and entail diversion 
programmes to intervene with repeat offenders using social services instead of fines 
and imprisonment (Interview 17
130
; Interview 21
131
; Interview 38
132
; Interview 
42
133
). However, interventions are currently limited through a lack of, in particular, 
financial resources, as stated by senior members of the community courts as well as 
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by other researchers who have assessed the state of the courts (Lue-Dugmore et al., 
2005; Interview 36
134
; Interview 47
135
).  
Of the three community courts in Cape Town, it appears that the idea of restorative 
justice is working well in the two courts situated in Cape Town‘s townships of 
Mitchell‘s Plain and Fezeka (Gugulethu). An researcher interviewed on the issue 
states that here the community is being represented and the issues concerning the 
people are being solved (Interview 36
136
). This is supported by an evaluation of the 
three community courts. In Fezeka and Mitchell‘s Plain, the offences the court deals 
with represent problems facing the communities, including shoplifting, assault, 
invalid/no driver‘s licence or possession of dagga (marihuana) (Lue-Dugmore et al., 
2005).       
However, although valid for all courts, the commitment of the community courts to 
urban revanchism becomes most obvious in the case study site. It is the declared aim 
of the community courts to prevent urban decay and it refers directly to the broken 
windows. In the ‗Guidelines for the establishment and functioning of Hatfield-type 
community courts‘ it states:  
The court follows the ‗broken windows‘ principles, a philosophy that 
addressing petty crimes serves as an important deterrent to more serious 
crimes. While improving community confidence in the criminal justice 
system, which is seen to be active in improving quality of life on the streets 
for residents (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for 
South Africa, 2006: 56). 
In the case of the Cape Town community court, which is situated in the case study 
site, the situation presents itself differently. In addition to 12.3% of offences which 
are unrecorded, 83.6% are breaches of ―By-law regulating to streets, public places 
and the prevention of nuisance‖, as outlined above (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005). As 
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this evaluation shows, the homeless population and its behaviour and ‗―lifestyle 
crimes‖ that contribute to urban decay‘ (Lue-Dugmore et al., 2005: 33) are targeted 
by the court. This is why the guidelines cited above note that ‗[t]o justify prosecution 
of by-law offences such as urinating in public, adequate public facilities should be 
provided‘ (Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation for South 
Africa, 2006: 50). If this is not the case, as in the case study site, the private policing 
of the by-laws becomes questionable. Agreeing with this, a researcher on the issue 
explains that it appears that the Cape Town community court does not represent the 
community, but instead mainly targets the homeless population as a social problem 
with the result that people get ‗punished for being homeless‘ (Interview 36137). 
Therefore, arguably the ‗revanchist city‘ (Smith, 1996) does not end with an arrest, 
but affects the parts of the criminal justice system outlined above. Here, a system of 
non-elected communities governs the territory of their financing bodies without 
being responsible for wider society. Having accumulated a lot of power and being set 
in a political environment that fosters this development, individual institutions, such 
as social development bodies, start to participate in it, possibly involuntarily and 
sometimes without even realising they are doing so if they do not assess the new de 
facto governing landscape. The coordinator of the community court reflects on the 
statistics on by-law offenders and argues: 
I agree that a lot of homeless people that went through those courts but not 
because of the fact that they are homeless, because the idea is not to 
criminalise poverty, the idea is to talk to those people who are contravening 
by-laws (Interview 47
138
). 
Again, this argument is similar to the one above: there is no arbitrary, unlawful 
targeting of homeless. This, however, is not what is being claimed. The argument is 
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rather that there is a bias in governing bodies that uphold the law, but this appears not 
to be the point of the critique, at least not openly. Although de jure the law applies to 
everyone, de facto it does not, and instead it serves the short-term interests of the 
governance bodies. To create space it is not necessary to break the law, instead 
governing bodies just have to follow it. Drawing on Mitchell‘s (1997, 2009) 
arguments, someone who is not homeless is less likely to have to wash their clothes 
in public, to light a fire in the city, or to defecate in a public space. Making this 
illegal without offering alternatives and supporting an, at least during daytime, 
almost omnipresent private police force, makes life in the community‘s territory very 
difficult, and even annihilates the people from these spaces (Mitchell, 1997). 
Therefore, de facto poverty as a social problem is being criminalised although de 
jure Justicia is still blind to this. Arguably this will remain the case until the 
community court acknowledges the governing power of the CIDs in its jurisdiction 
in terms of policing power.              
The community court that is situated in the case study area tries offenders arrested in 
four police stations (three of which are in the case study area), which are all 
characterised by either a CID and/or a well-organised community policing forum 
(often the two overlap in terms of personnel). As argued above, both governing 
communities have the aim of maintaining a particular kind of space by using security 
and fieldworkers, as well as developing the legal framework to do so. A legal 
researcher who was interviewed described the current situation as the processing of 
homeless, arrested for by-law offences, through the legal system (Interview 36
139
). It 
is argued that private community organisations, although without any direct 
jurisdiction in the court, use the community court as yet another tool to come closer 
to their idea of space. Equipped with the by-laws, the CID‘s security force, as the 
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most visible policing actor in their territory, can supervise arrests for quality of life 
offences that are then addressed in the community court. In this context the idea of 
being from the community for the community is biased, as the typical client of the 
court is not the average resident of the individual neighbourhood, but instead a 
member of its street people population, which is targeted for being a nuisance. Like 
social development bodies, the community court becomes part of a sophisticated 
policing landscape that private governance bodies can use to create space. The next 
section will integrate the social services into the considerations on urban revanchism.  
 
9.6 Social service 
Social services are part of the community courts and criminal justice system. As 
mentioned above, the idea of the community court is that the defendant, if guilty, 
pays the community back for the harm committed against it. However, practically 
‗paying the community back‘ involves an organisational structure that supervises the 
convicted person during community service. Besides Metrorail, a railway company 
that uses convicts to clean their carriages from time to time, two NGOs are the main 
recipients of people convicted by the community court in the centre of Cape Town. 
One of these organisations carries out diversion programmes at their own cost and 
deals with fewer people (Interview 42
140
); the second NGO, an Evangelical Christian 
organisation, plays a more significant role, managing to offer cleaning and basic 
gardening services through a system of rotation (Interview 17
141
; Interview 21
142
; 
Interview 38
143
). Having fewer staff and overhead costs, they can offer a service that 
is cheaper than commercial service providers. Here the forced labour of the 
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convicted competes on the open market. The main customers for their services are 
CIDs, especially the ones close to the centre who use them alongside commercial 
cleaning providers (Interview 21
144
; Interview 38
145
).  
In this case the idea of cleanliness has a double meaning in the eyes of the private 
governing. Firstly, it refers to the obvious, such as the removal of litter off the streets 
and the maintenance of public parks. In a second interpretation, however, it has the 
notion of clearing the homeless that are seen as a nuisance to public spaces off the 
streets. In the case of the convicted, who are there involuntarily, this system appears 
almost cynical. Possibly having been arrested under supervision of a CID security 
guard, they now have to work for the very same organisation, possibly clearing the 
semi-hidden belongings of other street people from drainpipes to throw them away. 
These cleaning groups‘ members are accompanied by a supervisor with a CID vest 
and security guards who keep an eye on the convicted (Interview 21
146
; Interview 
38
147
). In other words, CIDs arrest people who break the rules of the community and 
who then end up cleaning for the community while being off the street at the same 
time, and all of this for relatively cheap labour. Although the applied practice does 
not have the exclusionary character described above, it complies with the same goals 
of getting closer to a clean, controlled territory. Being under supervision of two 
authorities, one from the NGO and the security from the CID, and being clearly 
marked as service providers through their vests (see Figure 9.3), the convicted are 
not visible as ‗others‘ anymore.    
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Figure 9.3: Cleaning team in a City Improvement District  
 
Image taken by the author in July 2010 
 
Ultimately the role of the state is characterised in a twofold manner. First, due to a 
lack of resources the state would rather spend its resources in areas where no private 
community structures take the lead. Secondly, the city/state provides the basis for the 
politics described. Furthermore, the state applies a policy of outsourcing existing 
funds to NGOs and other private entities
148
 (Interview with local politician; Interview 
with representative of social development sector), opening the stage for private 
interests that are not necessarily for the wellbeing of the city in general, but for their 
own community.  
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 The outsourcings of state or municipality functions have to be seen as part of a wider neoliberal 
turn that occurred in South Africa in the post-apartheid area (Bond 1996; Samara, 2005, 2010).   
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9.7 Conclusion 
This section has shown that private governments possess a powerful policing 
network to shape the social geographies. The chapter revealed the de facto policing 
landscape and unmask the powers of private governments that are not usually 
discussed, at least not openly, between the actors involved. and which are not 
directly visible. It has been shown that private governments do not only rely on 
private policing bodies, which are still powerful, but use more sophisticated methods, 
supported in part by the state.  
Framed by Cohen‘s thoughts on social control, it has been shown how social 
development bodies morph into actors of the policing landscape. Led by 
territorialised ideas and a biased governance setup, they become the soft side of 
policing, complementing the hard policing applied by their colleagues from the 
private policing companies. This chapter has also argued that this sophisticated ‗soft 
and hard‘ policing network can only exist if facilitated by the local government, not 
only in terms of the introduction of the by-laws, but also of the community court and 
social services that deal with those arrested by private policing officers. Once 
uncovered, these extended policing networks should indeed be assessed as they have 
a significant on social geographies because they not only impact on the policing 
landscape, but also on social development and the criminal justice system. Here 
private governance nodes have reconfigured urban power relations that impact on 
urban space as well as society, something that will be outlined in the following 
Conclusion.  
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CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION 
10.1 Research findings 
This conclusion will begin with a summary that answers the first three research 
questions based on the empirical findings. The second section will then discuss the 
final open research question, the consequences of private policing for public space 
and society. Once all the research questions have been answered, the limitations of 
the research and possible future projects will be outlined, followed by a final section 
sketching out the relevance of the research beyond the immediate issue of private 
policing companies in central Cape Town.  
To start with the first three research questions:  
1. What are the spatial variations in the forms and practices of private 
policing and private security companies in public space? 
The spatial variations in the forms and practices of private policing and private 
security companies in public space have been demonstrated, mapped and discussed.  
CID policing: The largest and most prominent privately policed sites are the five 
CIDs that promote urban renewal programmes. Their policing includes foot patrols, 
cars, bicycles and, possibly, stationed campervans or booths (Section 7.2). Here, it is 
not only the sophistication of their force that suggests they are an actual policing 
body, but also several of the functions that come with the territory in which they 
operate. This supports the argument of Chapter 4. Besides their hard line against 
‗undesirables‘, they also act as ‗community ambassadors‘, helping to make the space 
appear as safe and as welcoming as possible for visitors. Another part of this public 
reassurance function is the close contact of the CID‗s policing companies with the 
community. Senior members of staff are regularly in touch with community 
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members to strengthen this connection. This close community contact is pursued as 
the private governments (CIDs and residential community structures) have a policy 
of establishing themselves as the main organisational node and the first port of call 
within their community. For basic officers, public reassurance and community 
contact is achieved through constant checking in at shops, hotels, etc. to sign the 
stored logbooks stored along the patrol routes. 
Private policing companies are the most likely to be the first to arrive on the scene of 
an accident, crime or dispute, or any other situation in which a policing body is 
required. With their control room and car, foot, and possibly bicycle or motorcycle 
backup, they can either respond themselves or delegate issues to more suitable 
agencies. These rapid response capabilities should be emphasised as they 
characterise a shift in policing.  
However, one of the strongest arguments for private policing companies in the case 
of the CID is their ability to enforce law, a fundamental order maintenance 
characteristic and part of most policing definitions (Section 4.3). The policing of law 
transpires in two ways. Legally, private policing companies have no more power 
than any other citizen; however, when it comes to the regulation of the urban poor, 
informal traders or any contravention against the comprehensive by-laws, policing 
companies fall back on an established customary law that provides them with the 
power or authority to act. In addition, private governments are able to ‗rent-a-cop‘ or 
law enforcement officer from the city with full powers of arrest if they are required 
by a private policing officer (Section 7.5). Figure 10.1 compares the forms and 
functions of private CID policing to the public police and confirms their strength by 
indicating the various overlaps between the two policing bodies. The empirical data 
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shows that the CID policing companies have advanced beyond a simple security 
function.    
 
Figure 10.1: CID policing functions 
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
 
Bobby-on-the-beat policing: The second largest policing setups are the residential 
bobby-on-the-beat sites. Here policing companies patrol designated areas to provide 
additional safety, but also encourage the urban poor to move on, or out of the area. 
Patrols are carried out using foot patrols, bicycles, Segways, and cars (Section 7.3.2). 
In terms of their role, they have less policing functions than the CID policing 
companies (see Figure 10.2). The key difference here is the missing law enforcement 
function of the bobby-on-the-beat policing, as this is something that is not necessary 
in those sites. Since the bobby-on-the-beat schemes operate in residential areas, 
issues such as vagrancy or traders, which in the CIDs are controlled through by-laws, 
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are not relevant. Therefore the bobby-on-the-beat police do not have to consider 
enhancing their law enforcement capabilities beyond the ones outlined in Section 
7.3.2. If ‗undesirables‘ appear they can simply send them away by playing out the 
physical strength and dominance of the bobby-on-the-beat officers. However, as 
Figure 10.2 shows, bobby-on-the-beat officers still have more functions than a 
security guard, and are therefore also labelled as private policing companies.         
 
Figure 10.2: Bobby-on-the-beat policing functions 
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
 
Static security: The smallest schemes are the static security setups where a guard, 
backed up by an armed response unit, patrols one small stretch of a public street for 
the residents, providing extra safety (Section 7.4.2). The guard is linked up to a 
control room and an associated armed response company that is capable of providing 
backup. Compared to the other two sites, the static security officers have almost no 
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policing functions (see Figure 10.3) and resemble much more a ‗classical‘ security 
company, as outlined in Section 4.4. Besides the immediate community, which only 
encompasses the residents in a short stretch of street and their rapid response 
function (something basic armed response services offer as well) their main purpose 
is crime reduction through visibility. Since the space they police is so small and in 
residential areas issues such as vagrancy are not a problem. In summary that means 
static security officers not much different to mall security. 
 
Figure 10.3: Static security functions 
 
Source: Own figure based on Bowling and Foster, 2002. Supplemented by Herbert and Beckett (2010) 
and Beckett and Herbert (2008); Fyfe (1992).   
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2. What is the impact of private policing on urban territory? 
Chapter 8 showed that the impact of private policing on urban territory is 
considerable. Although their success cannot be measured in terms of numbers and 
crime statistics (since they are not public), their impact on their space is significant. 
While in the cited literature (Chapter 6) public space was condemned to deprivation, 
the counter-movements researched did turn this trend around. Instead of a continuing 
downward spiral, public space investments are being made again, the FIFA world 
cup was successfully hosted, people are back to consume, and even street cafes are 
being opened since the constant ‗harassment‘ by urban poor is less significant. The 
successful impact is also being confirmed in the fact that the public police, to some 
degree, have withdrawn resources from privately policed territories; this indirectly 
suggests dropping crime rates, as the private actors cover many of the policing 
functions in these spaces, as the first research question established (Section 8.4). 
The policing strategy used to achieve this is the displacement of people and crime. 
Through their widespread presence and the displacement strategy, these companies 
help reassure the public in spaces that used to be regarded as too dangerous to make 
much use of them. In the policing schemes various companies have specialised in the 
strategy of laying out a tight net of officers patrolling and watching the space closely. 
Without exaggeration it can be said that in the CIDs one will most likely see a 
private policing officer within the first minute of entering their territory. In the case 
of residential areas, the police confirmed that on one police patrol they will see at 
least two armed response vehicles, and that is without considering the bobby-on-the-
beat or static policing schemes. Here as well, one will encounter officers patrolling 
very soon after entering the territory. Without having access to the exact figures, 
there are about 150 private policing officers patrolling the fairly small case study 
236 
 
sites during daytime. Numbers like this cannot be matched by the public police. 
Therefore, private policing companies are able to impact successfully on urban 
territory. 
 
3. Assess the significance of private policing networks on social geographies?  
Private policing companies are key in the de facto private policing landscape. Their 
considerable power and influence over space is outlined in the first two research 
questions. However, despite their power, private policing companies have limitations 
to their effectiveness, as not all problems can be solved through hard policing 
(Section 9.2.1). The above-mentioned displacement is not sustainable when applied 
on its own, as the displaced are likely to return eventually (maybe a week later, 
maybe as soon as a private policing officer turns his back). Therefore, the private 
policing landscape has been developed further to approach the issue of ‗clean and 
safe‘ space in a more holistic way. Today the so called ‗carrot and stick‘ approach is 
being applied using the ‗softer side of policing‘ to complement the ‗hard policing‘ 
strategies of the private policing companies (Section 9.4). These sophisticated private 
policing networks have started to shape the social geographies of the case study 
considerably.  
In recent years private governments have invested in social development to work 
alongside the private policing companies (‗the stick‘). Here social development 
actors, especially field workers (‗the carrot‘), will offer assistance to the urban poor 
and street people. If they accept the assistance they will ultimately leave the space 
by, for example, being reunited with their families or moving into homeless shelters, 
just as intended by the private governments. If street people and the urban poor do 
not accept the help from the social development programme, the matter of an 
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‗undesirable‘ in a space designated for urban regeneration will be referred to ‗the 
stick‘, or the private policing company. Being able to apply a number of 
comprehensive by-laws that make the existence in spaces where they are being 
policed impossible, the private policing companies can target the ‗undesirables‘ that 
do not comply with the offer of help from the social development bodies. Again, the 
targeted person(s) will ultimately be removed from the space. In this situation, 
participating in a social development programme is not a voluntary act, but serves an 
‗out-of-space‘ strategy. Social development becomes the ‗soft side of policing‘ as it 
complements the private policing companies or the ‗hard side of policing‘, 
describing a sophisticated de facto policing landscape. 
 
Map 10.1: All private policing schemes 
 
Own graphic 
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The argument on the policing landscape was then extended to the community court 
in the centre of Cape Town (Section 9.4). The point being made is that after an arrest 
for violating a by-law, a trial in the court follows. However, it appears that the court 
does not consider the privatised power relations and the impact of private 
governments to be within its jurisdiction. A large percentage of the crimes addressed 
by the court are arrests for violating the by-laws. Although being de jure right, the 
community courts de facto facilitate the outlined ‗carrot and stick‘ approach and 
support the clearing of the urban poor branded as a nuisance. In other words, the 
social geographies have been successfully turned to support the revanchist city.  
 
10.2 Creating parallel public spaces through private governments 
This chapter addresses the last remaining, but fundamentally important, question:  
4. What are the consequences of private policing for Cape Town’s public 
space and society? 
This section interprets the empirical findings on private policing companies and 
related actors and places them in the context of the wider debates on South Africa‘s 
public spaces and their changing nature. It explores how the new policing landscape 
impacts space and society in a city where considerations and worries around the use 
of public spaces determine life so fundamentally. Section 6.4 referred to work that 
has been done either in parts of the case study site (Samara, 2005, 2010a; Bénit-
Gbaffou et al., 2008) or in similar spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a, 2008b). Departing 
directly from ideas on urban fragmentation and exclusion, this work is very critical 
of what has been called governance of security. To recapitulate some of the key 
arguments: Samara (2005, 2010a) talks about a social ordering of space and the 
exclusion of ‗undesirables‘, namely street children, from the CCID in Cape Town, a 
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claim this study fully confirms. However, he then continues to describe CIDs as a 
concept that ‗turns what should be public space into literal or de facto private, 
heavily policed enclaves‘ (Samara, 2005) and that racial governance reproduces 
apartheid inequalities (Samara, 2010a). Bénit-Gbaffou takes her critique on CIDs 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008) and residential spaces in 
Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a), which correspond to the bobby-on-the-beat 
scheme of this thesis, a step further. Here both kinds of space are compared to gated 
communities, and it is argued that the grade of urban fragmentation echoes the 
apartheid city (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008: 709). Although agreeing with some of 
their lines of argument and, to an extent, with their findings, this thesis contests the 
conclusions Samara and Bénit-Gbaffou draw.  
At several stages this thesis has claimed that a more nuanced interpretation of space 
is needed to give justice to the complexity of fragmentation and governance. To give 
a blunt example of what is meant by this, white or middle class-friends of the 
researcher who do not look at every security sign or uniform they encounter do not 
notice the exact boundaries of the researched cases; they do, however, notice a boom 
in their way that stops them from continuing.  
As mentioned before, security in the researched cases can never be as closed as in a 
fenced private property. If one just transfers through the sites, even as one of the 
class of ‗undesirables‘, it is unlikely that the security will approach you right away. 
The security setups and exclusionary practices described are instead a constant 
struggle towards a clean and safe kind of space. Due to the busy nature of the space, 
they should not be compared to an actual gated community, which is comparably 
easy to secure (Zedner, 2009). To give another example (also see Vignette 7.1 and 
Vignette 8.1):  
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During the research I lived just outside a CID so several times a day I had to 
cross the boundary of my residential (non-CID) area and the CID where the 
mini-buses left, the shops were, etc. Having developed a routine of drinking a 
morning coffee whilst reading the papers in one of the cafes on the corner of 
the CID and residential area, I could observe the daily ‗cat-and-mouse‘ game 
between the urban poor and the security guards. When a guard on patrol 
passed by he would chase the usual suspects away (usually street people have 
spots where they spend the day and where they sleep, so when living in an 
area one will know the street people population after a few weeks and vice 
versa. The reason for chasing them away is in these cases often not based on 
any legal grounds but a constant procedure that has developed. Here the 
customary law explained in Chapter six comes into play). However, literally 
as soon as the guard turns, the street people come back. This game repeated 
itself day after day unless either there was a crackdown by police and 
security, which occurred at periodic intervals, or a social worker intervened.        
The reason for offering this anecdote is that, as long one behaves according to the 
standards and norms of the space (not violating a by-law), one is likely to pass or at 
least transect through the space un-harassed. So, as argued before, there is still a 
difference between a heavily fortified private enclave or a gated-community-like 
space (Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008) and an 
exclusionary governance of security as researched in this thesis.  
While this thesis agrees with the fragmentation rhetoric in general (Kempa et al., 
2004; Wakefield, 2003; Ericson, 1994; Rigakos and Greener, 2000; Crawford and 
Lister, 2004) and in South African cities in particular (Kempa and Singh, 2008; 
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002, Lemanski, 2006a, 2006b; 
Landman, 2006, 2008; Beavon, 2000), it questions the equivalence of these spaces 
with gated enclaves for two reasons: first, the levels of segregation and exclusion are 
not the same compared to gated enclaves. Secondly, by drawing on an interesting 
twist in the ‗end of public space‘ discussion, these spaces can become more public 
than they were before, thus differentiating them significantly from gated forms of 
space, possibly with the exception of some shopping malls (Wakefield, 2003). 
Instead a more differentiated terminology for new formations of post-apartheid 
fragmentation is suggested that argues for the existence of parallel public spaces, 
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referring to the century-old history of dysfunctional space in South Africa 
(something Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008: 709, very briefly refer to as well). Drawing 
on this, the final argument will be that a variety of public spaces that exist in parallel, 
instead of the one universal public space and a strict public-private dichotomy. These 
parallel public spaces are being policed and maintained by the researched private 
policing companies. 
 
10.2.1 The end of public space 
This section argues that privately governed and policed public spaces are far from 
being enclaves (as in gated communities), but can in fact be more open and public. 
To make this claim, some of the fundamental ideas on public space will be 
recaptured in order to develop a grounded foundation for the following arguments. 
Commonly, public space refers to streets, squares and parks one can use in an 
unrestricted way (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009; Collins and Shantz, 2009). However, 
when analysing the very nature of public space the arguments have to be based on 
the theoretical discussion of public space as defined by Mitchell (2003) and Mitchell 
and Staeheli (2009). Here, public space is that space where ‗the public‘ is formed, 
and thus the social and cultural rules that govern public behaviour predominate. In 
this sense, public space is definable in part only through comparison with more 
private spaces, or the spaces over which individual or small group sovereignty reigns 
(Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009: 511).  
Following these thoughts on the nature of public space, Young (1990) idealises 
public space as an open, democratic space in which social interactions are possible 
and urban life is created (here city life means being together with strangers; Young, 
1990: 237). For Young (1999), public space and city life is characterised by places 
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where differences can be lived without exclusion, that attract and draws people out of 
their homes, and publicity which makes a space accessible for everyone. However, 
she acknowledges the reality of public space that is better described through 
deprivation, segregation and the ‗ugliness of the city‘ that makes her ideals seem 
‗laughably utopian‘ (Young 1990: 241). Similarly, others describe the idea of ‗true‘ 
(in the sense of open and democratic) public space as theoretical and always under 
threat. Referring to the various changes in urban space, such as the rise of 
privatisation processes, increasing private power, semi-private space or mass private 
property, all of which can be summed up under the revanchist city (Smith, 1996; 
Atkinson, 2003; Swanson, 2007), prompts the question of whether it signals the end 
(Mitchell, 1995), or at least the shrinking, of public space (Nemeth and Hollander, 
2010; Nemeth, 2010). Therefore, Mitchell and Staeheli (2009) as well as others 
(Goheen, 1998; Madden, 2010) argue that public space is often a political space as it 
is contested not only by groups that occupy that space and make it unusable for 
others groups, but also by the state and private interests who try to construct space 
around certain ideas that might again exclude particular groups.  
In South Africa public space was to be avoided if possible during the first few years 
after 1994 due to the high crime rates and urban decay. This resulted in a situation in 
which private citizens grouped together and re-claimed their public space with the 
outcome that ‗others‘ - street vendors, urban poor, street people - were excluded, or, 
if they were there or had used the space before, pushed away (Miraftab, 2007; 
Peyroux, 2006; Samara, 2010a, 2010b; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b). This arguably 
contests the nature of public space (Mitchell, 2003; Goheen, 1998; Madden, 2010; 
Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009) and led Samara and Bénit-Gbaffou to the conclusion 
that it has become privatised space due to the lack of openness or loss of parts of its 
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public identity. However, their argument neglects the fact that in the first years of the 
post-apartheid city, where private governance was not exercised, public space was 
also of an exclusionary nature, although no formal exclusion was exercised; but due 
to the crime rates and deprivation no one wanted to use it if it was not necessary. So, 
with all respect to their critique, for the most part the grade of exclusion in reality did 
not change much. What did change was the body or mechanism of exclusion.  
From a gender perspective this has long been acknowledged (Hubbard, 2004; Day, 
1999; Pain 2001; Goheen 1998; Nemeth and Hollander, 2010). Having a truly open 
public space can possibly exclude the elderly or women from it, and in the case of 
South Africa this would apply to most of the middle class, even though there might 
be no formal restriction in the form of a police force or private security excluding 
certain groups. As Pain (2001) argues, the fear of crime has a significant impact on 
the use of space. If one group enjoys an open public space, such as a park, this group 
might at the same time restrict it to themselves for their own recreational use. Taking 
private spaces, such as the already outlined mass private property into consideration, 
Day (1999) claims that ‗public spaces are not necessarily public‘ (Day, 1999: 159, 
emphasis removed) and so private space is not necessarily private. Day (1999) 
examines the issue from a gender perspective and claims that the fear of crime, and 
therefore indirect exclusion from parks and other spaces, can make a mall more 
public for women than an actual public space; again, in South Africa this would 
apply to most of the middle classes. In this case public space is being defined as an 
open, recreational space (Day, 1999). Following this idea, the researched cases might 
even be more public in their current form than they were before, as many people 
certainly prefer the current state of being to the previous crime-ridden urban space. 
244 
 
As has been said before, finding a ‗free and safe urban space for all‘ is a ‗rare treat in 
Cape Town‘ (Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo, 2009: 367).  
This is in line with Madden‘s (2010) ideas, which bring an interesting twist to the 
argument of the ‗end of public space‘ thesis in the context of New York‘s Bryant 
Park. While agreeing with the end of public space in general, he suggests that 
‗[s]ome spaces are becoming more public in a formal sense but in the process they 
become more tightly bound to dominant forms of power. This is not privatisation but 
the transformation of the urban public itself‘ (Madden, 2010: 202). A similar 
observation has been made by Paasche and Sidaway (2010) in the case of the 
privately secured Jardim do Professor in Maputo. What is being described in both 
cases is a situation in which a public space, here a park, represents an antagonism 
between the de jure ownership and its de facto use. While the park was owned by the 
public de jure, de facto it belonged to criminals and drug users, making it a space to 
be avoided by the public. Once it was governed by a BID, the North American 
counterpart of the CID, and therefore quasi-privatised according to many observers 
(Samara, 2010a; Collins and Shantz, 2009; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009), it became 
open for the general public, meaning a wider intersection of the citizenry of the city; 
in other words its de jure privatisation enabled a de facto use by the wider public. 
Therefore, while some criminals and drug users are being excluded by the strict 
governance and policing, other, potentially more consuming, citizens can now use 
the space as a ‗public‘ park. As suggested above, this mirrors very much what has 
happened in this case study as well.  
Discussing ‗privately owned public spaces‘, Kirby (2008) applies a similar line of 
argument. His main theme is that a privately-owned space can hold a public function 
depending on its use. Here Kirby (2008) draws on the idea of a pre-industrial café-
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house and salon culture that are the spaces for social and intellectual encounters. In 
this sense, several of today‘s private spaces can be places where people come 
together to interact and exchange, corresponding with Young‘s (1990) idea on the 
democratic public space. Addressing the issue of revanchism and homelessness, 
Kirby (2008) argues that this is not an issue of a public space, but one of a socially-
responsible city and affordable housing. 
Therefore, despite Mitchell and Staeheli‘s (2009) definition about the theme of 
openness, a relatively sovereign elitist group actually ensures a certain public-ness 
that was not there before. However, what does this show in this context? First it 
shows that what determines public space cannot be clearly defined and that there 
might be spaces in which a clear public-private dichotomy might not work (Mitchell, 
1996). Comparing privately-policed public spaces to gated enclaves, the difference is 
striking. Although both are privately governed, public space becomes more public, 
while gated enclaves are as private as it gets.  
Bénit-Gbaffou (2008b) in particular continuously draws parallels to apartheid 
exclusion, hinting at similarities of space during this period and the current setups. 
This thesis agrees with this, and indeed there are certain parallels one can observe in 
the context of spatial exclusion. However, Bénit-Gbaffou and Samara do not 
acknowledge the fact that, although grades of segregation were incomparably higher, 
space was not seen as private space. Otherwise all ‗group areas‘ and hence most 
urban space would have been private space. Instead the country has a tradition of 
public but segregated space. In fact it has never known anything else since the 
Western ‗colonial‘ understanding of private property arrived with the Dutch East 
India Company.       
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10.2.2 Public space in South Africa 
Since its colonisation in 1652 with the landing of Jan van Riebeeck in what later 
became Cape Town, South Africa has arguably never experienced public space as 
known in the West and referred to in the common literature on the issue cited above. 
In the pre-1948 colonial state, crude ideas of white superiority prevailed in the 
Segregation City (Davies, 1981), which had its own agenda of inequality and unjust 
spatiality; however, the argument here departs from the more recent history of the 
apartheid state/city since 1948. By drawing on the apartheid government‘s urban 
planning, the argument of different, parallel existing public spaces will be made and 
used to explain the current situation of public space in Cape Town.  
As Christopher puts it, the imposition of apartheid by the National Party was ‗one of 
the major social engineering experiments of the twentieth century‘ (1997: 311). It 
was the declared aim of the apartheid state to create a complete separation of the 
different ethnic groups, as defined by the state. One of the core pillars of the 
apartheid policy was the Group Areas Act of 1950, which was the guiding legal 
framework for the ordering of public space until 1991 (Goldberg, 2001; Christopher, 
1997; Davies: 1981). Goldberg sums up the key points of the act: 
a A residential race zone or area [exists] for each racial group       
b Strong physical boundaries or imagined barriers [...] serve as buffers 
between human constructions, like a park, railway line, or highway. 
c Each racial group should have direct access to work areas (industrial 
sites or central business district), where racial interaction is necessary, or to 
common amenities (like government bureaucracies, airports, sport stadiums) 
without having to enter the residential zone of another racial group. Where 
economics in furnishing such common access necessitate traversing the racial 
space of others, it should be by ‗neutral‘ buffered means like railways or 
highways. 
d Industry should be dispersed in ribbon formation around the city‘s 
periphery, rather than amassed in great blocks, to give maximal direct access 
at minimal transport costs. 
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e The central business district is to remain under white control 
(Goldberg, 2001: 76) 
Although total apartheid, including the ideas on independent Bantustans, was never 
fully achieved, the regime came astonishingly close to it. Noteworthy exceptions to 
the group areas were non-white domestic workers in white households or black 
workers living in so-called hostels. To establish this segregation, the regime used 
different forms of removal of people and settlements, often involving violence. The 
best known example countrywide was the case of Sophiatown, a multicultural suburb 
of Johannesburg that was forcefully removed by the police with its former 
inhabitants resettled to the township of Soweto (Themba, 2007). The most prominent 
example in Cape Town was the removal of District Six, a culturally vibrant 
multiracial quarter that was re-designated as a white suburb with all non-white 
inhabitants being removed to townships in the periphery of the city (Christopher, 
1997; Davies, 1981). Within the non-white group areas, the population could govern 
itself to a certain extent. This included policing, a criminal justice system and the 
organisation of community life (Smith, 1992; Cook, 1992; Brewer, 1994; Burman, 
1989; Schärf, 2001; Seekings, 1992).       
As Maylam argues, ‗[s]egregation was essentially a form of spatial control over 
residential space‘ (1995: 29). Because the majority of the population was forced into 
segregation, parallel societies were established and with them different kinds of 
public space. Indeed, Bénit-Gbaffou sums up apartheid arguing that ‗society was 
characterised by political fragmentation based on the ideal of separate societies 
managed by separate jurisdictions‘ (2008a: 96), as well as a cultural segregation 
(Welsh, 1972).  
This reading of apartheid is confirmed by Smith (1992) and Robinson (1992). The 
idea not only of segregated space, but also of parallel societies is precisely what this 
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section is trying to establish. There was a continuum of separate, parallel spaces and 
societies that characterised the apartheid city. Having a separate space and society in 
which public life happens and a public is formed in return meant that there was a 
continuum of parallel existing public spaces that fulfilled both criteria in the 
definition cited above at the same time.  
The reason for highlighting this is to show that several public spaces had already 
existed in South Africa for decades. When Young (1999) argues that different classes 
are increasingly being divided by features such as highways, they have long been 
built in South Africa and continue to be built. The society that Rose (1996a) suggests 
has come to an end never existed in the first place, and the different societies or the 
community of one‘s own race have always been the points of reference in South 
African cities. Within the different separated communities, individual norms, 
cultures, music and fashion developed in parallel. What was acceptable in one 
community might be completely different in another. In his written account, Otter 
(2008), a white journalist who moved into Cape Town‘s largest black township, 
Khayelitsha, repeatedly mentions the cultural differences as well as the advice of his 
new friends to change his way of thinking as he was in their world where he was the 
other. The reason for pointing this out is that, even since the end of policed 
apartheid, these differences in society and space still exist as they are deeply rooted 
after centuries of segregation. In 1998 the deputy president of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki, who later became president, made this point when he gave a speech on the 
failed nation building in the country in which he talked about two nations living in 
parallel to this day: 
A major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation building is 
defined by and derives from the material conditions in our society which have 
divided our country into two nations, the one black and the other white.  
We therefore make bold to say that South Africa is a country of two nations.  
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One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or 
geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, 
educational, communication and other infrastructure (...) The second and 
larger nation of South Africa is black and poor (...). This nation lives under 
conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, 
communication and other infrastructure (...) And neither are we becoming 
one nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation is not 
being realised (Mbeki, 1998). 
Although directly about public spaces, this supports the argument that there are 
parallel spaces in which the two nations exist. This chapter is set against this tradition 
of a defunct nation and spaces existing in parallel. A local ANC activist and Head of 
the Secretariat for Community Safety in the Western Cape Department of 
Community Safety adds another key component to the argument, the different norms 
and values in the different societies:           
[I]f you look at normal township areas people live in very close proximity, 
share common economic status, and possibly common social and cultural 
norms, you would find the order and rhythm of that township to be very 
different to the leafy sheltered, spacious suburbs. So an example of that could 
be that in that typical township area for a group of guys to be kicking a ball 
around at the corner of a street would be normal, for people to be playing 
music loudly would be normal, for people to be playing music for everyone in 
the street could be pretty normal, for dogs to be barking at any time of the day 
and night is pretty normal. Take all of those same examples and you transfer 
that to a middle, to upper- middle class suburban area protected by private 
security companies and you would have a totally different response. Would a 
young people kicking a ball at street corner be considered normal? Would it 
be tolerated? Probably not. They would be regarded with suspicion; a 
nuisance at best and a danger to society. Why don‘t they go play in a 
designated area like a soccer field because those areas have such resources. 
There are recreation facilities for young people in the more wealthy suburbs. 
If you take the case of young people playing loud music - of course that 
would be a great nuisance to the order and rhythm of those communities and 
wouldn‘t be tolerated in suburbs, but in townships that same behaviour would 
be the order of the day and an acceptable norm. So who regulates social 
behaviour and by what norms and standards? It is no wonder therefore that 
security companies protecting the interest of their more wealthy clients would 
be targeting young black males engaging in any of the activities above, as 
targets for their attention. So what is normal and what is to be tolerated in 
different communities have a certain connotation, one which is translated into 
race and class. You can‘t separate it from socio-economic conditions or 
assume that there are generally accepted norms and values and that the same 
order can be imposed on everyone. This should be negotiated and facilitated 
through dialogue and conflict dispute resolution. Private security companies 
are not equipped to respond to these challenges. They continue therefore to do 
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what they do best – target those who do not ‗fit‘ the order from the 
perspective of their paying clients. And so divisions are perpetuated, normal 
behaviour of young black males (in the main) are criminalised when practiced 
in leafy suburbs and a different sets of behaviours are policed based on 
geographic location (Interview 34). 
Key to the argument of different spaces is the idea that they are characterised by 
different norms and values.   
 
10.2.3 From public space to public spaces 
This section will outline how private policing companies create parallel public spaces 
and through these means heavily influence the nature of the post-apartheid space as 
well as recomposing social life. Instead of describing the privatisation of space, it 
might be more suitable to pick up the point of different public spaces, defined by 
different norms and values, and to apply this to the case study site as well. In this 
dysfunctional society, different public spaces serve different, possibly parallel 
existing, communities, whilst potentially excluding each other by applying different 
sets of rules and norms. While the idea of one public space might be sufficient to 
describe a relatively homogenous society, at least in comparison to a South African 
city, this is not accurate in South Africa. As shown above, this is certainly the case 
between a white suburb and a black township, but also between the spaces ruled by 
private governments and complex security governance and the surrounding areas 
without such schemes.  
The chapter agrees thus far with Samara (2005, 2010a, 2010b), Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 
(2008) and Bénit-Gbaffou (2008a, 2008b) and others (Miraftab, 2007, Peyroux, 
2006), as these spaces are too different from the actual public space in terms of 
policing and ideas of social order to be the same. Here space is being ordered and 
regulated by private governments with the desire to ‗socially sanitise public space‘ 
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(Miraftab, 2007: 608) and not only to exclude the homeless, street children and sex 
workers, but also street vendors and unofficial parking marshals (Miraftab, 2007; 
Peyroux, 2006).  
Throughout the study, the exclusionary notion of and control over street people of 
private governments and their private police became obvious. Not only was this 
confirmed by the private governance actors themselves (Interview 13
149
; Interview 
14
150
), but also by city officials, local politicians associated with the different 
political parties (Interview 24
151
; Interview 26
152
; Interview 34
153
; Interview 35
154
), a 
local journalist (Interview 02
155
), and high ranking Metro Police officers (Interview 
04
156
; Interview 43
157
).      
Furthermore, there is a desire to create space above and beyond the immediate 
problem of ‗undesirables‘, which contradicts the image of a successful clean space. 
All larger private governments, such as CIDs, also have their own urban 
management sections which contract companies to clean the street. Also issues such 
as informal street vendors are highly regulated (City of Cape Town, 2009) and 
policed by the CIDs (Observation 08). In this way, private governments try to 
implement the particular image of space they have in their mind (Vignette 7.1 and 
Observation 12). Emphasising the difference from the surrounding areas, the CIDs 
and financially comparably potent actors have to spend their money within their 
territories (Interview 05
158
). Throughout the study, none of the participants, neither 
supporters nor critics, questioned the success of governance structures in terms of 
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achieving their goals to create space. By doing so, a different set of rules, norms and 
values prevail that make them distinctly different to their surrounding public space.   
Whilst achieving this, private governance creates a spatial segregation that is divided 
along class lines, something confirmed by many participants, which in the 
contemporary South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the old apartheid divisions. 
Therefore Samara (2005) argues that old apartheid fears are being perpetuated, which 
he explains with the idea of ‗moral panics‘. Without these policing schemes, the 
wider middle and upper classes would not make use of public spaces at all. In these 
terms, the old segregation order is not only evident in the gated community and the 
shiny mall, but also in public spaces with private governments as well, while on the 
borders the excluded ‗undesirables‘ accumulate. 
It is also correct that many of these spaces serve the purpose of consumption. 
However, this does not change the impression that more or different people and 
groups use them compared to before, confirming what Madden (2010) argued using 
the example of New York‘s Bryant Park. In a violent city, space becomes usable 
through exclusion and repression. The disposable income needed to consume a drink 
in a cafe makes space public again for middle classes as they are otherwise perceived 
to be too dangerous or exhausting to be in, in terms of the various aggressive begging 
practices or a constant feeling of worry.      
These urban fragments are then surrounded by ‗more open‘ or ‗truly public‘ spaces, 
as Bénit-Gbaffou and Samara might possibly argue. Here one might find a different 
social order. Excluded groups might accumulate, crime rates are possibly higher, and 
space looks more deprived. Referring to the literature presented, this will exclude the 
majority of residents and tourists and cause them to spend their leisure time in mass 
private properties, such as Century City or the V&A Waterfront; alternatively, as 
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happened in the last ten years and is continuing, the affected community of residents 
starts exercising a governance of security themselves. By introducing a space, similar 
to the researched cases, they now start excluding groups and people themselves in 
order to take over, or take back, their space. 
In the researched cases the norm and values that have been called socially acceptable 
(Herbert and Beckett, 2010; Beckett and Herbert, 2008) are controlled by having 
translated them into actual law and policing them with private agents in the name of 
private micro-governments. However, this does not make them private in general, 
just very different from the ‗truly‘ public spaces surrounding them. Thus they are 
neither private enclaves, as has been argued (Samara, 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; 
Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008), nor are they as public as they used to be and the 
surrounding spaces still are; they are just different, but here different becomes the 
norm.    
Having made the argument that these spaces work in Cape Town, one could almost 
read it as a case for privately policed public spaces; this is not the case. It is simply a 
logical development of a dysfunctional (neoliberal) society where ubuntu, the 
philosophy of human interconnectivity and relation, is not being practised outside the 
borders of the community. The shifting towards a patchwork of different public 
spaces and the state's support of this describes a securitisation of social problems and 
a continuum of defunct space in a country that has never experienced anything 
different. One of the most pressing issues in South Africa is social inequality, which 
is part of the cause of high crime rates, which is rooted in apartheid and its 
segregated or defunct spaces. However, instead of tackling these issues sustainably 
on the level of one society, which would mean channelling funds into the township 
areas to tackle the root causes of inequality, the city has outsourced the responsibility 
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to private governance agents, such as the CIDs. Instead, structures which are 
naturally concerned for their own benefit, rule over the different spaces and sort out 
problems according to their territorialised logic of spatial exclusion and private 
policing. In other words, a country that never had a society or a public space does not 
appear to be changing this. Instead the current development is continuing this 
tradition and the urban poor are being left in their space. 
So yes, these spaces are part of an urban fragmentation, but this urban fragmentation 
consists of different kinds of spaces including, but not limited to, private enclaves, as 
the literature suggests. Nevertheless, the parallel public spaces discussed here, 
namely CIDs and ‗extreme forms of neighbourhood watch‘, contribute to this 
fragmentation, despite being more public in a way and contradicting the notion of an 
equal post-apartheid city. Also these spaces show parallels with the apartheid city. 
While arguments about private enclaves such as gated communities blithely refer to 
the theme of exclusion on a small scale level, privately governed public spaces 
perpetuate the apartheid city to an even larger extent as they do not just exclude 
people from private space, but try to sort people in public spaces according to status, 
race, and class. Although many, including myself, contribute to the researched urban 
renewal efforts and are able to use public space, possibly again due to the racist 
apartheid order, this development is seen as problematic and as a threat to freedom 
and democracy. In short, this thesis suggests that social problems should not be 
addressed through the means of security and policing. The research showed that the 
benefits some gain from private governance of security in the revanchist city are 
gained at the cost of other, weaker groups in society, which is something that needs 
to be emphasised and ultimately criticised.        
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10.3 Limits of the research and possible future research 
During the research, three interesting themes emerged which could not be explored 
within the scope of this thesis. A fourth issue, which is discussed below, is more an 
outline of possible future projects departing from the thesis and combining the aspect 
of alternative policing as a subject with observation as the key method (Section 5.3.2, 
Vignette 7.1, and Vignette 8.1) that is promising and well worth exploring.  
First: The thesis studied the daytime security. At night all policing schemes change; 
space is re-negotiated between policing officers and the urban poor; under the 
shadow of darkness criminals come back into the case study sites and the consuming 
part of the population conglomerates on the small strips where the bars and pubs are 
located. The private policing agents gather there as well, making sure no one gets 
harmed, leaving the dark surrounding streets unprotected. Having stayed on the 
slopes of the Table Mountain during my first research trip, I could literally see these 
bright busy ‗party‘ enclaves lightening up the night sky while the rest of the City 
Bowl laid in darkness. Studying these night-time policing setups would greatly 
complement the thesis and provide further interesting insights into the private 
policing schemes.    
Second: Although the thesis was committed to grounded ethnographical research, 
security/policing officers are analysed in an abstract and impersonal way. They are 
seen as an institution with a function rather than as individuals. It would be 
interesting to break with this and to see the individual guard who is juggling between 
two very different worlds, an urban renewal designated revanchist inner city he, and 
only very rarely she, secures versus most the township space he is most likely to live 
in. Theoretically, such a study could be approached from a Marxist perspective in 
terms of ideas about the reserve labour force. Being able to fall back on the vast 
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number of unemployed urban poor from the townships, which were built during 
volkscapitalimse (O'Meara, 1983) and the later ongoing capitalist project (Davies et 
al. 1985), responsible communities, in Rose‘s (1996a) and Garland‘s (2009) sense, 
can maintain a cheap, but sufficiently large private police force to create and 
maintain space, as described above. In return this means that the guard on the ground 
is in the schizophrenic situation of defending a space against the community he is, 
figuratively speaking, part of. Several conversations with individual security guards 
have shown that this job is often their last resort. As the pay is low and the risk high, 
many South Africans refuse to work in the security industry. In return, immigrants 
from countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe or Mozambique, see no choice other 
than to take such jobs. This takes place against a background of increasing 
xenophobia in South African townships, which fuels existing animosity within the 
officer‘s neighbourhood, leaving the guards marginalised within their home 
community. This creates a difficult situation for some private policing personnel, 
which is a situation that deserves academic scrutiny.        
Third: A theme that came up occasionally, especially in the context of residential 
security, is the impact and role of the insurance industry. Within the scope of the 
thesis it was not possible to answer this question or to follow it up. The strict 
requirements of the insurance industry are strongly linked to the shaping of the built 
environment and are a driving force behind a number of walls and gates, as well as 
guards. In contrast to the common perception, individuals might not necessarily be as 
afraid of crime as is often assumed. Visible and invisible security measures can often 
be the product of the preconditions of the insurer, as the insured would otherwise not 
be covered by the policy.  
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The insurance industry has also introduced standards on alarm systems, response 
times, etc. Section 7.5 demonstrated that an effective regulatory regime for the 
private security/policing industry does not exist; this might have to be reconsidered 
in light of the regulations of the insurance industry. Only insurance industry-
accredited companies are accepted by the insurers. Since the private security industry 
is a highly competitive market, an armed response company cannot afford not to be 
accredited. This makes the insurance industry a sort of guarantee or quality assurance 
body, which is an issue that is widely neglected in the literature.  
Fourth: The thesis has successfully combined ethnographical observations with the 
study of alternative policing regimes. Since observations as a method and alternative 
policing regimes as a theme are both still under-researched, this combination 
presents itself for future studies. Here the context of countries in transformation are 
interesting places to conduct such a study with regard to the combination of a lack of 
state policing/control/legitimacy, often a high crime rate, and a history of violence. 
Staying with the example of Cape Town, a study of the less formal vigilante 
township policing would complement this thesis, which focused on formal, state-
sanctioned forms of alternative policing regimes. Inhabitants of the impoverished 
areas of the same city do not have the financial means to hire the services of private 
policing companies. Often in such spaces a variety of alternative policing agencies 
operate that are based on self-organised community structures and are established as 
a response to flourishing gangsterism and crime. These alternative policing setups in 
reality govern the lives of approximately a million people every day and exercise 
social control through an unofficial mandate given to them by the community, almost 
unnoticed by the academic world. Other spaces that come to mind include Cambodia, 
with a now more advanced transition or post-transition (Springer, 2009), or northern 
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Iraq, which is controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government and is currently in 
the process of transformation. 
Another interesting approach to utilising a theme and method would be to follow one 
international company to different spaces and cases around the world. The most 
interesting would be G4S, which is not only the largest security company worldwide, 
but, with 625,000 employees, is also the world‘s second largest private-sector 
employer (G4S, 2011; The American Prospect, 2009). Following G4S to different 
case study sites could be an interesting case study that would reveal the power and 
dominance of just one non-state actor over people, and often vital institutions and 
infrastructure. 
 
10.4 Relevance of the research on private policing companies 
This leaves the final question on the assessment of the researched policing 
companies and if they really matter, as well as their relevance for the scholarly 
world. So, if they did not exist, could the police still do their job? The South African 
police has proved over decades that it is very capable of segregating and excluding 
the larger proportion of the citizenry successfully. However, in a democratic nation 
such policing strategies are impossible. No police force could dispatch comparatively 
high numbers to elitist territories while leaving other areas dramatically under-
policed, or contain citizens in deprived areas, as was common practice under 
apartheid. In these terms, it can be argued that the researched governance schemes 
are only realistic when utilising private forms of policing, such as the ones 
researched here.     
Taking this into account, the governance situation would presumably be different and 
a reclaiming of space might not happen as is currently the case. In fact, the situation 
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could possibly be even worse, with a continuing decrease in public space to a degree 
where Landman‘s (2000) scenario, as outlined in Section 6.1, might become true. Is 
this development, therefore, being assessed as positive? No, it is not. The research 
has shown how the city‘s vast class differences and the problems arising from 
poverty are being securitised instead of solved. Social problems are being addressed 
through sophisticated policing machinery, sanctioned at the highest levels. However, 
it appears that the better it works the more it is being applied. In other words the 
problems are being moved out of sight, displacing them from the city‘s centre while 
leaving riot squads of state police to deal with the displeasure of and the protests by 
the poor, which occur on a regular basis in the townships (Samara, 2010b). 
However, before entering the field of guesswork at the end of a grounded study, it 
should be said that a clear answer cannot be given. As long as private governance 
actors have this liberty, this kind of politics and policing will continue and 
presumably advance. This raises the question: what will ultimately happen if the 
actual problems are not being addressed? Might the country ultimately implode? In 
the meantime, private governance nodes such as the ones described above form 
spaces in their own interest and become so powerful that the state has to withdraw its 
forces, leaving key spaces increasingly under the sole control of these private groups. 
Although the state is aware of this development it is actively supporting it by 
following an agenda of neoliberal politics and pacifying the taxpaying financial elite 
at the cost of democratic ideals. However, if the extent of these powers develop to a 
point of no return, it raises the question of whether this situation can still be called 
democratic, and whether it is neoliberal policies and responsibilisation or not. Private 
police subject to limited oversight functions should not be mistaken for so-called 
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force multipliers, but they are part of an increasingly anti-democratic process in 
which parallel public spaces are being created within the realm of the state. 
In terms of its contribution to the literature or its interest to scholars beyond the 
immediate case studies, this thesis caters for different interest groups: scholars 
interested in criminology, policing, and the nature of social control; academics 
researching the revanchist city and urban renewal in the global North, including the 
transfer of these ideas; and scholars interested in inequalities in cities of the global 
South.  
Contribution towards criminological thoughts: Most of the points concerning this 
aspect have been made in the course of the thesis. The key point is the research on 
the private security industry and its evolution under considerations of space, 
something that is still heavily under-researched. This applies in a very similar way to 
the combination of social control and social development. Although Cohen (2001 
[1985]) first published his thoughts on this in the mid-1980s, it has not been picked 
up in policing studies. However, as the thesis showed, a connection between social 
development and policing does exist and has an impact on life in an urban space. 
Therefore, it should be acknowledged or considered when researching policing and 
social control. While it does not claim to have conclusive answers to these questions, 
this thesis does intend to raise some thought provoking questions.  
Relevance for research on the revanchist city: The different researched sites are part 
of urban renewal strategies and policies that do not belong uniquely to Cape Town. 
Robinson (2011: 15) argued that they are ‗more or less ubiquitous‘ around the globe. 
However, the local characteristics and forms of these global phenomena are distinct. 
The different regeneration models and forms of urban revanchism keep changing, so 
discussions in one place are of interest to researchers working in very different 
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spaces, regardless of whether they are in the global North or South (McCann and 
Ward, 2011; Ward, 2011; Robinson, 2011). In aprticular, the idea of Improvement 
Districts and policing strategies are being transferred around the world and adapted 
to local situations. 
The global diffusion of the Business Improvement District programme since 
the mid 1990s has involved a number of transfer agents. As it has been 
moved around the globe from one place to another, so it has been subject to a 
number of changes in its institutional DNA. As it has been territorialised – 
embedded in particular socio-spatial relations – so certain elements of the 
programme have been emphasised, while others have been downplayed 
(McCann and Ward, 2010: 178). 
While the general mobility of urbanism has been established, it is its local 
modifications and adaptations that make the issue interesting. In Cape Town, the 
local specifics that influence these modifications of the international models and 
policies are the high crime rates, inequalities, and the lack of policing. Consequently, 
this causes these mobile models not only to emphasise security but also to advance it 
in innovative ways.     
In the case of the thesis, the common ‗ubiquitous‘ standard forms of policies and 
practices are private governments and BIDs/CIDs, by-laws and forms of residential 
security, all of which have been outlined in the review in Chapters 2-4. The empirical 
chapters then focus on the specific innovations and modifications to those core 
structures. New developments that have been identified are the private policing 
companies, the ‗soft side of policing‘, advanced sophisticated residential policing 
schemes, and a community court outfit that supports private governments in their 
revanchist efforts.    
After the core idea had found its way to Cape Town it underwent significant changes 
in ‗its institutional DNA‘ (McCann and Ward, 2010). These changes will now be of 
interest for other cities from both the North and South where they will again be 
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modified to make them fit the specific place. Having been on the demand side 
before, Cape Town‘s governance actors might now be supplying their ideas and 
introducing them on various platforms, such as urban renewal associations, planning 
conferences and expert visits (Ward, 2011).  
However, while these revanchist ideas circulate between spaces, so should critical 
thought. In this sense, new developments in one space are of interest for researchers 
working on the issue in other spaces where ideas of urban renewal are being applied. 
Therefore, research on specific changes is of interest for a wider audience working 
on urban revanchism, governance and policing, regardless of whether they are in the 
global North or South, referring to Robinson‘s (2008) ordinary cities.        
Relevance for research on urban transformation in the global South: While the 
North-South, rich-poor divide is less relevant from the urban revanchist perspective, 
this is somehow different from the perspective of inequality in southern cities and 
weak or failing cities. Cape Town, like other cities in the global South, is struggling 
with combining urban growth and participating in inner urban competition alongside 
the need for reducing poverty at the same time. Using the example of Johannesburg, 
which is seen as an example for many cities in the global South, Parnell and 
Robinson (2006) and Beall et al. (2000) argued that there was no ready solution for 
this dilemma. Therefore, innovative security and renewal schemes, whether for good 
or bad, are of interest for scholars researching similar urban spaces as there might be 
interesting ideas arising, or problematic schemes may emerge that should be watched 
critically as they can be transferred from city to city. Although the thesis did not 
directly study inequalities between the wealthy and the township spaces, it did 
identify recent changes to public space as being highly unequal. Although the 
apartheid city was segregated to extreme levels, the colonial city was generally 
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characterised by cultural segregation (Christopher, 1992). The theme of the unlawful 
body in parallel, ‗extraterritorial‘ spaces (Coutin, 2010) therefore appears to be 
relevant for research into many poor post-colonial cities. 
 
10.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
While this research analysed the spaces of security governance, this chapter has 
attempted to discuss the researched spaces in the context of wider urban changes. 
Although it has been strongly argued that they are not private spaces for all sorts of 
reasons, it has been acknowledged that the researched spaces are also significantly 
different from the surrounding public spaces as well. 
A possible answer to this question has been found by drawing on the history of 
public space in South Africa. It has been argued that the country has a tradition of 
parallel existing public spaces, each characterised by its own set of social norms and 
values. In terms of consequences for space and society, the research has shown there 
is a continuum of dysfunctional space. Particular ideas of space are being applied to 
distinguish and conceptualise them from their immediate surroundings. Again, the 
emphasis is on the prevailing norms in the different spaces.  
However, this does not necessary mean that the public-ness of space is suppressed by 
the presence of private policing actors; in fact they can foster it. The post-apartheid 
city has shown that completely open public space used to be highly exclusionary for 
the majority of the people (Chapter 6); only after private bodies took over the 
governance and security of the space did people start to use it. However, instead of 
seeing this as advocating this kind of space, it should rather be interpreted as a 
logical consequence of a society and speciality that has failed. It should be read as an 
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argument that Cape Town is a city, possibly like most other contemporary cities, that 
has no society and therefore no solidarity. 
This also means that these spaces are not only areas that are privately policed, but 
represent a much more complex cartography that shows space, next to the many 
gated enclaves, which is only usable for the public that can afford a cappuccino 
(Atkinson, 2003) whilst reading the Cape Times and enjoying public life and bustling 
streets again, even if it is at the cost of others. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Examples for interview schedules 
Interview schedule: Private Security Companies 
Services 
How does a regular working day of a security officer look like? 
What services do they offer? 
What are the most requested services? 
How do I have to understand this service? 
- What does it exactly entail? 
- What are they exactly doing? 
- What are the legal limitations? 
Do they work only for private clients or the state or the city as well? 
How dangerous is the job? 
- How do they protect themselves? 
Space 
What kind of space do they secure/police? 
- Is the difference between public and private space always clear? 
- is there an intermingling between public and private?  
Do they work or collaborate with the police? 
- If they secure a particular space, does the police still come there as well or do they 
focus on other spaces if they know that a security firm is already there? 
What is the difference to the police? 
- is the city‘s space divided between you and the police? 
What is the difference between the provision of security and policing? 
Are they providing security or are you policing? 
- Is the answer he gave his opinion or what he is obliged to say? 
What would you say is your role in for Cape Town‘s security? 
- How important are security companies for the urban changes? 
Where will this development go to in the future? 
Governance 
Who is usually paying you? 
Who is telling you what to do secure/police? 
Can the client decide how you have to secure/police the space? 
- Can it happen that there is a conflict between the wishes of the client and your legal 
restrictions?  
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What if the clients` needs conflict with the law? 
- What is for example with the case of semi-legal road closures? 
Who is evaluating your service? 
 
Interview Schedule: CID Security  
Why was the CID introduced in respect to security? 
Public-private partnership that secures the downtown area with a private company, 
what was the reason for this? 
What is the role of the City Council/the City of Cape Town in the city? 
Why is a privatization of these functions necessary? 
- Core functions of the state are privatized.  
- Is this kind of public-private partnership necessary or a political will or decision? 
- Is this an act of responsibilisation? 
Policing 
What is the CIDs security job? 
What changes have occurred in the policing network? 
- What are the new actors in this network? 
What is the relation between SAPS and private security of the CID?  
- How does a division of labour look like? 
- What rights does the CID have? 
What is the difference between SAPS and private security? 
What is the difference between policing and security? 
Do the shopkeepers contribute to the CID and therefore have less own security in 
front of their shops? 
- This system has strong parallels to the police as it is a core state function. 
Why is there such a demand for this kind of security? 
Space 
What area is policed by the CID? 
How has the character of space changed in the last decade? 
- How does the city council assess the increasing privatization? 
- Can the privatization be controlled? 
Example of glue sniffing kids seven years ago. What is the objective of this kind of 
policing? 
- Does the security of tourists include the exclusion of street-kids, homeless? 
Where do they think does this development go to in the future? 
Do they see problems as well if public space is privately policed?  
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Do they think that the slogan ―A city that works for you‖ really portrays the actual 
situation? 
 
Interview schedule: City Council 
Policing  
What changes have occurred in the policing network? 
- What are the new actors in this network? 
How does the city of Cape Town assess this development? 
Do they use private security? 
What is the relation between SAPS and private security? 
- What would the council like the relation to be? 
What is the difference between SAPS and private security? 
What is the difference between policing and security? 
Space 
How has the character of space changed in the last decade? 
- How does the city council assess the increasing privatisation? 
- Can the privatisation be controlled? 
In what spaces does the city of Cape Town use private security? 
- Do they use them on property that is owned by the council? 
- Do they use them in public space? 
Where do they think does this development go to in the future? 
Governance/Legislation  
Does the council assess the existing regulation of private security as sufficient? 
What could be optimised? 
 
Interview schedule: Metro Police  
How does the police assess the increase of private security companies operating 
especially in the public space?  
- What are the advantages? 
- What are the problems? 
- Are there no hard feelings when private companies start doing the same job? 
Where do they see the reason for this development? 
- Is there a lack of trust in the police? 
- Is the police overstretched? 
- Who do the people call first in a case of an emergency? 
- Are the different objectives of private companies a problem? 
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- Could the same service not be done by the police? 
Do they see an increasing fragmentation? 
- What do they think of urban enclaves? 
- What is the role of private security companies in this fragmentation process? 
What is the relationship between the SAPS and other actors? 
- Is there a division of labour? 
- What if the SAPS knows that a particular space is privately secured, do they still 
patrol there to the same extent? 
Public vs. private space 
- To what extent can they police private space? 
- Is there an intermingling of different spaces? 
- Is it always clear if a space is public or private? 
What is the reason for the high crime rate? 
Do they agree that the term poling is used correctly in the context of private security? 
- What is the difference to security? 
Where do they think will the development go in the future? 
- What about the crime rate? 
- What about the growing number of private security? 
How has the policing network changed during the last decade? 
- What are the new actors in the network? 
- What are all of the actors? 
How has Cape Town (the urban space) changed in the last decade? 
- Is there an increasing privatization of space? 
How does the police deal with this new situation? 
- Does it make the policing easier? 
Do they divide urban space between different policing actors? 
Do they see a problem in the fact that PSCs are privately governed and therefor have 
different objectives e.g. policing only for clients? 
- Does it matter if there are different objectives? 
Do they have control over PSCs? 
How is the police governed? Who is deciding what your aims and objectives are? 
Is a security company always the same for them?  
- Are there differences in quality and trust? 
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Interview schedule: Armed response companies  
Services 
How does a regular working day of a security officer look like? 
What services do they offer? 
How do I have to understand this service? 
- What does it exactly entail? 
- What are they exactly doing? 
- What are the legal limitations? 
Do they work only for private clients or the state or the city as well? 
How dangerous is the job? How do they protect themselves? 
Space 
What kind of space do they secure/police? 
- Is the difference between public and private space always clear? 
- is there an intermingling between public and private?  
Do they work or collaborate with the police? 
- If they secure a particular space, does the police still come there as well or do they 
focus on other spaces if they know that a security firm is already there? 
What is the difference to the police? 
- is the city‘s space divided between you and the police? 
What is the difference between the provision of security and policing? 
Are they providing security or are you policing? 
- Is the answer he gave his opinion or what he is obliged to say? 
What would you say is your role in for Cape Town‘s security? 
- How important are security companies for the urban changes? 
Where will this development go to in the future? 
Governance 
Who is usually paying you? 
Who is telling you what to do secure/police? 
Can the client decide how you have to secure/police the space? 
- Can it happen that there is a conflict between the wishes of the client and your legal 
restrictions?  
What if the clients` needs conflict with the law? 
- What is for example with the case of semi-legal road closures? 
Who is evaluating your service? 
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Interview Schedule: Social Development Actor  
What is the role of the City Council/the City of Cape Town in the city? 
- Why is the city not doing this job? 
Why is a privatization of these functions necessary? 
- Core functions of the state are privatized. Safety and security, quality urban 
management (cleaning), social development, competing for investments. 
- Is this kind of public-private partnership necessary or a political will or decision? 
Is the goal to run the city like a company? 
Social Aspect 
On the services offered by the CIDs? Safety and security is clear. Quality urban 
management or cleaning makes sense. Why social development?  
What is social development? 
In own words, what does the social work of the CID entail? 
What is the motivation behind this program? 
- Responsibility of the civil society 
- To attract investments homeless and street kids need to be off the street 
What is the role of NGOs in this social network? 
What do the programs look like? How do I have to imagine them? 
How do the reintegration programs for homeless without jobs look like? 
Are they sponsored by companies? 
- I remember having seen something like this on the back of their vests. 
What is the role of private security companies in the shelters etc. 
- What is their objective? 
Is the slogan ―a city that works for you‖ correct? 
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Appendix B: Risk assessment form  
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Appendix C: Information for participants and consent form 
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Appendix D: Crime statistics from the South African Police Service 
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Appendix E: 'Observation: USS New York' 
Observation 
THE USS NEW YORK 
 
Till F. Paasche 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
University of Plymouth 
PL4 8AA, Plymouth 
United Kingdom 
E-mail address: till.paasche@plymouth.ac.uk 
Fax: +44 (0)1752 233054 
 
 
Veit Bachmann 
Institut für Humangeograpie 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
Robert-Mayer-Str. 6-10, 60325 Frankfurt 
Germany 
Email address: veitb@uni-frankfurt.de 
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The USS New York 
The USS NEW YORK (LPD 21) (…) was commissioned in New York City 
on Nov. 7, 2009. At approximately 8:00 a.m., on November 2, the USS NEW 
YORK came to a standstill across from the World Trade Center site, dipped 
her flag, and delivered a 21-gun salute. Members of the Fire Department of 
New York, the New York Police Department, Port Authority Police, members 
of the families of 9/11 victims and veterans gathered on the shore at the North 
Cove in the World Financial Center to return the salute. (USS New York LPD 
21, 2009a) 
The USS New York will soon be defending freedom and combating terrorism 
around the globe, while also ensuring that the world never forgets the evil 
attacks of Sept. 11 (…) (New York Gov. George Pataki quoted in USS New 
York LPD 21, 2009b)  
  
The following is about a ship, more precisely a war-ship, the USS New York (see 
figure 1). We claim that the USS New York is being used to popularise an ideology 
(Chomsky, 2001) that exploits the tragedies of the terror attacks for advancing a 
militaristic agenda. However, although the ship is a good example for this militarised 
discourse, we see it in a line of events and reports that communicate what Gregory 
(2004) has called the colonial present
159
. It is therefore that the USS New York is not 
only an extraordinary example as it might first appear, but that through a constant 
reproduction of the discourse, of which the USS New York is part, we now face what 
James Sidaway (2001, 2003, 2008) has termed banal geopolitics:  
War and a plethora of new strategies, military technologies and security 
procedures have become everyday and ordinary. War is more or less taken for 
granted as the norm, fed (especially in the United States) by a daily media 
coverage about ―terrorism‖. (Sidaway, 2008, p. 2) 
Drawing on Sidaway‘s work, Merje Kuus describes processes of banal militarisation 
and banal imperialism in her work on NATO‘s eastern enlargement (Kuus, 2007, 
                                                 
159
 By ‗colonial present‘ Gregory (2004) describes a situation where Washington, London, and Tel 
Aviv position the ―West‖ as the victimised target of terror attacks to emphasise our (the West‘s) 
difference to them (the terrorists in the former colonies). Having established this difference, military 
actions, occupations, or a continuing colonial present/presence on their territory is then legitimised as 
part of the wider ‗war on terror‘.  
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2008). Describing the processes of imperial subject-making in Central Europe (i.e. 
only through subscribing to NATO‘s agenda do Central European states become 
recognised and accepted ―Western‖ states), Kuus (2007, p. 269) illuminates ―the 
practices through which military force and military solutions are associated with 
moral good. These practices are central to the militarization of social life today‖. The 
processes of militarisation lead, according to Kuus (2007), to the production of a 
―normative space of imperial right‖ through which an imperial agenda is sought to be 
morally legitimated and advanced. In this context, Kuus (2008, p. 627) argues 
elsewhere that the  
practices of civic militarization are essential for global empire-building. They 
habituate electorates to the business of the military-industrial complexes and 
thereby make these complexes appear natural components of world affairs. In 
so doing, they erode the distinction between wartime and peacetime and 
legitimize the global state of imperial war.  
Fundamental to both Sidaway‘s and Kuus‘ arguments (see, in this context, also 
Gregory and Pred, 2007; in particular the contribution on banal terrorism by Cindi 
Katz, 2007) is an alarming reminder of the growing (and constructed) normalcy of 
various forms of militarism. In this intervention we use the extraordinary example of 
the USS New York, to remind us as well as the reader to raise awareness to this, by 
now, ordinary or mundane politics. Precisely because we see it every day, this 
intervention highlights the importance of critical reflection upon such mundane 
practices of the demonstration not only of military force but also the militarisation in 
everyday life. Through such practices, militarisation often turns into what Cynthia 
Enloe (2000, p. 3) describes as a ‗pervasive process‘ that is so ―hard to uproot, 
precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life threatening‖ and 
therefore runs danger of being forgotten or becoming ‗banal‘ (Kuus, 2007, 2008; 
Sidaway, 2001, 2003, 2008).   
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Figure 1: The USS New York 
 
Source: USS New York LPD 21. 2009a. 
The USS New York is dedicated to the victims of the terror attacks of 11 September 
2001, made from the steel of the World Trade Center (although more symbolically as 
only 7.5 tons were actually used for the bow, which is about a thousandth of the 
actual weight), and built near New Orleans by workers who survived hurricane 
Katharina. The USS New York relates directly to two of the biggest catastrophes on 
US American soil and demonstrates the world that their nation arises from it even 
stronger. The USS New York epitomises resurgence of the United States of America 
after humiliation through terror as well as a natural and (partially self-inflicted) 
social catastrophe. It embodies dominance and strength. It rose phoenix-like from the 
ashes of New York, destined to hunt the ones responsible for the 9/11 attacks but 
also overplays the direct aftermath of hurricane Katharina when the state‘s failure in 
dealing with a natural disaster, that ultimately also unveiled a social disaster with 
military strength (Katz, 2008). To continue with Katz‘s thoughts, here the terror, 
including natural disasters, is being mobilised to ―solidify a porous nation‖ within, as 
well as to justify the geopolitical agenda outside the homeland (Katz, 2007, p. 355). 
As the retired governor George Pataki said: ―On September 2001, our nation‘s 
enemies brought their fight to New York (…) The USS New York will now bring the 
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fight to our nation‘s enemies well into the future‖ (Quotes in USS New York LPD 
21, 2009a).  
In terms of post-9/11 ideology, the USS New York is a highly interesting case, not 
least for the kind of ship chosen to play this prominent symbolic role. In general, for 
symbolising issues of dominance and power one might expect such a strong symbol 
to be a big new destroyer. This is, however, not the case; the USS New York has only 
four smaller guns for its self defence. It is an ―amphibious transport dock of the San 
Antonio class‖ (USS New York LPD 21, 2009b), a troop carrier for amphibious 
landing operations (see figure 1). The choice of ascribing such symbolism to this 
kind of ship indicates a shift in the nature of sable-rattling away from the 
demonstration of brute firepower to more flexible intervention capabilities. 
Clausewitz‘s army-against-army wars appear outdated (Kaldor, 2007, Ò Tuathail, 
2000), whilst at the same time the challenges of so called asymmetrical warfare 
against criminal organisation, insurgents and different terrorist groups loom large. 
Destroyers are of limited value to this kind of conflict. Instead, highly trained mobile 
commando units, such as the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) based onboard the 
USS New York, become of increasing importance. The crew of the ship are only 360 
sailors but additional 800 marines from the ‗Special Purpose Marine Air Ground 
Task Force 26‘ that are stationed on board with their associated gear including heavy 
Abrams combat tanks, helicopters, and landing crafts. As they advertise themselves, 
MEUs are flexible multi-purpose units that are supposed to be able to react to all 
challenges this century might offer (Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 
26, 2009). In other words, the USS New York is US America‘s answer to future 
challenges. It is a way to reassert the US‘ ability of global power projection.   
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However, examining the underlying ideology of war campaigns, there is more to the 
ship than just its well chosen type. The website of the USS New York (yes, the ship 
has its own website: www.ussnewyork.com) opens with the line: ―Out of the ashes of 
911 comes a ship forged from the steel of the World Trade Center‖. The website has 
a strong focus on the victims of the terror attacks using songs, videos, speeches, and 
poems. Figure 2 shows the kind of mood and atmosphere that is being evoked; the 
United State‘s heraldic animal, the bald eagle, is crying over the burning twin towers 
(USS New York LPD 21, 2009c). More evident is a certain theme of revenge when 
reflecting on the motto of the ship ‗never forget‘. Everyone who has lost a loved 
person knows the idea of never forgetting. Never forget what a great person he or she 
was; never forget the happy times we had. Onboard a warship that epitomizes an 
ideology which creates a dichotomy between our victims and the ones who are 
responsible for it and who attacked us on ‗our own‘ (Western) soil.  
Figure 2: The crying eagle 
 
Source USS New York LPD 21. 2009c 
New York and New Orleans: two cities representing the ―free America‖ (Wall Street, 
the Broadway, the ‗Big Apple‘ and the French Quarter, Mardi Gras, leisure culture 
respectively) had come under attack as sites of US vulnerability and failure, but are 
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thus being morphed again into symbols of strength and power. Furthermore, these 
tragedies are used to justify the use of force and to attain public support by inducing 
emotional heroism and patriotism; always remember our victims. The event was not 
only covered in a vast media campaign, involving all major US news stations. There 
are also some 300 videos when searching for USS New York on YouTube. The USS 
New York also has its own Facebook site displaying numerous enthusiastic 
comments. Together with other examples such as the ego-shooter computer game 
‗America‘s Army‘ – developed, constantly updated and offered for free download by 
the US military (CNN Money, 2002) – or an own department that liaises with 
Hollywood to represent the armed forces in their interest (The Guardian, 2009), the 
USS New York communicates a ideology that is highly likely to continue well into 
the future. Therefore it is not only the United States‘ army that has adjusted to the 
21
st
 century warfare; it is a widely produced ideology in ―a time of crisis‖ and a trial 
―to mobilize the population for the same course‖ (Chomsky, 2001) that seek to 
justify US/western imperial presence (Gregory, 2004).  
In such critical terms the ship has received very little attention amongst academics, 
political commentators and in the wider public. Does this suggest that the case of the 
USS New York is not the extraordinary event as which it has been described above. 
Contrarily, we argue that it is another (although remarkable) example for what has 
been termed ‗banal geopolitics‘ (Sidaway, 2008) or in this case better ‗banal 
imperialism‘ (Kuus, 2008). Rather than qualifying Gregory‘s and Chomsky‘s 
arguments, it builds on and emphasises them. The ship and the ideology it represents 
simply appear mundane, showing how advanced the ‗colonial presence‘ has become. 
Through a constant reproduction of the discourse it developed into an omnipresent 
companion, at least in the Western news-landscape, to a stage of its banality.  
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In countries such as the US, the UK or Germany pictures of soldiers (such as the 
mentioned MEUs) in combat, possibly departing from ships like the USS New York, 
kicking in doors in dusty cities or the greenish blurry videos of ‗smart‘ bombs hitting 
their targets have ceased to be horrifying or shocking. They became a daily routine of 
news coverage - on the ‗war on terror‘, the ‗war on drugs‘ and all the other wars that 
are supposedly being fought at the moment and thus serve to popularise a respective 
agenda.  
In 2001, Chomsky pointed to a silent process of mobilising the population for the 
‗same course‘. In 2011, we are beyond that stage. We have become ‗mobilised‘ to an 
extent where we accept the necessity of combat and war – routinised through daily 
visualisation – as a component of our globalised lives. In fact, the banality of the 
‗colonial present‘ reached a stage at which the ―normative space of imperial right‖ 
(Kuus, 2007) becomes the plot for our entertainment on rainy weekends when we 
watch movies such as ‗The Hurt Locker‘ or ‗Green Zone‘ with a supersize container 
of popcorn. Because we face this banal imperialism, as critical geographers as well 
as citizens, we need to get the banality out of this kind of geopolitics and all the 
(constructed) wars currently being fought. Although these ideas are not new, we 
argue that we must remind ourselves of this ―civic militarisation‖ (Kuus, 2008) and 
use our privileged position as academics to question these practices (Chomsky, 
1967/2011) and offer (freely accessible) thoughts of awareness. We hope that this 
observation will form part of this process.  
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